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The April Revolution and the Contribution
of Education to Changing 'Portuguese Realities'

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Abstract

The subject of this thesis is educational mobilization in Portugal during the decade of the seventies. Rather than present an exhaustive account of the educational events that took place during the decade, the thesis attempts, firstly, to disentangle the complex web of occurrences in the field of education, and, secondly, to present an interpretation of three major educational events and their relationship to the changing nature of the Portuguese state.

Inevitably the crowning event of the decade of the seventies, the April revolution of 1974, comes under considerable scrutiny. This brought to an end the Salazarist regime, which was incapable of coming to terms with the, eventually overwhelming, problem of decolonization. It also marked the beginning of a serious attempt to extend and deepen the effects of the (1971-3) Veiga Simão reform in education, which, in acting as a pivot for debates on the development and modernization of the country, found itself mediating the demands for change emerging from civil society. This is described in Chapter 2.

Chapters 3 and 4 describe how the April revolution stimulated very far reaching processes of democratization in education, both within the realm of relations of management within the school and in terms of what actually counted as education (that is, its redefinition in the light of the 'rediscovery' of 'Portuguese realities'). The fading of the project that was 'Portugal in transition to socialism', embodied in the process of 'normalization' which characterized the latter years of the decade of the seventies, is approached and assessed, in Chapter 5, through a study of the intervention of the World Bank in Portuguese higher education.

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Introduction

The relative absence of data on 'Portuguese realities'¹ is recognized nowadays in practically all material appearing on the subject. Below, we, too, shall reference this fact particularly in the area of education and development. There is, however, another much less acknowledged problem that also confronts the researcher in Portugal: the fact that many of the concepts that he/she would like to employ to interpret 'Portuguese realities' have been developed through theories attempting to come to grips with very different realities. Thus, right from the start the researcher may find that one of the problems he/she has to resolve is how to avoid distorting either the theories and concepts being applied or the 'realities' being studied. Additionally, or rather allied to this problem, the researcher in Portugal finds him/herself obliged to put to work theories and concepts almost always created and operationalized in the so-called 'core' countries. These concepts inevitably contain their own fair share of values and specificity (not to mention ethnocentrism). How, then, does the researcher avoid being caught up in a kind of conceptual imperialism?

The problem may be particularly acute for the researcher educated in one, or more, of the 'core' countries. And it may be even more difficult, though not necessarily,² for the 'core'-country researcher investigating a reality even further removed from his/her own than Portugal (such as a 'Third-World' country). On the other hand, theoretical work by 'Third-World' theorists, particularly in the realm of dependency theory, has led to the

production of 'home-grown' theories and concepts,³ perhaps to an even greater extent than in countries like Portugal where theoretical 'dependency' appears to be practically taken for granted.

Of course, there are always exceptions to the rule. Thus, the possibility that one might be involved in a form of cultural imperialism, as a result of the ingenuous application of theories and concepts developed in advanced capitalist countries to a reality like Portugal, was made apparent to this particular researcher during the course of a conversation with Mário Murteira, a well-known Portuguese economist.⁴ Murteira made his point through two 'stories' which went roughly as follows:

'At the beginning of the decade of the seventies, there appeared on the front page of our daily newspaper with perhaps the highest circulation, O Diário de Notícias, in banner headlines, the announcement that there was NO ASIAN FLU IN PORTUGAL. Now, of course, we were all delighted to learn that we had escaped from Asian flu, but the curious thing to note is that the headline was taken directly from the English newspaper, The Times! In other words, a Portuguese newspaper had reproduced an announcement by an English newspaper to proclaim triumphantly to the Portuguese public that, in fact, there was no Asian flu to be found in Portugal!!!';

and,

'Just recently I came across a copy of a new reader in economics, published in Mexico, on recent developments in semi-peripheral and peripheral societies. Much to my surprise, I discovered that the article dealing with Portugal had been written by two Soviet economists!'

The moral of the two stories is not quite as straightforward as it might at first seem. True, there has been a lack of research, particularly sociological, in education in Portugal,⁵ and also in the area of education and development⁶ (not to mention

other vast areas outside the range of this thesis⁷). And, as a result, there is a shortage of 'home-grown' theories and concepts. But whether this shortage has occurred as a result of the failure of the Portuguese to take themselves seriously, or as a result of the failure of the West to take the Portuguese seriously, is not immediately evident. However, it must be said right away that even a predisposition on the part of Portuguese intellectuals to put into practice concepts and/or theories that have been developed elsewhere (mostly in advanced capitalist countries and that must therefore be right!) may, in the end, be due to a legacy of foreign intervention in Portuguese affairs: i.e. decades, if not centuries, of economic colonialism by the British,⁸ cultural colonialism by the French⁹ and even the actual fact (from 1580 to 1640), in addition to the constant threat, of political domination by Spain (and all this in a country with its own colonial empire!). But there is, also, the need to consider the effects of decades of censorship imposed on the Portuguese by the Portuguese themselves, in the form of the Salazarist regime that lasted almost half a century (1928-1974). In the light of the characteristics of this regime (details of which are revealed in Chapter 1), is it, for example, surprising that sociology as a discipline, not to mention sociological research, has only begun to come into its own since the revolution of April 1974?¹⁰

Looking back over the history of education in Portugal, we find a curious mixture of precociousness and frustration. For example, in spite of the fact that Portugal was one of the first European countries to establish the principle of compulsory schooling, 'which came to be formulated in the Reform of Rodrigo de

Fonseca on the 7th of September, 1835, was suspended in December of the same year, but renewed once again with the Reform of Passos Manuel on November 17, 1836¹¹, the illiteracy rate among the population at the turn of the century was extraordinarily high (in 1900: 66% of all men and 82% of all women¹²). Further evidence of a certain availability of the 'right ideas', but a profound incapacity to make them work, is supplied by the following comment extracted from a work by the historian Pulido Valente on Portuguese 'liceus' during the period 1834-1930:

'(...) if the battle could be won in the field of choice of curriculum, study plans and programmes, it could not have success when it came to (pedagogic) methods. Indeed, here all the endemic deficiencies of the Portuguese education system (poverty of means, lack of teachers, poor installations, lack of school equipment, etc.) made its weight felt. Thus, in spite of all measures taken between 1910 and 1926 to improve inductive and experimental methods, lyceum education remained, as Sérgio argued, abstract, verbalist, descriptive and mnemonic.' 13

The tables on Portuguese education in the 1970s, presented in Appendix I, suggest that the 'endemic deficiencies of the Portuguese education system' continue to plague present-day Portugal. Thus, in addition to the problems of colonialism and censorship, two constant thorns in the side of the Portuguese education system which further explain a possible scepticism on the part of the Portuguese with regard to their own productive capabilities, have been the, almost certainly related but more general, problems of

- 1) a frequent inability to translate policies into practice, and
- 2) a lack of resources. In fact, these problems are not specific to the education system, but refer to the state generally. They

are also problems which have become recognized as problems in large part because public expectations have been generally stimulated with regard to what a 'successful' Portugal should be. This means that Portugal is obliged to try and live up to its history as one of the first and most successful European colonizing powers, with a national life dominated by memories of her former glory, and by the benefits and much more important costs of attempting to retain elements of that empire and its associated glory. It also means that Portugal's strategic location on the European continent and its proximity to the consumer and cultural centres of Europe are now, and have been, exceptionally important factors in determining the country's future.¹⁴

