

University of Porto

Faculty of Psychology and Educational Sciences

**“YOUR PAST COUNTS”: PERCEIVED (IL)LEGITIMACY AS A CRITERION
FOR REACTING TO DEVIANCE**

André Filipe Gonçalves Marques

June, 2014

Dissertation presented for the Integrated Master's in Psychology,
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Presidente: Doutora Luísa Faria

Arguente: Doutor Diniz Marques Francisco Lopes
(ISCTE)

Orientador/a: Doutora Isabel Maria Pinto

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Resumo

A Teoria da Dinâmica de Grupos Subjetiva (TDGS, e.g. Pinto, Marques, Levine & Abrams, 2010) sugere que os membros desviantes ameaçam os padrões normativos do seu grupo, e que a identidade positiva do grupo só pode ser restaurada através de reações negativas extremas dirigidas a esses desviantes. No entanto, o modelo de Crédito de transgressão (TC, Abrams, Randsley de Moura, & Travaglino, 2013; Randsley de Moura & Abrams, 2013) declara que tais reações negativas não se aplicam a líder desviantes do endogrupo, dado que os outros membros atribuem licença para desviar. Numa experiência ($N = 75$), prevemos e encontramos que o crédito de transgressão foi concedido apenas a líder que eram legítimos aos olhos dos participantes. Adicionalmente, encontramos que este efeito era ainda maior em situações, em que os mecanismos de controlo social formais eram ausentes. Em contraste, os participantes concordaram mais com ações de punição formal e ação coletiva punitiva em direção ao líder ilegítimo. Interessantemente, a ausência de mecanismos de controlo social formais predisseram a ação coletiva punitiva em direção ao líder desviante legítimo.

(176 palavras)

PALAVRAS-CHAVE: LEGITIMIDADE DE LÍDERES; DINÂMICA DE GRUPOS SUBJETIVA; CONTROLO SOCIAL (IN)FORMAL; CRÉDITO DE TRANSGRESSÃO; REAÇÃO AO DESVIO.

Abstract

Subjective group dynamics theory (SGDT, e.g., I. R. Pinto, J. M. Marques, J. M. Levine & D. Abrams, 2010) suggests that deviant members threaten their group's normative standards, and that the group's positive identity can only be restored through extreme negative reactions directed to these deviants. However, the transgression credit model (TC, Abrams, Randsley de Moura, & Travaglino, 2013; Randsley de Moura & Abrams, 2013) states that such negative reactions do not apply to deviant ingroup leaders, as other members give them license to deviate. In one experiment (N = 75), we predicted and found that transgression credit was granted only to leaders who were legitimate in participants' eyes. In addition, we also found that this effect was even greater in situations in which the group's formal social control mechanisms were absent. In contrast, participants agreed more with formal punishment and punitive collective action towards the illegitimate leader. Interestingly, the absence of group's formal social control mechanisms predicted punitive collective action towards the illegitimate deviant leader.

(166 words)

KEY WORDS: LEADER'S LEGITIMACY; SUBJECTIVE GROUP DYNAMICS; (IN)FORMAL SOCIAL CONTROL; TRANSGRESSION CREDIT; REACTION TO DEVIANCE.

Conceptual Framework

The on-going Portuguese financial crisis that emerged in 2010 is a major political and socio-economic issue that stands for the most severe economic recession in Portugal since the 1970s. To most Portuguese people, the countries' leaders across the last decades are to blame for this crisis and its effects on the economy and well-being of a large majority of citizens. Doubts are shed not only about the competence of our policy-makers, but also about their credibility and honesty. Just last year, hundreds of thousands of people have taken part in protests across Portugal demanding the government to resign (<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-21643853>, March 2, 2013).

In the present work we propose that motivation to engage in collective action against ingroup leaders may be due, not only to the leaders' deviance itself, but especially to the widespread opinion that these leaders are incompetent, untrustworthy, that they disregard the group's goals, and as such, should not be entitled to lead – i.e., leaders perceived as having no legitimacy to assume such a relevant role within the group. Although we might observe, in daily-life, that groups often punish or even remove their leaders because of their lack of competence, a fair amount of research shows that leaders can also be tolerated or even accepted despite their wrongful behaviour (Transgression Credit, Abrams, Randsley de Moura, & Travaglino, 2013; Randsley de Moura & Abrams, 2013). We think that formal group acceptance of deviant leaders should lead to collective tolerance only when leaders are perceived as assuming legitimately group leadership. On the contrary, when deviant leaders are perceived to be illegitimate, they should be perceived as highly threatening to the group, and, consequently, should evoke extreme negative reactive emotions, and, therefore, motivation to engage in collective action. In this work, we propose an analysis of this process based on social identity theory, subjective group dynamics theory, and the transgression credit model.

The Social Identification Approach

In society, people tend to perceive and position themselves and others as members of groups or social categories with which they may or may not identify, towards which they may share a more or less positive or negative emotional involvement, and in terms of which they may try to achieve some degree of positive value to themselves and others as group members (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). In this vein, social identity theory (Tajfel, 1978;

Tajfel & Turner, 1979) defines social identity as the part of an individual's self-concept that derives from their knowledge that they belong to a social group, together with these group's potential contribution to the value assigned to the self, and the emotional consequences of that value.

Social identity theory (SIT), postulates that people are motivated to hold a positive self-concept. Because the social categories in which people include themselves contribute to a positive or negative value to their self-concept, and because such value can only be established comparatively to other groups, people will develop strategies that allow their group to attain a comparatively superior position relative to other groups (Tajfel, 1978). That is, individuals identify themselves with certain groups (ingroups) and, as a result, are motivated to increase the value of these groups by differentiating them (and, hence, by differentiating themselves as group members) from relevant outgroups in particular contexts of social comparison.

Group norms

Group belongingness and identification with a group also implies knowledge and affiliation of some degree to the specific norms of the group. In social life, norms are important devices that allow individuals to guide their behaviour appropriately, knowing what to expect from others in different social contexts, and to proscribe inappropriate behaviour (Asch, 1951; Sherif, 1936; Brauer & Chaurand, 2010). Norms define social uniformities that emerge as a product of social interaction, and that guide individuals' perceptions and judgments of the physical and social world (Hogg & Turner, 1987).

Subjective group dynamics and reaction to deviance

There is a strong link between compliance with ingroup normative positions and the very definition of the social self. Subjective group dynamics theory (SGDT, e.g., Marques & Páez, 1994; Pinto, Marques, Levine & Abrams, 2010) deals mostly with situations in which individuals face ingroup members who ostensibly violate important norms to the group, thus potentially jeopardizing other members' positive social identity. SGDT postulates that deviance within groups threatens the normative standards of the group, being perceived as contributing negatively to the group's positive value and, consequently, to the social identity of its members. Such a threat to the legitimacy of the ingroup's

superior position relative to other groups, and hence to the self, generates motivation to exert social control over deviant members (Marques, Páez & Abrams, 1998).

