Sequential cross-border mergers

• Tipo: Artigo em Revista Científica Internacional
• Data: 2009

Autores

Eileen Fumagalli (Autor) Outra; Helder Vasconcelos (Autor) FEP

Revista

Título: International Journal of Industrial Organization

Vol. 27

Páginas: 175-187

ISSN: 0167-7187

Editora: Elsevier

Indexação

ISI Web of Knowledge - 19 Citações

ISI Web of Science

Scopus - 20 Citações

Econlit

Classificação Científica

FOS: Ciências sociais > Economia e gestão

Outras Informações

ID Authenticus: P-003-MV3

DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2008.06.002

Abstract (EN): This paper proposes a sequential merger formation game to study how trade policy can influence firms' choice between intra-national and cross-border mergers in an international Cournot oligopoly with a cost structure a la Perry and Porter [Perry, M. and Porter, R.H., 1985. Oligopoly and the Incentive for Horizontal Merger. American Economic Review 75(1), 219-227]. We find that the equilibrium market structure depends heavily on: (i) the level of trade costs: and (ii) whether or not active antitrust authorities are incorporated within the sequential merger game. In addition, it is shown that whenever mergers occur in equilibrium, they occur in waves and the merger wave comprises at least one cross-border merger.

Idioma: Inglês

Tipo (Avaliação Docente): Científica

Nº de páginas: 13