The West's failure to take Portugal seriously is renowned.¹⁵ One need only refer to the fact that many Englishmen and women, and more particularly Americans, still think that Spanish is spoken, not only in Portugal, but also in Brazil (which goes a long way towards explaining the Spanish, or Greek (!), music scores that so often accompany Hollywood films set in Portugal!). As Pollack and Taylor point out,¹⁶ not only works of an historical nature, but also works of economic history have been virtually non-existent on Portugal (which is not the case with her neighbour Spain). It is true that since the revolution of 1974-5 a spate of articles and books written on the revolutionary period, by both foreign and Portuguese authors, has appeared. However, in spite of this fact, it is rare that one comes across in a British social science journal, in an international journal, or even on university library bookshelves (even more rare, in a London bookshop), analyses or studies carried out by the Portuguese on their

own reality.¹⁷

In contrast with the relatively indifferent approach towards Portugal by many Western scholars, which has resulted in the common neglect of serious study from the West on Portugal (and on works by Portuguese scholars), and in the consequent homogenization of important distinctions such as 'Third World', semi-peripheral and peripheral,¹⁸ there have appeared a few serious, and not unsubtle, attempts to come to terms with 'Portuguese realities'. One such attempt is Nicos Poulantzas's brief, but complex, study of the fall of the Salazarist regime.¹⁹ Poulantzas's study is particularly interesting because it is an example of an attempt, by a Marxist sociologist, to fit 'Portuguese realities' to a series of concepts imported from another reality (France, primarily, but also other advanced capitalist countries).

Poulantzas's theorization of the 'exceptional' capitalist state (fascism, dictatorship, bonapartism), that is, a state at the 'limit' of the 'bourgeois state', and therefore different in form from the 'normal' capitalist state (i.e. the parliamentary-democratic state), results from his creation of a variant of the ideal-type model of the capitalist state. This is expressed in a showcase of concepts ('imperialist world context', 'interventionist state', 'uneven development', 'crisis of hegemony', 'state apparatuses', 'power bloc', etc.). Originally applied to Germany and Italy to illustrate the process by which their states became 'exceptional', Poulantzas next applied his model, devoid of any historical content, to the particular realities of Spain, Greece and Portugal in order to study the 'inverse form of the "rise of fascism"', i.e., 'the fall of the dictatorships'. Effectively,

Poulantzas, characterized these three regimes as in transition from the 'exceptional' to the 'parliamentary-democratic' form of state.

In spite of the insights that one may gain from Poulantzas's study,²⁰ there is something profoundly unsatisfactory in his characterization of a regime which lasted for nearly fifty years as 'exceptional'. Further, the characterization of Hitler's Germany, Mussolini's Italy and Salazar's Portugal as containing 'exceptional' forms of the capitalist state quite possibly hides more than it uncovers. At the root of the problem we would like to argue, is the imposition of a set of categories which, in the end, treats 'Portuguese realities' like so many pieces of a puzzle that to be understood merely need to be slotted into the right spot of the conceptual framework.

All this is not to deny the validity of using theories and concepts developed (mainly, but not only) in advanced capitalist countries to interpret 'Portuguese realities'. Some are, of course, essential (if we are not to repeat the whole history of the social sciences in Portugal), but also some are more difficult to employ than others. In addition to the problems created by the imposition of whole conceptual frameworks, as in the Poulantzas example above, there are individual concepts that when extracted from theories dealing with very specific phenomena, like 'late capitalism', are not directly applicable to a country like Portugal. Thus, a concept like 'legitimation crisis',²¹ which attempts to specify the particular nature of the late capitalist state, in contrast with the earlier, 19th century, capitalist state, needs considerable new accompanying explanation and demonstration before it can be applied to a country which arguably never passed through a phase of 'laissez-faire' capitalism.

Other concepts, that may appear on the surface to be less attached to particular theories, like 'development', in fact come to the analysis highly charged with connotations that have accrued over a long period of time due to the usage of the concept within a particular theoretical problematic and/or within a particular social context. Sociologist Reinhard Bendix argued some years ago that the identification of the history of Western societies with the concept of development made the concept's usefulness somewhat dubious (particularly for understanding the differences between the Western societies themselves).²² Thus Bendix made a distinction between 'modernization', which he argued was characterized by socio-political change, and 'industrialization', characterized by technico-economic change. Together, 'modernization' (the 'proper' attitudes, values and symbols) and 'industrialization' (including economic growth) would equal 'development'. However, the problem is, or was, as Bendix himself pointed out, that with this notion of development implicit appears the belief that societies will increasingly resemble each other as they become fully 'industrialized' and/or 'modernized'.²³

In their struggle against modernization theory, dependency theorists, like Clive Thomas, have, in effect, reversed this argument by arguing that modernized, industrialized countries 'develop' 'underdevelopment', not among themselves, but among the other nations of the world. Thus, increasingly, there is seen to be a dissimilarity between the 'developed' and the 'underdeveloped' countries. Unfortunately, this usage of the concept of development has had the tendency to reduce it to what is, in effect, a negative economic 'growth' rate.²⁴

One of the main aims of the first chapter of this thesis is to try to overcome the above-mentioned deficiencies of the way in which the concept of development has been employed. It is argued that to understand development it must be placed in both its national and international contexts taking into account not only economic relations within and between states but also the specific political and ideological conditions that support and integrate those economic relations, or, on the other hand, oppose them. In Chapter 1 changing definitions of national development are studied through the changing nature of the Portuguese state over a period of fifty years. The changing contribution of education to the formation of these changing definitions of national development is argued to be important and at times vital. In the course of the analysis we discover that while severe constraints were placed on the state in Portugal by the country's international economic and political position, the precise forms taken by the state's responses to these constraints covered a wide range, from Republicanism to Salazarism to the popular politics associated with the 25th of April revolution. The state, therefore, is not conceived as some sort of originating subject, with an essential unity (for example, the authoritarian character of the state in Portuguese history²⁵), that could very well lead one to portray both the Republican period and the revolutionary period as mere aberrations in the normal course of Portuguese history.²⁶ Rather, the state is conceived as a number of state apparatuses - 'specifically publicly financed institutions'²⁷ - that have definite effects on political struggles and which are in turn effected by those struggles.

Neither external constraints nor national history is thought to be totally determining. Rather they are seen as setting limits on the state's action, and hence on its capacity to change its nature. Variations in these limits reveal themselves from chapter to chapter. Thus, if in parts of the first chapter the broadly shaping presence of the capitalist state is strongly felt, due to the presence of a state that is more coercive than consensual and which performs a central economic role, in Chapter 2 the state appears slightly more consensual, partly in response to the crisis of the regime and to pressure coming from below, partly in response to pressure coming from abroad (which became increasingly important not only in terms of resources, but also in terms of a model of economic development). In Chapters 3 and 4, the state, in the midst of institutional crisis, becomes an almost irrelevant oppositional entity, existing more in terms of its potential than in terms of its actual capacity. Finally, in Chapter 5, the state regains form and capacity for action, with surprising ease, and reappears as both capitalist and controlling, but at the same time with a degree of permeability and responsiveness that can only be attributed to the legacy of the revolutionary period.