SGDT proposes that only through an extreme negative reaction towards deviant ingroup members, individuals are able to show their commitment to the group, the group is able to restore the validity of the violated norm, and, consequently, preserve their positive social identity (Marques & Páez, 1994; Pinto, Marques, Levine & Abrams, 2010). Indeed, research within the SGDT has consistently shown evidence consistent with this idea: it has demonstrated that an extreme rejection of deviant ingroup members (as compared to similar outgroup members) seems to be linked to the violation of those norms that are relevant for the group's attainment of a positive social identity and is a function of individuals' degree of social identification (Branscombe, Wann, & Noel, 1994; Marques & Páez, 1994; Pinto, Marques, Levine, & Abrams, 2010). More specifically, ingroup deviant members are more derogated when the group's positive distinctiveness is uncertain because of the threat that deviant members cause to the validity of the ingroup normative positions (Marques, Abrams, & Serôdio, 2001).

Transgression credit model

In contrast with SGDT, the transgression credit model (TC, Abrams, Randsley de Moura, & Travaglino, 2013; Randsley de Moura & Abrams, 2013) posits that these negative reactions do not apply to transgressive leaders. In comparison to outgroup leaders and to regular ingroup or outgroup members, people are less critical toward ingroup leaders when they transgress a relevant norm (Randsley de Moura & Abrams, 2013). According to this model, it appears that members use a "double standard" in judging ingroup deviant leaders that allows them to turn a "blind eye" to leaders' deviant behaviour and assign these leaders license to deviate. The authors explain this leniency towards transgressive ingroup leaders on basis of members' adherence to a norm of loyalty to the ingroup. According to these authors, punishment towards an ingroup leader may be perceived as an act of disloyalty per se. Indeed, and as Hogg (2001) proposed, leaders have great influence in the group because they are perceived as the most prototypical member. In other words, a prototypical leader is the member that fits the role best (in comparison to other ingroup members). Thus, usually, leaders are accepted by others as source of influence and models of guidance of group behaviour (Hogg, 2001). Because they occupy such a central role and are the best representatives of the ingroup, a negative reaction

towards leaders that misbehave may be perceived as a negative reaction towards the ingroup itself.

Though, we believe that this assumption only makes sense if the leader is really considered as the best representative of the group, being acknowledged by the group to lead them. In this sense, our general proposition for this study is that only a leader that gathers legitimacy among group members can be given credit to transgress group norms, thus, the TC should only apply to deviant leaders acknowledged by the group.

Legitimacy in leadership and idiosyncratic credit

Followers bestow power and status on leaders, whom easily gather consensual prestige among regular group members (Hollander & Julian, 1969; Hogg, 2001). Thus, leadership role is reinforced by the commitment of other members to the group and to their leader. Hollander (2006) defines *legitimacy* as the attribute ascribed to group members that obtain a leader status based on followers' validation and on the interaction they maintain with this member. According to this conception, a leader needs the group's acknowledgment and validation of his/her leader status to be perceived as legitimate (Hollander, 2006, 2009). Julian, Hollander and Regula (1969) propose some attributes that contribute to such acknowledgment, such as perceived leader's competence and leader's task success (see also, Hogg, Hains, & Mason, 1998).

According to the idiosyncrasy credit model (IC, e.g. Hollander, 1958, 2006, 2009) leaders obtain credit through behaviour benefiting the group that captivate positive perceptions among other group members. On the contrary, when the leader loses all previously awarded credits ascribed by the group, thus reaching a balance of zero, group members begin to engage in pressure strategies to remove him/ her from this status or even from the group (Hollander, 1958). Thus, legitimacy and credit bolster one another (Hollander, 2006, Hollander & Julian, 1970). Therefore, a leader's legitimacy should reflect the credit that allows him/ her to deviate.

Collective action and emotional climate

SGDT has being focused on reaction to deviance as a strategic response implemented by individuals aimed to restore the violated norm, and consequently, the positive value of their social identity. Nevertheless, in some circumstances, group members may unite to deal with the deviant member, but collectively.

Collective actions are not only about rare revolutions, but also about everyday activism (van Zomeren, 2013). Collective action is considered as any action that individuals undertake as group members rather than individuals, thus implying some level of group identification (De Weerd & Klandermans, 1999; Van Stekelenburg & Klandermans, 2013). Indeed, in support of this reasoning, a great amount of research shows that high identifiers engage more in collective action (e.g. protest or petition) in defence of their group than low identifiers (e.g. De Weerd & Klandermans, 1999; Klandermans, Sabucedo, Rodriguez & de Weerd, 2002; van Zomeren, 2013), especially when the group is threatened or is at disadvantage (Reicher, 1996; van Zomeren, Spears, & Leach, 2008).

Along with collective actions, emotions also contribute to a dynamic system of meaning that shapes ongoing commitment to a cause (Thomas, McGarty, & Mavor, 2009). Van Stekelenburg and Klandermans (2007) refer to emotions (such as anger) as *accelerators* or *amplifiers* of group protests, as they translate intentional behaviour into action faster and louder. These emotions, when shared within the group, may then serve as fuel to collective action. Complementarily, and more directly relevant to psychosocial processes underlying reaction to deviance, there is some evidence that relates members' feelings of shame regarding a deviant ingroup member and punitive reactions directed to this member (Chekroun, 2008).

Social Control

Social control refers to the mechanisms that social groups have in order to preserve their values (e.g., Gibbs, 1981). Thus, the presence of deviant members within the ingroup triggers social control mechanisms (reactive strategies) in order to restore the value of the violated norm, and consequently, to preserve group's values (Marques, Abrams, Páez & Hogg, 2001). Reactive strategies may be formally implemented by groups, such as legal penalties prescribed to the deviant member (e.g., Becker, 1963), or informally implemented by other members, such as derogatory reactions, hostility (e.g., Levine, 1989), or, importantly for our purposes, punitive collective action (e.g. De Weerd & Klandermans, 1999; Klandermans, Sabucedo, Rodriguez & de Weerd, 2002; van Zomeren, 2013).

Present study

If we integrate Hollander's ideas regarding leader's legitimacy (e.g. Hollander, 2006, 2009) and idiosyncratic credit (Hollander, 1958) with the transgression credit model (Abrams, Randsley de Moura, & Travaglino, 2013; Randsley de Moura & Abrams, 2013), we may think that individuals should only assign license to deviate to leaders that gather legitimacy among other group members. Indeed, legitimacy of a deviant leader should account for how group members perceive the deviant behaviour, so that a legitimate leader could be given idiosyncratic credit and, concomitantly, because they are highly representative of the ingroup (Hogg, 2001), it should contribute to vent a double standard in members' judgments by giving the benefit of doubt for his/ her actions. Complementarily, SGDT research guidelines allow us to ponder that an illegitimate leader, thus who has never gathered idiosyncratic credit, in case of incurring in deviant behaviour, should be perceived as highly (doubling) threatening to the group's positive value and, consequently, to the other members' social identity. Indeed, illegitimate leaders that deviate from group normative standards should be perceived as being threatening not only because of the deviant behaviour they adopted, but also because they assume a role within the group that do not deserve. Hence, these members should not obtain a transgressive credit for their deviant behaviour. On the contrary, these members should trigger more negative emotions from other members and consequent strong negative reactions. We believe that, in the absence of a perceived proper implementation of formal social control mechanisms towards the illegitimate leaders, group members should be more prone to agree in engaging in punitive collective action towards these members, in order to protect the group, namely by demanding these leaders' removal from the leader role.

Empirical Study

1. Overview and Hypotheses

We conducted an experiment aiming to test the above idea. Participants read a piece of newspaper depicting a Portuguese deviant leader from a PPP (Public-Private Partnership). According to experimental conditions, the leader was presented as being competent, trustworthy and credited by other group members (Legitimate condition) or as the exact opposite, as being incompetent, untrustworthy and not credited by group members (Illegitimate condition). Participants then gave their opinion about how threatening was the leader to the group, evaluated the target, and showed their agreement with the implementation of formal social control. Then, a second piece of the same newspaper informed participants about the social control measures that were undertaken by the group (Social Control): the deviant leader was going to be brought to trial and to be judged according to the law (Present condition) or the case would be filed/prescribed (Absent condition). Following this manipulation, participants gave their agreement with collective action, and reported their emotions about the deviant leader.

We expected participants to evaluate more positively, to perceive as being less threatening to the group, to agree less with formal punishment measures to express a lower intensity of negative emotions and less agreement with punitive collective action in the Legitimate condition as compared to the Illegitimate condition. In sum, we should observe reactions consistent with the attribution of a transgressive credit towards the legitimate deviant leader, whereas we should observe extreme negative reactions towards the illegitimate deviant leader.

Moreover, we expect Legitimacy to predict agreement with collective action mediated by perceived threat caused by the deviant leader, agreement with the implementation of formal social control and intense expression of negative emotions. Nonetheless, this multi-mediation model should be moderated by social control. More specifically, participants should agree more with collective action directed toward the illegitimate deviant leader, to the extent that they perceive this member to be threatening to the group's image. Such perceived threat should predict participants' agreement with formal punishment. Agreement with punitive formal reactions should predict agreement

with punitive collective action especially when no formal social control is exerted towards the leader. In the absence of formal social control measures directed towards an illegitimate deviant leader, negative emotions about the deviant member should emerge among participants, which, in turn, should lead them to commit to collective action (Mediation Hypothesis).

2. Method

2.1. Participants and Design.

A sample of 32 male and 43 female Portuguese respondents ($N = 75$), aged from 17 to 76 years old ($M = 26.93$, $SD = 10.73$) participated in this study. There were no significant differences in sex ($\chi^2_3 = 1.44$, ns) or age ($F_{3,71} = 2.14$, ns) across experimental conditions. The experimental design was a 2 (Leader's Legitimacy: Legitimate vs. Illegitimate) X 2 (Social Control: Present vs. Absent) between-participants factors.

2.2. Procedure.

Participants were informed they were taking part in a study about "Political behaviour in Portugal", specifically about PPP's (Public-Private Partnerships). A fictitious piece of newspaper from "National Health Journal" was presented about the president "António Sousa" of the PPP "Ministry of Health – Hospital of Loures". In this piece, participants read that António Sousa adopted some deviant measures regarding his workers: "He ignores some safety measures to save time"; "He made some reductions in workers' salaries in order to compensate the costs of the construction process of the hospital"¹.

¹ The leader's deviance induction was selected through a pilot study. Participants ($N = 26$) gave their opinion about how correct they thought that several attitudes that were supposedly implemented by leaders of projects related to PPP institutions were [$1 = Completely wrong$; $7 = Completely correct$]. The following were the deviant attitudes that were considered for statistical analysis: (1) "To benefit friends/relatives since it does not significantly affect the project"; (2) "Occasionally, to give priority to customers that are "most interesting" in economic terms"; (3) "To pay extra monetary amounts aiming to speed up measures regarding the project"; (4) "To, ignore some minor security measures in order to save time ", (5) "To not give great importance to the opinions of those colleagues that do not have the necessary knowledge about relevant issues;" (8) " To assign jobs to friends / relatives in order to accelerate the process of recruiting staff,

2.3. Leader's Legitimacy Manipulation.

In the Legitimate condition, participants learned that the leader's partners stated that "António Sousa was always successful in the projects he participated in" and that "We believe that this partnership will be successful". Moreover, participants also read some opinions from his workers: "From the beginning he has showing good skills as a manager (...)" and "I heard that as a manager he never had any problem in concluding previous projects, (...) this relieves us, especially because he occupies the most leading role in the project (President)". In the Illegitimate condition, partners claimed that "António Sousa was not always successful in the projects he participated in" and that "We fear that this partnership might fail". Moreover, the workers' opinions were: "Since the beginning we have constant doubts about his skills as a manager (...)" and "I heard that this isn't the first time he has problems in concluding projects, (...) this worries us, especially because he occupies the leading role in the project (President)".

2.4. Social Control Manipulation.

A second piece of the same newspaper stated that the deviant leader "was under investigation [was denounced] by the Attorney-General due to inconsistencies from "administrative decisions" recently adopted by the President [leader], speculating as a misuse of public funds". In the Present condition, the piece referred that "this case is in trial, and António Sousa will be judged according to law", while in the Absent condition, the piece referred that "the Attorney General will dismiss the case, thus it will not be brought to court".

providing they have the required skills", (9) "To reduce workers' salaries to obtain more money to spend in the project "; (10) "To ignore bureaucracy in some urgent cases". Results showed statements 4 ($M = 2.15$, $DP = 1.46$) and 9 ($M = 2.42$, $DP = 1.27$) were the most negatively evaluated, thus, composing the deviance induction for the experiment.

3. Measures

3.1. Social identification.

Social Identification was measured by the following items (*1 = Disagree; 7 = Agree*): (1) "Being Portuguese is important to define who I am"; (2) "I share the costumes, tastes and opinions of the majority of Portuguese population"; (3) "I am glad to have been born in Portugal"; (4) "I am proud to be Portuguese". We averaged the answers to these items to a Social identification score (Cronbach's $\alpha = .60$)².

3.2. Perceived Legitimacy.

After the manipulation of Leader's Legitimacy, participants' perception about the leader was measured in three items (*1 = Untrustworthy, Incompetent, Unreliable; 7 = Trustworthy, Competent, Reliable*). We averaged the answers to these items to a Perceived Legitimacy score (Cronbach's $\alpha = .92$).