Throughout the thesis the analysis of the Portuguese state is aided by the distinction between state and civil society. The concept of civil society helps us to theorize social relations which are not directly relations of production. It enables us to distinguish different forms of the state which may be important for understanding education's role and its degree of autonomy both from the family and the church and from the economy. By taking into account the social relations of civil society, kept separate and distinct from both the social relations of the state and of the economy,

we are able to get greater purchase on the changing nature of the state (which in turn affects the structure and process of the education system), for the changing demands on the state in carrying out its basic functions are filtered through and mediated by the social forces of civil society. In sum, the concept of civil society enables us to enlist support for a more pluralist view of competing ideologies as it acts, in Perry Anderson's words, as a 'line of demarcation', distinguishing those institutions and mechanisms lying 'outside the boundaries of the state system proper'.²⁸ While this usage is not wholly satisfactory - at times the state and the realm of politics appear to take on a somewhat artificial character, while at other times they appear completely autonomous - it does provide a more complex and plausible conception of relations within a capitalist society.²⁹

Summing up what we have said so far, this thesis, in the main, sets out to be heuristic in its investigation of the contribution of education to changing 'Portuguese realities' during the decade of the seventies in Portugal. This is due in part to the conceptual constraints imposed upon it, and in part to the breadth of its object of analysis. Much of its emphasis, therefore, is on the preliminary task of ordering phenomena of change, in the light of a particular perspective,³⁰ in order to find out just what change may have occurred and in order to gain an idea of that change likely to occur in the future. This should not be misconstrued to suggest that the thesis avoids interpretation of the description and selection of data and events that it brings to analysis. On the contrary, by mapping out and presenting a preliminary assessment of both policy and experiences it aspires to influence the formulation of education policy in Portugal.³¹ Also, in the course of

providing a modest contribution to the establishment of 'Portuguese realities', in full recognition of their international and historical character, it strives to respect, but not to revere, theories and concepts designed and developed beyond the frontiers of those 'realities'.

Educational and Cultural Mobilization in the 1970s

Unquestionably the dominant event of the decade of the seventies in Portugal was the April revolution of 1974. And the revolution, by bringing to the surface, and once there focussing, contradictions for some time present in Portuguese society, made clear the obstacles blocking profound educational change (expressed most clearly in the initial programme of the Armed Forces Movement as the three Ds: 'Decolonize, Democratize, Develop'³²). For as Karabel and Halsey have pointed out:

'The process of educational reform during periods of revolutionary upheaval raises with particular sharpness the general problem of the relationship between education and social change. For these are among the rare historical moments when the weight of existing institutions and practices lightens to permit radical experimentation in education. Revolutions do not merely make educational change possible, they require it. They must transform the education system and bring it into harmony with the new institutional and ideological framework.' 33

It is the processes of educational and cultural mobilization that provided the context for, and made possible, such transformation in Portugal that make up the object of analysis of this work.

To set the arena in which the action of the mobilization processes are to take place, Chapter 1 begins with a characterization

of four phases in the relationship between the state and civil society in Portugal. This characterization focusses on the contribution of education during each of these phases to the resolution of problems faced by the Portuguese state. The analysis starts in 1926, because it was in that year that the various liberal and socialist attempts to transform Portuguese state and society to bring them more in tune with a rapidly changing outside world were finally brought to an end by decisive military action. This in turn made possible the quite different methods and purposes of coming to terms with a changing world adopted by António d'Oliveira Salazar, who dominated Portuguese state and society for almost forty years. It is Salazar's goals for the country, and the structures he created in attempting to bring them about, that provide the context for the first two periods of our analysis: from the military coup of 1926 to 1945, and from 1945 to the April revolution of 1974.³⁴

Portugal post-Salazar is characterized briefly in the two periods making up the remaining years of the decade of the seventies: the revolutionary period from April, 1974, to the taking of office by the 1st post-revolutionary Constitutional Government in 1976; and finally the period of 'normalization' that took on full force in the educational field with the appointment of Sottomayor Cardia as Education Minister to the 1st Constitutional Government in 1976, to the appointment of Vítor Crespo as Prime Minister Sá Carneiro's Education Minister at the beginning of 1980.³⁵

Chapters 2 to 5 develop in detail the conflicts generated over particular educational policies adopted by the state, and/or make clear changes in state practices or within state institutions during the 1970s. This is accomplished through a study of the content and effects of the three major educational events of the

decade: a) the Veiga Simão Reform in education, which made its impact principally in the first years of the decade, b) the mobilization activities associated with the revolution of 25 April, 1974, and c) the intervention of the World Bank in Portuguese higher education during the latter part of the decade.

In point of fact, Salazar retired from political activity after a stroke in 1968. Marcello Caetano, life-long colleague and supporter of Salazar, took over the reins of government and soon after initiated a period that came to be known as 'liberalization'. One of the major symbols of 'liberalization' was the 'Battle in Education' officially announced to the public at the beginning of 1970. The analysis of the Veiga Simão Reform in education (1971-73), which was the centrepiece of the famed 'Battle in Education', results in a discussion of several contrasting interpretations of the Reform and its possible implications as an official strategy to break out of the economic and social crisis which became increasingly evident during the early years of the decade of the seventies. It also aims to show that the opposition in the field of education to the Salazarist/Marcellist regime, in its declining years, was not only a reality, having direct effects on the regime's attempts to solve its own political crisis, but also a foretaste of things to come. While not recognized as such, educational mobilization made its debut at the beginning of the decade of the seventies under the guise of, and through the mouthpiece that was, the Veiga Simão Reform. Thus, in Chapter 2, it is argued that the educational mobilization associated with the April revolution actually began prior to the revolution. This in no way denies the impact of the revolutionary period, but rather challenges the view that 'the 25th of April lifted the lid off a political and

cultural vacuum.³⁶

Chapters 3 and 4 explore in some detail educational mobilization during the revolutionary period, 1974-75. Since it is impossible to deal with all the diverse aspects of the revolutionary period,³⁷ two categories of events are singled out as being representative of educational mobilization. These are, in Chapter 3, the introduction of democratic management in schools, and in Chapter 4, centrally planned and controlled mobilization activities such as the Cultural 'Dynamization' Campaign carried out by the Armed Forces Movement (the MFA) and initiatives promoted by the Education Ministry such as the Student Civic Service and Civic Polytechnic Education. These events are chosen for several reasons: 1) because of their impact during the period (as reported in the media and in subsequent material produced on the period³⁸); 2) because they permit the systematization of the tensions between different concepts of political expression that existed among the agents of the revolution; and 3) because through them it is possible to question the nature of the revolution itself, and particularly of education's contribution to it.

The systematization of the tensions between different conceptions of political expression that existed among the agents of the revolution is referred to directly in the thesis as two mobilizing currents with conflicting solutions for resolving the problem of the revolution in Portugal: 'alfabetização' (mass literacy) and 'poder popular' (popular, or people's, power). Although these currents are conceived as expressing different conceptions of politics, they are both constitutive of educational mobilization during the revolutionary period. They also cut across the more rigid categories of Communist Party-left and Ultra-left (meaning that

they do not correspond unambiguously to distinct social supports). Breines, in a recent work,³⁹ has referred to the distinction between 'strategic' and 'prefigurative' politics. While the latter is essentially anti-organization, anti-hierarchical and based on participatory democracy, the former is committed to building organization in order to achieve power in order to produce structural changes in the political, economic and social orders. Without going further into details here (in order not to pre-empt the discussion which is carried out in Chapter 4), in Breines's terminology 'alfabetização' employed a 'strategic' conception of politics, while 'poder popular' employed a 'prefigurative' politics. The result was that while, for example, 'poder popular' put at the top of its agenda the condemnation of the class nature of the 'capitalist' school, in a capitalist Portugal, and its replacement through the immediate creation of the 'socialist' school (the school would thus become a counter-institution based on participatory, direct democracy), 'alfabetização' saw as priority the immediate expansion of the education system by throwing open the doors of the school to the whole of the Portuguese community. In the meantime it would set about the concretization of a central revolutionary power to be eventually capable of orienting the school as an aid to the construction of the socialist society.