3.3. Threat to the group.

Participants gave their opinion about the threatening character of the deviant leader to the group, in three items (*1 = I completely disagree, 7 = I completely agree*): (1) "This individual jeopardizes the country"; (2) "This individual threatens Portugal's image"; (3) "The content of this news undermines my confidence in the Portugal's political system". We averaged these items to a Threat to the Group score (Cronbach's $\alpha = .86$).

3.4. Target's evaluation.

Participants evaluated the target in four bipolar traits: (*1 = Negative, Dishonest, Unfair and Disrespectful; 7 = Positive, Honest, Fair and Respectful*). We averaged these items into a Target's Evaluation score (Cronbach's $\alpha = .91$).

² Item 2 was removed to increase internal consistency (with item 2, Cronbach's $\alpha = .55$).

3.5. Formal Punishment.

Participants gave their agreement on several possible formal punishment reactions regarding the target ($1 = I$ completely disagree, $7 = I$ completely agree): (1) "António Sousa should maintain his President role in the project"; (2) "We should wait for the real impact of his implemented policies"; (3) "António Sousa should justify his decisions in a public report" and (4) "António Sousa should work under supervision"; (5) "António Sousa should be demoted and become an integrated member without exerting management decisions"; (6) "António Sousa should be fired and replaced by someone more competent"; (7) "Authorities should open a judicial inquiry regarding Antonio Sousa". A Principal Components Factorial Analysis with Varimax rotation showed that the seven items saturated in 2 main factors: factor 1³, denominated as "Punishment" (Cronbach's $\alpha = .87$), and explains 47.3% of variance; factor 2, as "Control" (Cronbach's $\alpha = .72$), explaining 23.8% of variance of the results (see Table 1).

3.6. Perceived Social Control.

After the manipulation of Social Control, participants answered to three items aiming to check the effectiveness of Social Control manipulation ($1 = I$ completely disagree; $7 = I$ completely agree): (1) "I believe in the efficacy of the Attorney General to deal with this case"; (2) "This kind of decisions prevent similar problems in future situations"; (3) "The course of action taken by the Attorney General is sufficient to solve this problem". We averaged the answers to these items to a Perceived Social Control score (Cronbach's $\alpha = .77$).

3.7. Collective action.

After the Social Control manipulation, participants indicated their agreement ($1 = I$ completely disagree; $7 = I$ completely agree) with three items measuring punitive collective action regarding the case they read about: (1) "A public manifestation/rally should be carried to defend a higher integrity of PPPs' "; (2) "People should stand for the end of this type of Partnerships"; (3) "People should participate in a petition aiming to

³ Items 1 and 2 were recoded, due to negatively saturating with items 5, 6 and 7. Given that items 3 and 4 did not saturate with the main factor, they were not used in this study.

remove Antonio Sousa from the Partnership". We averaged these answers to a Collective Action score (Cronbach's $\alpha = .70$).

3.7.1. Negative emotions.

Finally, participants indicated which emotions were triggered by the deviant leader ($1 = None$; $7 = A lot of$): "shame"; "embarrassment"; "disappointment"; "discouragement"; "revolt"; "anger". We averaged these items to a Negative Emotions score⁴ (Cronbach's $\alpha = .94$) (see Table 2).

4. Results

Control measures

We will begin by presenting the analyses regarding control measures, because these are less relevant regarding our hypotheses, but are fundamental to assure equality of identification across experimental conditions, and the efficacy of experimental manipulations.

4.1.Social identification.

A Leader's Legitimacy X Social Control Anova on the Social Identification score shows that participants highly identified with the ingroup ($M = 5.90$, $SD = 0.94$) and similarly between conditions, all $F_s(1, 71) \leq 2.43$, *ns*.

4.2.Perceived Legitimacy.

Because participants responded to Perceived Legitimacy items before being presented with Social Control manipulation, we expected to find differences in this measure only regarding Leader's Legitimacy conditions. A Leader's Legitimacy X Social Control Anova on the Perceived Legitimacy score showed that participants perceived

⁴ Items "uncertainty" and "insecurity" were removed. A post-hoc careful inspection about these items leads us to think that they do not refer to negative and reactive emotions. Indeed, these might be emotions about the ingroup, but do not have the negative character of the others.

greater legitimacy in the Legitimate condition ($M = 4.83$, $SD = 0.68$) than in the Illegitimate condition ($M = 2.41$, $SD = 1.03$), $F(1, 71) = 139.17$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .622$. Thus, Leader's Legitimacy manipulation was effective. As expected, we found no effect of Social Control, $F(1, 71) < 1$, *ns*. We did find a Leader's Legitimacy X Social Control marginal interaction $F(1, 71) = 3.44$, $p = .068$, however this is not an issue, since there was no significant differences between Social Control in the Legitimate condition $t(30) = 1.50$, *ns*, or in the Illegitimate condition $t(41) = -1.38$, *ns*.

4.3. Perceived Social Control.

A Leader's Legitimacy X Social Control Anova on the Perceived Social Control showed that participants perceived a higher level of formal punishment directed to the deviant leader in the Present condition ($M = 4.69$, $SD = 0.84$) as compared to the Absent condition ($M = 3.06$, $SD = 1.33$), $F(1, 71) = 37.76$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .34$. Thus, Social control manipulation was effective. Moreover, we found a significant marginal effect of Leader's Legitimacy, $F(1, 71) = 3.02$, $p = .086$ and significant Leader's Legitimacy X Social Control interaction $F(1, 71) = 10.27$, $p = .002$, $\eta^2 = .13$. Even though there were no significant differences between Leader's Legitimacy in the Present condition $t(31) = -1.25$, *ns*, in the Absent condition, participants perceived less social control, when the leader was Illegitimate ($M = 2.56$; $DP = 1.06$) than when he was Legitimate ($M = 3.78$; $DP = 1.38$) $t(40) = 3.25$, $p = .002$. This outcome may accrue from the Leader's Legitimacy manipulation, in the sense that participants perceived the absence of social control on an illegitimate leader as less efficient, because they might believe that he should have been punished. Therefore, these results only further support our hypothesis that Leader's Legitimacy has a strong influence on reaction to deviance.