Chapters 3 and 4, in summary, attempt to establish the general nature of what counted as education in a society where sudden, thorough-going change altered the basic supports of civil society, by introducing important new supports and changing the relative weight of others. In the discovery of this process, we are also led to discover what meanings were attributed to both democracy and socialism and to the notion of revolution itself. The introduction

of democratic management into schools and the campaign of cultural 'dynamization' were two events exemplifying the activity, contact and energy of the revolutionary period, where new forms of education, or, at a minimum, the extension of those already existing, demonstrated the capacity and the creativity of a reborn civil society. Thus, they were part of the 'discovery' - or, better, 'rediscovery' - of 'Portuguese realities', through which political expression was enlightened and enriched.⁴⁰ This was particularly true in a Portugal that had suddenly not only lost its empire, but had also temporarily lost (but in the long term reinforced?), at least politically and culturally, its normally designated status of 'peripheral'.⁴¹

In fact, Portugal's temporarily displaced peripheral status returned with a certain degree of vengeance. This process is discussed in Chapter 5 through a consideration of the question of Portuguese national independence. After the contact, creativity and discovery of the processes of educational and cultural mobilization, there followed a period that we have called 'normalization'.⁴² The key concepts in education during this period were efficiency and hierarchy. To be successful, the rapid reconstruction of the state, which rode in on the wave of 'normalization', required both resources and an alternative interpretation of 'Portuguese realities', which would appear as both neutral and natural (i.e. 'normal'). Both became available with the assumption of political power by the Socialist Party in 1976, via the mechanisms of pluralist democracy, and with the explicit support of international organizations such as the EEC, EFTA, the World Bank and, eventually, the IMF. Thus the alternative interpretation of 'Portuguese realities' was to be based on the consolidation of pluralist democracy at the

expense of 'Portugal in transition to socialism'. Here the World Bank played a significant role, for apart from providing a certain coherence both in terms of the objectives 'desired' by the education system and the planning procedures necessary for obtaining them, it also contributed external support to 1) an Education Ministry in need of putting its own house in order, and 2) to the pluralist party-based call for a strengthening of Portugal's European cultural heritage⁴³ in order to save a 'dependent' Portugal direly in need of good relations with her 'democratic' and 'pluralist' European neighbours.

It is argued in Chapter 5 that the attempted ideological neutralization of education, central to normalization, in apparent correlation with the Government's priorities and in harmony with the World Bank's solution for education, namely the adaptation of education to the necessities of economic development that demand the preparation of skilled labour with different levels of qualification, was not only in opposition to the constant and vibrant debate within post-revolutionary civil society over educational problems, but also that it took place at a time, in a particular conjuncture, when Portuguese national independence was particularly vulnerable to external influence, and hence to increased 'peripheralization'.

In one sense the Veiga Simão Reform, the educational mobilization of the revolutionary period and World Bank intervention at the end of the decade of the seventies were all elements of wider attempts to provide a model of social and economic development capable of resolving Portugal's long-endured 'endemic deficiencies', both economic and political. However, it appears that conflicting interpretations of 'Portuguese realities', always subject to the limits imposed by a changing international situation, have

consistently resulted in conflicting solutions for resolving political and economic problems.⁴⁴ Thus, although one could argue that, in the end, after the dust had settled, that is, after the revolutionary period had definitively come to a close, that education did, indeed, find itself restored to its 'proper' place within the social order, 'in line with the new institutional and ideological framework',⁴⁵ doubts remain. This may be due to the difficulty of neutralizing considerations over the justice of social life replacing them with considerations of efficiency and of technical skills in a social context dominated by the continuing clash between the heritage of the revolutionary process and Portugal's international economic and political position.

A Final Note on Methodology

It might be argued that the events of the decade of the seventies are too recent to be seen in their proper perspective. And, indeed, in certain respects the relative nearness of the period in study has caused problems. However, in terms of the problem of 'proper perspective', it is worth remembering that even events in the distant past do not sort themselves out in the course of time by some automatic process. The present observer does the sorting and often contemporary reasons determine the order of arrangement.⁴⁶ Additionally, there are advantages to be gained in the study of 'contemporary history': materials are much closer at hand and therefore generally more available, and the memory of impressions by participants and observers of the period in question is much more vivid.

But it is also this last fact which may raise problems,

particularly for the employment of certain research techniques. For example, in this present work, it has been discovered that formal interviewing techniques have had very little to offer. The problem is summed up in the following remark made by the historian Llewellyn Woodward:

'None of us can escape from the distorting influence of after-knowledge. The memories of persons who have held positions of power tend (...) to be unreliable.' 47

Naturally, this problem is exacerbated by the nearness in time of the event in question, and, further, by the degree of intensity with which the event was lived. Both the explosive and, at times, sectarian nature of the revolutionary period in Portugal, and the ambiguity of the revolution's aims, have made it very difficult to obtain anything like an 'impartial' or 'objective' view. This problem, compounded by the remaining effects of half a century of repressive regime where even suspicion among friends was common, has led to the insistence of former participants in the educational events studied here to, in general, merely justify the particular policies they may have pursued, or the particular positions they may have taken, and to qualify their judgements in order not to jeopardize their political futures. Consequently, it was decided that the contribution that such persons could make to this study would be as equally effective through the use of their writings and possible interviews to the press as through any process of formal interviewing. Also, in this way, a more complete research of documental sources could be undertaken.

The material drawn upon to support the view expressed in this thesis ranges from the general literature on the sociology of education and the sociology of development to governmental programmes

and political party documents. The chapter on the Veiga Simão Reform draws heavily on the governmental proposal for the reform of the education system (1971) and on its transition into law (1973). The debates which took place in the 'National Assembly' on the Reform and the public debates that took place in the press and other mass media on the proposal and the governmental measures, also contribute considerably to the analysis.

The revolutionary period draws particularly on political and educational reports and programmes of the central organs of political decision-making (legal 'diplomas', governmental programmes, parliamentary debates, official reports) and on political party documents (programmes, congresses, conferences on education and schooling). Notwithstanding the, at times, intensely sectarian nature of the debate over national problems, significant documents produced through other institutionally organized forms of public expression, namely teachers' unions, parents' associations, students' associations, professional associations, the Catholic Church, are also used.

Finally, the analysis of the World Bank intervention in Portugal, in addition to extending itself to materials and sources equivalent to those mentioned above, bases itself on World Bank reports produced especially for the Bank's programme in Portugal, and on publicly available documents released by the World Bank's information office.

Footnotes to the Introduction

1. The phrase 'Portuguese realities', which makes up part of the title of this thesis, appears frequently in official Portuguese documents and in ministerial and legislative speeches, not only subsequent to the April revolution of 1974, but also prior to it. It is a phrase that has been employed by all sectors of the political spectrum, usually in a rather bombastic manner, rarely enjoying the privilege of being precisely defined.
2. 'Not necessarily', for it depends on the nature of the research. In anthropological research, distance from the object of analysis can actually help one avoid the imposition of one's own values. José Cutileiro discusses this problem to some extent in his study A Portuguese Rural Society, Oxford University Press, 1971. Even for the sociological research of a recent period in Portuguese education, being an 'outsider' does have certain advantages. It gives one, for example, a certain distance which allows for a certain objectivity, and perhaps more importantly, it allows one a certain freshness of view (particularly relevant following a turbulent revolutionary period).
3. We are thinking here of important works such as A. Emmanuel (1972), Unequal Exchange: A Study of the Imperialism of Trade, New York: Monthly Review Press; Samir Amin (1976), Unequal Development, Brighton: Harvester Press; F.H. Cardoso (1969), Sociologie du Developpement en Amerique Latine, Paris: Anthropos; Celso Furtado (1970), Theorie du Developpement Economique, Paris; F.H. Cardoso and E. Faletto (1972), Dependencia y Desarrollo en America Latina, Mexico; Theotonio dos Santos (1973), "Crisis of Development Theory and the Problem of Dependence in Latin America", in Bernstein, H. (ed.), Development and Underdevelopment, Harmondsworth: Penguin; Ladislau Dowbor (1977), A Formação do Capitalismo Dependente no Brazil, São Paulo: Prelo; etc.
4. Mário Murteira was Minister of Planning and Economic Coordination for the 1st, 4th and 5th Provisional Governments (1974-75). Reference to his work appears at fairly regular intervals

throughout this thesis.

5. Most of the sociological work in education that appeared before the April revolution of 1974 was produced by the Gabinete de Investigações Sociais (G.I.S.). Sedas Nunes, Portugal's best known sociologist (and Director of G.I.S.), in addition to an important work in the area of sociology of development (Sociologia e Ideologia do Desenvolvimento, Lisbon: Moraes, 1968), was responsible for several studies on the Portuguese university during the latter part of the sixties, early part of the seventies: Estudos Sobre a Universidade em Portugal, published in 1968; "O Meio Universitário em Portugal", with Vítor Matias Ferreira, also published in 1968 (in the journal of G.I.S., Análise Social); "A Crise da Universidade em Portugal: reflexões e sugestões", written with J.P. Miller Guerra and published in Análise Social, 1969; A Universidade na Vida Portuguesa, a collection of studies edited by Sedas Nunes and published in 1969 (2 Volumes); O Problema Social da Universidade, from 1970; and finally, O Problema Político da Universidade, a collection of studies published in 1970 by the Portuguese publisher Dom Quixote. In addition, there appeared in Análise Social works such as "A Evolução Recente da Estrutura Escolar Portuguesa", by Ludovico Morgado Cândido, in 1964; "O Desenvolvimento Sócio-Económico e a Educação", from António Sousa Gomes, in 1964; and "Cronologia Histórica das Universidades Portuguesas: 1759-1968", by Maria Eduarda Cruzeiro and Raul da Silva Pereira, published in 1968. Beyond the realm of Análise Social very little else was published that had to do with sociology and education. Journals like Seara Nova and O Tempo e o Modo published in the early seventies conjunctural analyses of educational events, some of them sociological in flavour. Of course, one could draw up a list of many distinguished Portuguese writers and essayists, like, for example, António Sérgio and Rui Grácio (see bibliography for a number of works by these authors), who have contributed to education in some significant way in Portugal over the years of the 20th century (works post 25 April 1974 are discussed below), but the number of actual studies carried out employing some form of sociological method

are few indeed. Finally, one should mention Rogério Fernandes's two books (Ensino: Sector em Crise, Lisbon: Prelo Editores, 1967; and Situação da Educação em Portugal, Lisbon: Moraes, 1973) which attempt to analyse Portuguese education conjuncturally in terms of its social context.

6. Almost all the works in this area prior to the April revolution were carried out by economists during the decade of the sixties working for ministerial departments or institutions, often in conjunction with the OECD. Many of them were related to, or stimulated at least in part by the "Projecto Regional do Mediterrâneo" (Mediterranean Regional Project), Instituto de Alta Cultura, Centro de Estudos de Estatística Económica, Lisbon, 1963. Reference to these works occurs several times in the body of the thesis. Works appearing after 1974 are discussed below.
7. For comments on further shortages in other areas, see Benny Pollack and Jim Taylor (1983), "Review Article: The Transition to Democracy in Portugal and Spain", British Journal of Political Science, 13.
8. Portuguese historian Joel Serrão comments that Portugal was '(...) a country which, after the loss of Brazil (1822), did not succeed in uncovering another route save that of economic vassalage to England (...).' see Joel Serrão (1981), "Estrutura Social, Ideologia e Sistema de Ensino", in Manuela Silva and M. Isabel Tamen (eds.), Sistema de Ensino em Portugal, Lisbon: Fundação Calouste Gulbenkian, p. 27.
9. Once again, citing Joel Serrão: 'The model which the Portuguese bourgeoisie followed in assuming its historic responsibility of the erection of a Liberal State was of French origin.' see *ibid.*, p. 22. In secondary education, the Portuguese 'liceu' was equivalent to the French 'lycee'. In fact, public organizations generally both on the mainland and in the overseas territories were 'structured according to the norms of a hierarchical and centralized administrative model based on the reforms executed by Napoleon in early 19th century France.' see L.S. Graham

(1975), Portugal, the Decline and Collapse of an Authoritarian Order, London and Beverly Hills: Sage, p. 63.

10. Some discussion of the appearance (and the disappearance!) of sociology as a discipline at various levels of the education system occurs in Chapter 1. University degrees in sociology are now available in Portugal. Prior to the April revolution there was some attempt to introduce sociology into the University, around the time of the Veiga Simão Reform. Thus the newly-created institute of higher education, ISCTE ('Instituto Superior das Ciências do Trabalho e das Empresas'), offered a licentiate degree in 'Ciências de Trabalho', which was in fact very sociological in content. The first degree in Sociology only appeared, however, after the April revolution (Sociology of Education as a discipline is only just now, in 1983, getting off the ground). Most sociological research continues to be oriented by the G.I.S., which only recently (February 10, 1982) became the Institute of Social Sciences of the University of Lisbon.
11. see José Salvado Sampaio (1978), "Insucesso Escolar e Obrigatoriedade Escolar em Portugal", Análise Psicológica, no.1, vol. 2, p. 11.
12. *ibid.*
13. see Vasco Pulido Valente (1973), "O Estado Liberal e o Ensino: os Liceus Portugueses (1834-1930)", Cadernos G.I.S., p. 29. The years between 1910 and 1926 constituted the years of the 1st Portuguese Republic. Reference is made to this period in Chapter 1. The 'Sérgio' Valente refers to is António Sérgio. see Chapter 5 for further comments on Sérgio.
14. One need only refer to the fact that there are a million Portuguese living and working in France. I. Wallerstein would add another conditioning factor: its 'nature' as a buffer-zone between the 'core' countries of the 'capitalist world system' and the 'peripheral' nations of the 'Third World'. see I.

Wallerstein (1981), "The Rise and Future Demise of the World Capitalist System: Concepts for Comparative Analysis", in Rod Aya, Hamza Alavi and Teodor Shanin (eds.), The Sociology of Developing Societies, London: Macmillan.