Dependent measures

4.4. Threat to the Group and Formal Punishment.

We expected participants to perceive higher threat from and to agree more with formal punishment towards the illegitimate deviant leader than the legitimate deviant

leader⁵. We conducted a Leader's Legitimacy X Social Control Manova on the Threat to the Group and Formal Punishment scores. This analysis showed a significant effect of Leader's Legitimacy (Wilks' $\lambda = .705$; $F(2,70) = 14.61$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .295$). For Social Control effect and Leader's Legitimacy X Social Control interaction, Wilks' $\lambda \geq .960$; $F(2,70) \leq 1.46$, *ns*. Regarding Threat to the Group, the effect of Leader's Legitimacy showed that participants perceived the deviant leader as more threatening in the Illegitimate condition ($M = 5.19$, $SD = 1.31$) than in the Legitimate condition ($M = 4.29$, $SD = 1.45$), $F(1, 71) = 8.84$, $p = .004$, $\eta^2 = .11$. Regarding the Formal Punishment score, the effect of Leader's Legitimacy showed that participants agreed more that the illegitimate deviant leader should be punished ($M = 4.87$, $SD = 1.29$) than the legitimate deviant leader ($M = 3.37$, $SD = 1.19$), $F(1, 71) = 29.67$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .30$. These results support our hypothesis, as the illegitimate deviant leader is perceived as more threatening and triggers more agreement with punitive reactions towards him than the legitimate deviant leader.

4.5.Target's Evaluation.

In the same line of the previous measures, we also expected participants to evaluate more negatively an illegitimate than a legitimate deviant leader. A Leader's Legitimacy X Social Control Anova on the Target's Evaluation score showed only a significant effect of Leaders Legitimacy, indicating that participants evaluated less negatively the deviant leader in the Legitimate condition ($M = 3.98$, $SD = 1.09$) than in the Illegitimate condition ($M = 2.66$, $SD = .93$), $F(1, 71) = 31.88$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .31$. As expected, we found no effect of Social Control, $F(1, 71) \leq .66$, *ns* or Leader's Legitimacy X Social Control interaction $F(1, 71) \leq .02$, *ns*. These results are consistent with our hypothesis according to which the transgressive credit should be ascribed to the legitimate leader and not to the illegitimate deviant leader.

4.6.Collective action.

A Leader's Legitimacy X Social Control Anova on the Collective Action was conducted in order to test the idea that participants should agree more with punitive

⁵ We should not expect any effect of Social Control nor significant Leader's Legitimacy X Social Control because Threat and Formal Punishment were measured before the Social Control manipulation.

collective action towards the illegitimate deviant leader than the legitimate deviant leader, especially when no formal social control is exerted upon the deviant leader. The analysis yielded a significant effect of Leader's Legitimacy, $F(1,71) = 3.79, p = .056, \eta^2 = .051$, but no significant effect of Social Control, $F(1,71) < 1, ns$ nor Leader's Legitimacy X Social Control interaction $F(1, 71) < 1, ns$. These results indicate that participants agreed more with collective punishment in the Illegitimate condition ($M = 5.06, SD = 1.29$), than in the Legitimate condition ($M = 4.45, SD = 1.43$). However, because we did not observe any effect of social control in this score (either main effect or through a significant interaction with Leader's Legitimacy), we may say that results only partially support our hypotheses.

4.7.Negative emotions.

A Leader's Legitimacy X Social Control Anova computed on the Negative Emotions score yielded significant effects of Leader's Legitimacy ($F1,71 = 4.69, p = .034, \eta^2 = .062$) and Social Control ($F1,71 = 4.75, p = .033, \eta^2 = .063$), but no significant interaction between both factors ($F1,71 < 1$). Participants significantly felt negative emotions with greater intensity when the deviant leader was illegitimate ($M = 5.15; SD = 1.37$) than when he was legitimate ($M = 4.41; SD = 1.68$). The significant Social Control effect shows, in turn, that participants felt more negative emotions in the Present (of formal Social Control) condition ($M = 5.22; SD = 1.32$) than in the Absent condition ($M = 4.53; SD = 1.66$). Because we did not obtain the predicted significant interaction, but based on the obtained two main effects, we decided to further inspect how Negative Emotions differentiate between experimental conditions, through independent t-tests. Results show significant differences between the Legitimate-Absent condition ($M = 3.94; SD = 1.56$) and the other conditions, specifically with Legitimate-Present condition ($M = 4.94; SD = 1.71, p = .059$), the Illegitimate-Present condition ($M = 5.45; SD = .87, p = .004$), and the Illegitimate-Absent condition ($M = 4.94; SD = 1.63, p = .035$; remaining comparisons: p always ns). This evidence shows that the TC only applies when the group acknowledges the deviant leader as legitimate, and especially when participants perceive that the group does not direct any formal punishment to him.

4.8.Mediated-Moderation Hypothesis

We predicted that Leader's Legitimacy should affect Collective Action through Threat to the Group and Formal Punishment. Furthermore, we proposed that agreement

with formal punishment should predict collective action through Negative Emotions, but only in the Absent (Social Control) condition. To test this hypothesis, we conducted two separated analyses. We started to conduct a multi-mediated analysis attempted to test the mediation impact of Threat to the Group and Formal Punishment on the association between Leader's Legitimacy and Collective Action. The second analysis aims to clarify the mediating impact of Negative Emotions on the association between Formal Punishment and Collective Action, unconditionally moderated by Social Control.

4.9. Mediation model.

For the first analysis, we tested the idea that Leader's Legitimacy predicts Threat to the Group, which predicts Formal Punishment, which in turn predicts Collective Action. Thus, we expected a multi-mediation model, in which Leader's Legitimacy should be the predictor (Legitimate = 1 and Illegitimate = 2), Collective Action as the dependent measure, and Threat to the Group and Formal Punishment as the mediators of the relationship between Leader's Legitimacy and Collective Action.

The Pearson's product-moment correlations between the measures that compose the mediation component of our model were all significant ($r \geq .222$, $p \leq .055$). This correlational pattern allows us to proceed to a multi-mediation analysis using Hayes' (2013) PROCESS analysis (Model 6; see Figure 1) to test our prediction.

This model accounted for 39% of the variance. The total model explained significantly Collective Action, $F(3, 71) = 14.83$, $p < .001$. In line with our prediction, as expected, the significant bivariate effect of Leader's Legitimacy on Collective Action ($b = .61$, $SE = .32$, $t = 1.95$, $p = .055$) became non-significant when we entered Threat to the Group and Formal Punishment in the equation ($b = -.25$, $SE = .30$, $t = -.84$, ns). Thus, the model fully accounts for the predicted mediation of Threat to the Group and Formal Punishment between Leader's Legitimacy and Collective Action (Threat to the Group: Sobel's $Z = 1.79$, $p = .073$; Formal Punishment: Sobel's $Z = 2.64$, $p = .008$). These results fully support our predictions: participants that perceived the deviant leader to be illegitimate, agreed more with collective action. Moreover, such agreement was predicted by the perception that these illegitimate deviant leaders were threatening to the group and by participants' agreement with formal reaction towards the leader.