15. With the exception of NATO, which has always taken Portugal very seriously. For examples of NATO 'concern' during the revolutionary period, see T. Szulc (1975), "Washington and Lisbon: Behind the Portuguese Revolution", Foreign Policy, no. 21, Winter; also Rainer Eisfeld (1983), "A 'Revolução dos Cravos' e a Política Externa: O Fracasso do Pluralismo Socialista em Portugal a Seguir a 1974", Revista Crítica de Ciências Sociais, no. 11, May.
16. Benny Pollack and Jim Taylor, op. cit. Unfortunately, Pollack and Taylor appear to suffer from the very disease they wish to cure: their 'basic recommended bibliography on Portugal' - i.e. 'list of essential readings' - contains only five works by Portuguese authors (out of a list of 25 works on Portugal). see also Juan Linz who refers to the neglect of smaller countries by Western social scientists in the Foreword to Lawrence S. Graham and Harry M. Makler (eds.) (1979), Contemporary Portugal: The Revolution and its Antecedents, Austin and London: University of Texas Press, p. vii.
17. At least in some quarters, however, there is an attempt being made to make Portuguese analyses of their reality known to a wider public. see, for example, the Graham and Makler reader referred to above (note 16); also Richard Scase (1980), The State in Western Europe, London: Croom Helm (which includes an article by Portuguese authors N. Portas and S. Gago, "Some Preliminary Notes on the State in Contemporary Portugal"); and the recent reader, In Search of Modern Portugal, edited by L.S. Graham and D.L. Wheeler, University of Wisconsin Press, 1982. One should also mention, in this context, the valuable diffusion work being carried out by Douglas Wheeler's International Conference Group on Portugal, based at the University of New Hampshire. see, for example, the Portuguese Studies

Newsletter, nos. 1-11, Department of History, University of New Hampshire, 1976-83.

18. It is important to cite Nicos Mouzelis's work on Greece here. Mouzelis has probably gone further than anyone else in specifying the political and economic aspects of European 'peripherality'. He has done so through his attempt to establish the specificity of Greek capitalism. This has led him, in contrast to both modernization theory and dependency theory, to put great emphasis on historical specificity. Thus Mouzelis has explored not only the process of dependent industrialization and its 'enclave' form in Greece, but has also sought to explain the relationship between state and civil society in Greece. see Nicos Mouzelis (1978), Modern Greece: Facets of Under-Development, London: Macmillan; (1978), "Class and Clientelistic Politics: the Case of Greece", Sociological Review; (1980), "Capitalism and the Development of the Greek State", in R. Scase (ed.), op. cit.; (1980), "Modern Greece: Development or Underdevelopment?", Monthly Review, vol. 32, part 7; and (1980), "Modernization, Underdevelopment, Uneven Development: Prospects for a Theory of Third World Formations", The Journal of Peasant Studies, 7.
19. Nicos Poulantzas (1976), The Crisis of the Dictatorships, New Left Books.
20. Which include a penetrating critique of economism, the introduction of a wealth of theoretical determinations to specify fascism as an 'exceptional state' and a general analysis of the state, which had the effect of focussing struggles over and in the state and which, in Portugal's case, stressed the structural weight of the military and from there the obstacles in the path of a potential 'parliamentary-democratic' Portuguese state.
21. see Jurgen Habermas (1976), Legitimation Crisis, London: Heineman.

22. see Reinhard Bendix (1964), Nation-Building and Citizenship: Studies of Our Changing Social Order, New York: John Wiley and Sons, Chapter 1.
23. *ibid.*
24. see Clive Thomas (1974), Dependence and Transformation: The Economics of the Transition to Socialism, New York and London: Monthly Review Press, especially Part 1.
25. For a discussion of this problematic, see Stephen R. Stoer (1978), "Ideology and the Specificity of the Portuguese State", M.A. Dissertation, Institute of Education, The University of London.
26. The alternative 'aberration' is to portray the Salazarist period as a sort of 'extended interruption' in the modernization process of Portugal. see Chapter 1 for comments on the Republican period. A typical view of the revolutionary period as an aberration is given by Richard Robinson, who refers to the 'Revolution of the Flowers' as a 'temporary suspension of the superego of socio-political discipline'. This permits him to state further: 'The activist ego was given free rein and the results were manifested in political, and to a lesser extent social, flights of fantasy which ignored or challenged the hard facts of economic and social reality. By 25 November, 1975, most of the libido was spent and the superego began again to take up its function.' see Richard Robinson (1979), Contemporary Portugal, London: George Allen and Unwin, p. 195.
27. For a discussion of state apparatuses as publicly financed institutions, see R. Dale (1981), "Education and the Capitalist State: Contributions and Contradictions", in M. Apple (ed.), Economic and Social Reproduction in Education, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. see also especially Chapter 5 for specific discussion of the state.
28. see Perry Anderson (1976), "The Antinomies of Antonio Gramsci",

New Left Review, no. 100, p. 35.

29. In all theories, but particularly Marxist theories, of the state there appears a seemingly irresolvable tension created by the desire to conceive the state, at one and the same time, as basically organized coercion, in Skocpol's words, as a 'set of administrative, policing and military organizations headed, and more or less well-coordinated by, an executive authority', and as a set of institutions founded ultimately on some form of social consensus that makes society itself possible. Thus, state policies - such as the Veiga Simão Reform discussed in Chapter 2 - appear, on the one hand, as coercive, because they contribute, directly or indirectly, to securing the conditions of existence for the continued functioning of the (exploitative) capitalist accumulation process, and, on the other, as responsive, in the sense that they are often claimed by the 'people' - i.e. to the extent that they are deemed to respond to the needs/interests/demands of the 'exploited' sector(s) of the population. see, in this respect, John Urry (1981), The Anatomy of Capitalist Societies, London: Macmillan; Theda Skocpol (1979), "State and Revolution: Old Regimes and Revolutionary Crises in France, Russia and China", Theory and Society, vol. 4, nos. 1 and 2, January-March, p. 12; and C. B. Macpherson (1977), "Do We Need a Theory of the State?", Archives of European Sociology, XVIII.
30. This perspective is neo-Marxist. Such an approach is adopted because we see the basic functions of the state in Portugal, as in Britain, defined by the constantly evolving process of capital accumulation. The analysis carried out attempts to see just how the state carries out these functions, what forces act upon it, and how in doing so it affects the structure and processes of the education system. As Macpherson has pointed out, it is the Marxist problematic of the relative autonomy of the state that has contributed most to the question of the state in capitalist societies. see C.B. Macpherson, *ibid.*
31. Accordingly, we would like to quote approvingly the authors

of Unpopular Education: 'Like all students of social development, we stand inside the social relations we describe, not outside them. We have consciously taken sides and not held back from arguing political preferences.' see Steve Baron, Dan Finn, Neil Grant, Michael Green and Richard Johnson (1981), Unpopular Education: Schooling and Social Democracy in England Since 1944, London: Hutchinson, p. 13.

32. see Decree-Law 203/74 of the 15th of May, 1974.
33. Jerome Karabel and A.H. Halsey (eds.) (1977), Power and Ideology in Education, New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 551.
34. The year 1945 is not chosen because of any clear rupture in the Salazarist regime during that year, but rather because internal factors, such as the 'Law of Industrial Reorganization' passed in that year (see Chapter 1 for further comments), and external factors, such as the end of the IIInd World War and the beginning of the epoch of Marshall Aid and bilateral agreements with the U.S.A., make it a convenient dividing line.
35. For a list of Ministers of Education from 1970 to 1980, see Appendix II.
36. see Roger Dale (1977), Open University Course E202 Schooling and Society, Television Programmes 10 and 11: "Alternatives - Portugal".
37. A lot of material has been produced on the revolutionary period, most of it journalistic in nature. In the field of the sociology of education very little has been done. One should mention, however, the contribution of Rui Grácio whose writings, often reflexive in nature, and usually written in essay style, supply good characterizations, with an abundant supply of pedagogic and historical references, of the educational events of the revolutionary period, both in terms of their successes and