4.10. Moderating effect of Social Control.

To further inspect the relationship between Formal Punishment and Collective Action, we conducted a mediation analysis, in which we considered Formal Punishment as the predictor, Collective Action as the dependent measure, and Negative Emotions as the mediator of the relationship between Formal Punishment and Collective Action. We predicted that the above mediation process would be stronger especially in the Absent (Social Control) condition, thus, Social Control should moderate the relationship between Formal Punishment and Negative Emotions. We conducted a PROCESS analysis (Hayes, 2013; Model 7) in order to directly inspect the complete moderated-Mediation model (see figure X).

This model accounted for 27X% of the variance. The complete model significantly predicts Collective Action, $F(3, 71) = 8.67, p < .001$. In line with our prediction, as expected, the direct effect of Formal Punishment on Collective Action ($b = .34, SE = .09, t = 3.91, p < .001$) became non-significant when we entered Negative Emotions as a mediator ($b = -.21, SE = .35, t = -.58, ns$). Importantly, the joint effect of Punishment and Social Control on Negative Emotions was marginally significant ($b = .41, SE = .21, t = 1.90, p = .061, 95CI = -.02 \text{ to } .83$).⁶ The effect of Social Control on Negative Emotions was strong in the Absent condition ($b = .28$) than in the Present condition ($b = .09$). Thus, participants that agreed with formal punishment towards the deviant leader tended to agree with collective action to the extent that they felt intensive negative emotions. However, such negative reactions were intensified when participants faced an absence of social control.

5. Discussion

Consistent with our predictions, perceived leader's legitimacy predicted members' reaction towards the deviant leader. Results showed that a legitimate leader that endorsed deviant actions generated less perceived threat, was more positively evaluated and more

⁶ Punishment ($b = -.20, SE = .35, t < 1, ns$); Social Control ($b = -2.34, SE = .96, t = -2.44, p = .017$).

tolerated by the group in comparison to an illegitimate deviant leader. That is, individuals ascribed more transgressive credit to the legitimate than to the illegitimate deviant leader. Regarding the presence or absence of group social control on negative emotions triggered by the deviant leader and agreement with punitive collective action, results partially support our predictions. An inspection on the means showed that participants manifested lower negative emotions when they observed a legitimate deviant leader and, simultaneously, the absence of social control mechanisms implemented by the group. Such mitigation of negative emotions in this condition is consistent with the transgressive credit model assumptions. However, it seems that when individuals perceive the group to implement social control mechanisms towards a legitimate deviant leader, the transgressive credit does no longer prevail. Indeed, when individuals perceive the group to implement social control mechanisms toward a deviant leader, they manifest intense negative emotions and become to agree more with punitive collective action towards this leader. In brief, it seems that the double standard predicted by TC gives place to loyalty towards the group normative standards (provided by those social control mechanisms) when individuals know the guidelines of group reactions: the knowledge that the group does not implement social control mechanisms leads individuals to follow this pattern of condescence for leaders misbehaviour, whereas the presence of social control mechanisms guide individuals' judgments and trigger reactions consistent with derogatory strategies.

Regarding the illegitimate deviant leader, results fully support our predictions. This leader not only was perceived as more threatening to the group, but also triggered more derogatory reactions. Interestingly, regardless of the presence or absence of the implementations of social control mechanisms, individuals showed high intensity of negative emotions and strong willingness to engage in punitive collective action. Interestingly, though, for our predictions, results also suggest that individuals were more prone to materialize their agreement with formal social control to punitive collective action when they perceive that the group did not direct social control mechanisms towards the illegitimate deviant leader.

The present findings respond to some of the questions raised. It seems that the double standard applied to legitimate leaders may help group members to legitimize the leader's actions as normative. Conceivably, a legitimate leader deserves, at least, the benefit of doubt. In this sense, his actions may be justified, as deviance is sometimes

necessary for the benefit of the group. Therefore, the group allows the deviant leader to continue his actions, as they may accept them as necessary. Moreover, the absence of formal social control, may even lead participants to support the leader's actions, as they stop perceiving them as deviant. In contrast, the fact that participants felt strong negative emotions when the legitimate deviant leader was already formally punished, but did not engage in collective action must mean that some level of transgression credit was also present.

A final idea comes to mind. Illegitimate leaders are people that the group does not acknowledge as leaders, which means that the leader may formally have leader status, but no actual influence with the group. If the leader is not perceived as a leader, then he is perceived as a regular member, and as such is considered an ingroup deviant member. Thus, consistently with subjective group dynamics theory, participants will extremely derogate and punish the deviant leader, now considered as a "black sheep".

In summary, leader's legitimacy is essential to take into account regarding reaction to deviant leaders. Legitimate leaders are given more credit to deviate from group's norms, in a sense that group acknowledgement acts as support to the leader's action. Only when the deviant leader is perceived as legitimate and the group does not react, it seems that the group is in a "normalization" process of this member behaviour: group members really "forgive" and even accept the deviant leader. On the contrary, an illegitimate leader triggers negative emotions and agreement with punitive collective action (specifically in an attempt to remove this member from the leader role), regardless of any social control mechanisms.

A possible critic lies in the similarity between *credit* in Hollander's Idiosyncrasy credit model (1958), and *legitimacy* as we present it. Credit is defined through a balance of normative vs deviant actions (Hollander, 1958). However, in our study, leader's legitimacy is presented through validation provided by close workers and partners that provide an overview of the leader's background, such as his past competency, credibility, among other aspects. Hollander (2006, p. 299) stated that: "Legitimacy is seen as a fundamental factor, such as in granting trust to a leader. *Credit* is another, more psychological, way of considering the leader-follower bond, in regard to positively disposed perceptions". Furthermore, "influence and power flow both from legitimacy and those additional elements affected by followers through their perceptions, attributions, and judgments" (Hollander, 2006, p. 299). Therefore, legitimacy seems to reflect how leaders operate in

relatively non-coercive situations in which power is dependent on the context and related persons. Moreover, while credit allows that it becomes possible that previous signs of conformity with the group's norms allow later nonconformity to be better tolerated (Hollander, 1958), in our study, the leader never conformed to the group's norms as he was presented as a deviant in both conditions. Despite this, we found the significant differences depending on leader's Legitimacy.

6. Conclusions

The present study sheds some light into the increasing emergence of social movements in Portugal. The present study showed that a scenario where illegitimate deviant leaders are not punished raises an emotional negative climate among group members that leads them to engage in collective action. Indeed, the Portuguese people are filled with social frustration towards our leaders, often seen through popular "lynching" and demands such as collective requests for resignation of leaders. The current socioeconomic crisis weighs heavily on the people, and Portugal's leaders appear to be failing in restoring order to the country and serving the people's best interests. Such failure may deem leaders as illegitimate, for not being competent or motivated enough, losing credibility among the people, thus leaving them with a strong need of justice upon the leaders. Since formal social control to be exerted upon these deviant illegitimate leaders remains to be seen, people feel they have to see justice by their own hands, and thus, to go out on the streets and claim a new change, through the resign of current leaders. A leader's formal status is not the only thing that defines his power, as leadership means nothing without group acknowledgement.