their defeats. see the bibliography for a list of Grácio's works. All other work in the sociology of education that has appeared since 1975 has dealt with various periods of the Salazarist regime or with a study of the current state of the education system, particular emphasis being given to school failure. With respect to the former, see, for example, J. Salvado Sampaio (1977), O Ensino Primário 1911-1969: Contribuição Monográfica, Vols. I,II,III, Lisbon: Fundação Calouste Gulbenkian; M. Filomena Mónica (1978), Educação e Sociedade no Portugal de Salazar, Lisbon: Presença; M. Fátima Bivar (1975), Ensino Primário e Ideologia, Lisbon: Seara Nova; Sérgio Grácio (1982), "Escolarização e Modos de Integração na Formação Social Portuguesa (1950-1978)", Análise Psicológica, no. 4, April/May/June; and Luisa Cortesão (1982), Escola, Sociedade, Que Relação?, Oporto: Edições Afrontamento. With respect to the current state of the education system and school failure, see, for example, Sérgio Grácio and Sacuntala de Miranda (1977), "Insucesso Escolar e Origem Social : resultados dum inquérito-piloto", Análise Social, no. 51; S. de Miranda (1978), "Insucesso Escolar e Origem Social no Ensino Primário: resultados de um inquérito na zona escolar de Oeiras-Algês", Análise Social, no. 55; Ana Benavente (1976), A Escola na Sociedade de Classes, Lisbon: Livros Horizonte; M. Eduarda Cruzeiro and M.L. Martinho Antunes (1976), "O Ensino Secundário em Portugal", Análise Social, no. 48; M. Eduarda Cruzeiro and M.L. Martinho Antunes (1978), "Ensino Secundário: duas populações, duas escolas (I)", Análise Social, no. 55; Ana Benavente and M. Adelaide Pinto Correia (1981), Obstáculos ao Sucesso na Escola Primária, Lisbon: Instituto de Estudos para o Desenvolvimento; and also two doctoral theses: Emília Ribeiro Pedro (1981), "Social Stratification and Classroom Discourse: a sociolinguistic analysis of classroom practice", CWK Gleerup/Stockholm Institute of Education, and M. Conceição Alves Pinto (1983), "L'Entrée a L'Université au Portugal: un essai d'une approche systemique en education", Université François Rabelais, Tours. Finally, one should also mention the following works which analyse from different perspectives education during the revolutionary

period: A. dos Reis Monteiro (w/d), Educação, Acto Político, Lisbon: Livros Horizonte; Rogério Fernandes (1977), Educação: uma Frente de Luta, Lisbon: Livros Horizonte; and António Teodoro (1978), A Revolução Portuguesa e a Educação, Lisbon: Livros Horizonte.

38. see Chapter 4 and the bibliography.
39. see Wini Breines (1980), "Community and Organization: The New Left and Michels' 'Iron Law'", Social Problems, Vol. 27, no. 4, April.
40. Reference should also be made to the frustrations and setbacks of the period (some of which are considered in Chapters 3 and 4). Political sectarianism and struggle got so fierce that at one point during the revolutionary period there was fear of civil war in Portugal.
41. For an amusing example of the sudden attention focussed on Portugal, see João Abel Manta's cartoon in Appendix VII entitled "Portugal: a difficult problem".
42. After Rui Grácio, who was probably one of the first to use the term. see, for example, his article "A Educação - Quatro Anos Depois", O Jornal da Educação, April, 1978.
43. The Socialist Party's campaign slogan for the legislative elections of 1976 was 'Europe is with us' (Europa Está Conosco). see Margaret Milkman (1979), L'Articulation entre la Politique Internationale et la Politique Interne au Portugal Après le 25 Avril 1974, Licentiate dissertation, Université Catholique de Louvain; Institute de Science Politique et Sociologie, September; also Rainer Eilsfeld (1983), "A 'Revolução dos Cravos' e a Política Externa: o Fracasso do Pluralismo Socialista em Portugal a Seguir a 1974", Revista Crítica de Ciências Sociais, no. 11, May.
44. An interesting work yet to be done in Portugal is an analysis

of the political strategies of the working class movement. One wonders to what extent these strategies have been 'substitutionist' rather than 'statist'. see Steve Baron, et.al., op. cit., for a discussion of these two strategies with relation to the English working class movement and the appearance of mass schooling in England. see also Richard Johnson (1981), 'Education and Development' Course E353, Unit 1, Milton Keynes: The Open University.

45. see note 34 above.

46. 'All history is "contemporary history", declared Croce, meaning that history consists essentially in seeing the past through the eyes of the present and in the light of its problems (...).' see E.H. Carr (1964), What is History?, Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, pp. 20-21.

47. see Llewellyn Woodward (1966), "The Study of Contemporary History", Journal of Contemporary History, 1, 1.

Part One

Chapter 1

Four Phases of the Relationship between
State and Civil Society in Portugal, 1926-1980

"Conservative Modernization"¹ - Remaking the Nation State

The period from 1926 to 1945 in Portugal is notable for its economic stagnation, although as various authors have pointed out, it was during these years that conditions were created for future development, in terms of economic growth and the construction of the Estado Novo (the New State).² The latter was to be the basis for the achievement of what Augusto Joaquim has termed 'Salazar's first axiom: the existence of Homo Lusitanus.'³ The 'New State' was Salazar's method of ensuring the independence and identity of the Portuguese people in the turmoil created by 16 years of the Republic (beginning in 1910 with the overthrow of the Constitutional Monarchy and ending in 1926 with the seizure of power by the military - during the interim there were numerous governments and several attempts to establish dictatorships of one kind or another⁴) and, importantly, world economic crisis; as Augusto Joaquim puts it

'If the Portuguese wanted to remain Portuguese, this could be achieved only by their being independent, frugal and hierarchized members of a strong national state. Salazar saw no solution for the survival of the Portuguese in Portuguese civil society.' 5

The result was a form of corporatism, a system of authority and interest representation, derived in large part from Catholic social thought,⁶ that conceived of a dominant form of socio-political organization 'harmoniously' integrating labour and

capital in guided corporate bodies.⁷ These new compulsory structures, 'singular, non-conflicting, hierarchically ordered and functionally compartmentalized associations'⁸ necessitated the removal of voluntary, competing ones, and were created in the name of national and/or public interest; corporatism and order thus were presented as the alternatives to capitalism and chaos. In addition to 'muzzling deep conflicts',⁹ they were to provide the state with a new base of support for the integration of social groups. The installation of this form of political organization necessarily drew for its legitimation on what have been variously termed 'ideological residues', 'a body of ideas', 'raw materials constituted by prior interpellations'. Thus, Salazarism articulated and legitimated principles of unity, order, nationalism through the trio Deus, Pátria, Família, reducing civil society to the 'natural authorities' of the church, the family and the weltanschauung of the small peasant.¹⁰ At the same time it integrated Portugal's tradition of Catholic social thought and its proud history as a colonial and world-exploring power with the basic material conditions of the country, i.e. a form of dependent capitalism in a country predominantly agrarian, where 80% of the population lived on the land in isolated and particularly poor conditions.

Harry Makler has argued that the

'(...) corporate system in Portugal was intended to organize the interests of the various social groups and subordinate them to the interests of the state.' 11

But what was the precise nature of that state and its relation to civil society, and what mechanism did the state rely upon to

solve its main problem of finding public unity, at least in terms of order if not in terms of consensus? In Salazar's Portugal one finds a form of what Schmitter calls 'state corporatism'. State corporatism

'(...) tends to be associated with political systems in which territorial subunits are tightly subordinated to central bureaucratic power; elections are non-existent or plebiscitary; party systems are dominated or monopolised by a weak single party; executive authorities are ideologically exclusive and more narrowly recruited and are such that political subcultures based on class, ethnicity, language, or regionalism are repressed.' 12

Under Salazar's state corporatism, civil society, that ensemble of associations and organizations such as the family, church, political parties, press, trade unions, etc., which may combine ideological and economic functions, was structured, shaped and dominated by the state to such an extent that the distinction between state and civil society became virtually irrelevant.