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Appendix A

Questionnaire presented to participants – varies according to conditions (see Method)

Comportamento político em Portugal

Nacionalidade _____ Idade: _____ Vota (Sim/Não): _____

No âmbito do Mestrado em Psicologia Social, está a ser realizado um estudo com o objetivo de compreender as opiniões que os portugueses têm acerca da existência de PPP's (Parcerias Público-Privadas) e na forma como o dinheiro público é gerido.

Este questionário tem a duração média de **cinco minutos**. **Não existem respostas erradas**. Os dados serão **anónimos** e **confidenciais**, destinando-se apenas para fins de investigação.

Agradecemos desde já a sua participação.

Indique o seu grau de acordo ou desacordo com cada uma das seguintes afirmações:

1. Ser português é importante para definir quem eu sou.
Discordo totalmente <input type="checkbox"/> 1 <input type="checkbox"/> 2 <input type="checkbox"/> 3 <input type="checkbox"/> 4 <input type="checkbox"/> 5 <input type="checkbox"/> 6 <input type="checkbox"/> 7 Concordo totalmente
2. Partilho os hábitos, os gostos e as opiniões da maioria dos portugueses.
Discordo totalmente <input type="checkbox"/> 1 <input type="checkbox"/> 2 <input type="checkbox"/> 3 <input type="checkbox"/> 4 <input type="checkbox"/> 5 <input type="checkbox"/> 6 <input type="checkbox"/> 7 Concordo totalmente
3. Fico contente por ter nascido em Portugal.
Discordo totalmente <input type="checkbox"/> 1 <input type="checkbox"/> 2 <input type="checkbox"/> 3 <input type="checkbox"/> 4 <input type="checkbox"/> 5 <input type="checkbox"/> 6 <input type="checkbox"/> 7 Concordo totalmente
4. Sinto orgulho em ser português.
Discordo totalmente <input type="checkbox"/> 1 <input type="checkbox"/> 2 <input type="checkbox"/> 3 <input type="checkbox"/> 4 <input type="checkbox"/> 5 <input type="checkbox"/> 6 <input type="checkbox"/> 7 Concordo totalmente

PPP na Saúde: uma fatura sempre a aumentar

As parcerias público-privadas (PPP) consistem em contratos assinados entre uma entidade pública - administração central ou empresa pública – e uma entidade privada, para a construção de uma obra de interesse público. As PPP's têm como objetivo a construção de infraestruturas importantes para a população, sem a obrigação do Estado para acarretar todos os custos da sua construção. No entanto, estas parcerias têm contribuído para o agravamento da dívida pública, nomeadamente por os contratos serem mais benéficos para as entidades privadas do que para o Estado.

Por favor, **leia a notícia** que se segue sobre **António Sousa**, Presidente da PPP Ministério da Saúde – Hospital de Loures. O objetivo desta parceria é a construção de um novo hospital em Loures que irá abranger o distrito de Lisboa e com **implicações no sistema de saúde para todo o país**.

“Uma PPP em (des)envolvimento”

António Sousa é o atual Presidente responsável pelo projeto “Mais Saúde para Todos” entre a Parceria Ministério da Saúde – Hospital de Loures. (...).

As opiniões que recolhemos junto dos **trabalhadores e sócios** desta Parceria sobre António Sousa **não são favoráveis ao Presidente**. Segundo os sócios, “*António Sousa nem sempre foi bem-sucedido nos projetos em que participou*” e “*Temos receio que esta parceria fracasse*”.

No mesmo acordo, os trabalhadores comentaram que “*Desde o início que temos dúvidas constantes das suas capacidades como gestor (...)*”; “*Ouvi dizer que não é a primeira vez que se levanta dúvidas sobre a conclusão em projetos anteriores, (...) isto deixa-nos preocupados, especialmente quando ocupa o cargo mais importante do projeto (Presidente)*”.

A verdade é que algumas das medidas tomadas até agora pelo Presidente **levantam algumas suspeitas**, nomeadamente, a forma como **ignora algumas medidas de segurança** dos trabalhadores para poupar tempo, que considera “pouco importantes”, ou a recente proposta de **redução do salário dos trabalhadores** do projeto com o objetivo de compensar a derrapagem orçamental agregada à construção do hospital (...).

(Jornal Nacional da Saúde, 17/07/13)

Tendo em conta o historial apresentado e as opiniões dos trabalhadores, indique qual a sua perceção sobre a liderança de António Sousa para o projeto em causa:

Não Confiável	<input type="checkbox"/>	Confiável						
Incapaz/Ineficaz	<input type="checkbox"/>	Eficaz/Capaz						
Não Credível	<input type="checkbox"/>	Credível						

Em que medida acredita que:

1. Este indivíduo prejudica o país.	Discordo totalmente	<input type="checkbox"/>	Concordo totalmente						
2. Este tipo de situações ameaça a imagem do nosso país.	Discordo totalmente	<input type="checkbox"/>	Concordo totalmente						

3. Esta notícia enfraquece a minha confiança no sistema político de Portugal.
 Discordo totalmente 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Concordo totalmente

Tendo em conta as medidas tomadas pelo Presidente António Sousa que opinião tem acerca dele:

Extremamente Negativa	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> 6	<input type="checkbox"/> 7	Extremamente Positiva
Extremamente Desonesto	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> 6	<input type="checkbox"/> 7	Extremamente Honesto
Extremamente Injusto	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> 6	<input type="checkbox"/> 7	Extremamente Justo
Extremamente Desrespeitador	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> 6	<input type="checkbox"/> 7	Extremamente Respeitador

Em que medida concorda que se deveria implementar as seguintes ações sobre A. Sousa?

1) Permitir que António Sousa mantenha o cargo como Presidente do projeto.	Discordo totalmente	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> 6	<input type="checkbox"/> 7	Concordo totalmente
2) Dar mais tempo para verificar o real impacto da implementação das políticas implementadas pelo Presidente.		<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> 6	<input type="checkbox"/> 7	
3) Obrigar António Sousa a justificar as suas tomadas de decisões em relatório público.		<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> 6	<input type="checkbox"/> 7	
4) Exigir que António Sousa trabalhe sob supervisão, de forma a controlar as decisões importantes.		<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> 6	<input type="checkbox"/> 7	
5) Despromover António Sousa, mantendo-o como membro integrado na parceria, mas sem exercer cargos de chefia.		<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> 6	<input type="checkbox"/> 7	
6) António Sousa deverá ser despedido e substituído por alguém mais competente.		<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> 6	<input type="checkbox"/> 7	
7) As autoridades competentes deverão abrir um processo criminal contra António Sousa.		<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> 6	<input type="checkbox"/> 7	

A seguinte notícia refere-se a um caso sobre o Presidente António Sousa, que está a ser investigado pela Procuradoria-Geral.

Presidente de PPP investigado pelo Ministério Público

O atual Presidente do projeto “Mais Saúde para Todos” está a ser investigado pela Procuradoria-Geral devido às inconsistências que advêm das “decisões administrativas” tomadas recentemente pelo Presidente, especulando-se como desvio de fundos públicos. Segundo o Procurador-Geral, “este caso está em tribunal, e António Sousa será julgado de acordo com a lei.”
Filipa Gonçalves, JNS,
 28/08/13

Como avalia a ação da Procuradoria-Geral relativamente a este caso?

1. Acredito na eficácia da Procuradoria-Geral para lidar com este caso. Discordo totalmente <input type="checkbox"/> 1 <input type="checkbox"/> 2 <input type="checkbox"/> 3 <input type="checkbox"/> 4 <input type="checkbox"/> 5 <input type="checkbox"/> 6 <input type="checkbox"/> 7 Concordo totalmente
2. Este tipo de decisões irá prevenir situações problemáticas semelhantes no futuro. Discordo totalmente <input type="checkbox"/> 1 <input type="checkbox"/> 2 <input type="checkbox"/> 3 <input type="checkbox"/> 4 <input type="checkbox"/> 5 <input type="checkbox"/> 6 <input type="checkbox"/> 7 Concordo totalmente
3. A ação realizada pela Procuradoria-Geral é suficiente para resolver este problema. Discordo totalmente <input type="checkbox"/> 1 <input type="checkbox"/> 2 <input type="checkbox"/> 3 <input type="checkbox"/> 4 <input type="checkbox"/> 5 <input type="checkbox"/> 6 <input type="checkbox"/> 7 Concordo totalmente

Se estivesse no lugar dos sócios/trabalhadores desta PPP, o que estaria disposto a fazer?

1. Uma manifestação pública a defender maior integridade nas PPP's. Discordo totalmente <input type="checkbox"/> 1 <input type="checkbox"/> 2 <input type="checkbox"/> 3 <input type="checkbox"/> 4 <input type="checkbox"/> 5 <input type="checkbox"/> 6 <input type="checkbox"/> 7 Concordo totalmente
2. Acabar/encerrar este género de Parcerias. Discordo totalmente <input type="checkbox"/> 1 <input type="checkbox"/> 2 <input type="checkbox"/> 3 <input type="checkbox"/> 4 <input type="checkbox"/> 5 <input type="checkbox"/> 6 <input type="checkbox"/> 7 Concordo totalmente
3. Fazer um abaixo-assinado a exigir que António Sousa seja removido da Parceria. Discordo totalmente <input type="checkbox"/> 1 <input type="checkbox"/> 2 <input type="checkbox"/> 3 <input type="checkbox"/> 4 <input type="checkbox"/> 5 <input type="checkbox"/> 6 <input type="checkbox"/> 7 Concordo totalmente

Pensando neste tipo de decisões pelos atuais responsáveis de cargos de responsabilidade de topo em Portugal, em que medida sente:

Nenhuma vergonha	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> 6	<input type="checkbox"/> 7	Muita vergonha
Nenhum embaraço	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> 6	<input type="checkbox"/> 7	Muito embaraço
Nenhuma desilusão	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> 6	<input type="checkbox"/> 7	Muita desilusão
Nenhum desânimo	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> 6	<input type="checkbox"/> 7	Muito desânimo
Nenhuma revolta	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> 6	<input type="checkbox"/> 7	Muita revolta
Nenhuma raiva	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> 6	<input type="checkbox"/> 7	Muita raiva
Nenhuma incerteza	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> 6	<input type="checkbox"/> 7	Muita incerteza
Nenhuma insegurança	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> 6	<input type="checkbox"/> 7	Muita insegurança

Obrigado pela colaboração!

Appendix B

Table 1. Formal Punishment: Item Factor Scores after Varimax.

Table 2. Negative Emotions: Item Factor Scores after Varimax Rotation.

Table 3. Means and Standard Deviations of Threat to the Group, Target's Evaluation and Formal Punishment.

Table 4. Means and Standard Deviations of Collective Action and Negative Emotions.

Table 5. Pearson Correlation's Tests for Measures.

Figure 1. Mediated-Moderation model with standardized coefficients.

Table 1. Formal Punishment: Item Factor Scores after Varimax Rotation

	<i>Factor 1</i>	<i>Factor 2</i>
<i>Formal Punishment</i>	<i>Punishment</i>	<i>Control</i>
(1) António Sousa should maintain his President role in the project	.890	.045
(2) We should wait for the real impact of his implemented policies	.818	-.120
(3) António Sousa should justify his decisions in a public report	.056	.872
(4) António Sousa should work under supervision	.136	.869
(5) António Sousa should be demoted and become an integrated member without exerting management decisions	.707	.146
(6) António Sousa should be fired and replaced by someone more competent	.859	.176
(7) Authorities should open a judicial inquiry regarding Antonio Sousa	.769	.285

Table 2. Negative Emotions: Item Factor Scores after Varimax Rotation.

<i>Negative Emotions</i>	<i>Factor 1</i>
<i>Negative Emotions</i>	<i>Negative Emotions</i>
Shame	.940
Embarrassment	.860
Disappointment	.856
Discouragement	.886
Revolt	.899
Anger	.834

Table 3. Means and Standard Deviations of Threat to the Group, Target's Evaluation and Formal Punishment.

	Legitimate				Illegitimate			
	Present		Absent		Present		Absent	
	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>
Threat to the Group	4.47	1.72	4.14	1.20	5.63	.97	4.87	1.44
Target's Evaluation	3.90	1.35	4.06	.84	2.53	1.09	2.75	.80
Formal Punishment	3.27	1.06	3.46	1.29	5.29	.99	4.57	1.41

Table 4. Means and Standard Deviations of Collective Action and Negative Emotions.

	Legitimate				Illegitimate			
	Present		Absent		Present		Absent	
	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>
Collective Action	4.64	1.68	4.28	1.19	5.20	.94	4.96	1.50
Negative Emotions	4.94	1.71	3.94	1.56	5.45	.87	4.94	1.63

Table 5. Pearson Correlation's Tests for Measures.

	Legitimacy	Threat to the Group	Target's Evaluation	Formal Punishment	Social Control	Collective Action	Negative Emotions
Legitimacy	1						
Threat to the Group	.311**	1					
Target's Evaluation	-.554***	-.460***	1				
Formal Punishment	.520**	.644***	-.461***	1			
Social Control	-.212	-.086	.096	-.074	1		
Collective Action	.222*	.545***	-.366**	.570***	-.115	1	
Negative Emotions	.240*	.542***	-.343**	.446***	-.153	.660***	1

*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)

**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)

***Correlation is significant at the 0.001 level (2-tailed)

Figure 1. Mediated-Moderation model with standardized coefficients.