In Portugal, at the time when state corporatism was institutionalized, i.e. from 1928 to 1933, the ensemble of associations and organizations of a voluntary nature and maintaining a certain independence from the state found itself truly exhausted, its strength and vigour having been drained away by the 'traumatic' experience of the 1st Republic.¹³ To a large degree, the underlying causes of the Republic's failures were the traditional preponderance of the state and the process of dependent industrialization of peripherally European Portugal. In terms of the former, Howard Wiarda has written on the history of the Portuguese state:

'Among the nobles, corporate entities, municipalities, and the like existent in the emerging Portuguese system, the state became

overwhelmingly preeminent. The state was the regulator of both social structure and economic life. It was the state, specifically the crown, that granted the privileges, titles and monopolies that bought the loyalty of the nobles, that helped centralize royal power, and that made the system work. Using this model of a patronage-patrimonialist system, a succession of kings helped make Portugal the first centralized nation-state in Europe and probably the most developed institutionally of that time.' 14

In terms of the latter, Portugal was, and is, with certain other European countries, like Spain, exceptional in the sense that it fitted neither the European model of capitalist development, with capitalism rising internally - feudalism thus acting as a 'cocoon for embryonic capitalism'¹⁵ - nor the third-world model, where capitalism was imposed from the outside.¹⁶ As Poulantzas notes in his study of three European peripheral countries, Portugal, Spain and Greece,¹⁷ the specific character of development in Portugal was its unevenness, between industrial development through the growth of comprador capital linked, on the one hand, with the colonies, and on the other, with Britain, and the rural sector where the absence of agrarian reform and landowners' feudal exploitation retarded capitalist accumulation, exacerbating regional inequalities, especially those between the interior and the coast. The result of this uneven development was a role for the state as permanent subject of economic development, as an important organizer of capitalist accumulation, in spite of its dependence on foreign capital. This augmented role of the state became more visible in its response to the dual crisis that resulted from Portugal's first serious attempt at modernization (in the Republican period), a crisis within both the power bloc and within the working classes, where neither

was able to organize a coherent political and ideological practice. Through its military apparatus starting with the military coup of May 28, 1926, and later via its conception of the 'enlightened statesman' (Salazar), the state effected a compromise between the national and comprador fractions of the bourgeoisie,¹⁸ and with Catholicism became the cohesive force in the political recomposition of the classes opposed to the (numerically small and politically divided) working classes. It is in this sense that one can argue (as did Mouzelis in his analysis of Greece¹⁹) that capital maintained its dominance in the Portuguese economy without the economically dominant industrial bourgeoisie exercising control over the state apparatus. This was made possible by the destruction or literal incorporation of the institutions of civil society entailed by the constitution of the New State; while the corporatist institutions may not have been outstandingly successful positively, in bringing about the thoroughgoing restabilization of national life which was claimed for them (always in opposition to the chaos of the Republic),²⁰ they did, negatively, have the effect of outlawing any alternative, and potentially hostile, organizations, notably, of course, trade unions and political parties or pressure groups (of whatever stripe).²¹ Rather, then, than either a corporatist society, or an active civil society, what the New State legislation fostered was much more a social vacuum.²²

The particular interpretation of the state's role as the (albeit reluctant) guarantor of capitalism in Portugal in the Salazar period laid down distinct parameters and distinct goals for the education system. On the one hand, insofar as the requirement for specialized knowledge and professional capability

to perform the integrative and regulatory role which the market could not achieve was met, it was through the incorporation of business, worker and professional associations into the state through corporative forms of organization, and scarcely impinged on the education system at all. On the other hand, the overwhelming priority given to the maintenance of social order and the preservation of national identity/independence²³ - neither of which, it should be noted, are directly and necessarily associated with capitalism - had to be met in a country with such a repressed civil society, essentially by the education system, which took its cue from the family, and the church, which established an almost inseparable link within the state, to the point where it was more like a state body than an independent institution of civil society.²⁴

Maria Filomena Mónica has provided a valuable account of education under this state corporatist regime. For Mónica, education in Portugal during the period 1926-39 was primarily ideological inculcation:

'The Salazarist vision of society as an immutable hierarchical structure led to a different conception of the role of the school: it was not destined to serve as an agency of professional distribution nor of the detection of intellectual merit, but above all as an apparatus of indoctrination. Anyway, for Salazarism, there was no way to justify economic inequalities, they were inevitable and instituted by God.' 25

Indeed, education and economic growth were totally divorced during this period. Insofar as education related to national development it was in terms of regulation, and of safe-guarding and

strengthening what was interpreted as traditional national identity/independence. Hence, any influence that might come from abroad was immediately suspect (even as late as 1947):

'In 1947, a Salazarist Minister of Education, Pires de Lima, expressed, in a legal document, strong reservations with regard to foreign models: "(...) the best method, being as one is dealing with schooling for the Portuguese, will be that one in consent with our character, traditions and way of life, and which observes, thus, less what other nations have done and more the results of the experiences of our own country".' 26

It also involved the promotion of a form of sociopolitical organization that was authoritarian, bureaucratic, catholic, patrimonialist. Deus, Pátria, Família in educational terms meant (in addition to the portrait of the chief of state in every classroom (DL 25305 of May, 1935) and a crucifix behind every teacher's desk ('Lei' 1.941 of 1936)),

'(...) a reduction in the curriculum to allow for concentration on "fundamentals", and an emphasis on "applied knowledge" (this meant on design and manual work for boys and on domestic activities for girls (27) and "all principles are to indicate ideas of fatherland, family and the love of birthplace"' (as set out by the First Congress of the União Nacional in 1934). 28

In 1936 the Escolas do Magistério Primário (Colleges of Education for the training of primary school teachers) were closed, on the grounds that a training programme centred on 'pedagogical objectives' for teachers of primary schools was a waste of time, money and intelligence. The schools were later reopened, in 1942, but the course was reduced from three years to two years. In the meantime, regentes escolares, that is, 'teachers' with only primary school education (4 years of

schooling), were called in to fill the places of trained teachers, thus ensuring an economic means of teacher supply.²⁹ The curricula of the teachers training colleges which were approved in February 1934 (DL 32 629) remained in effect until October 1974. As one might have expected, the emphasis in these curricula was on the removal of anything that might have, even remotely, 'problematized' education:

'That which is necessary to be taught in this first part (pedagogy) is of little importance and shouldn't occupy more than a quarter of a semestre (a little more than one month) of the teacher's time (...). One shouldn't allow in the Escolas do Magistério Primário any discussion of the ultimate ends that inform the process of formation of human beings in their growing phase. Students don't possess, on the one hand, the cultural formation necessary to treat such intricate problems; and one doesn't find, on the other hand, in our country a state of critical indecision regarding the conception of life and the values of society. We are oriented today with values perfectly defined (...).' 30

Education was thus part of the overall impulse against 'modernization' and in support of traditional attitudes.

Economic Expansion, Repression and Equality of Opportunity

By the second half of the 1940s, the nature of the demands on the Portuguese education system had begun to alter, with changes in the contributions the education system was required to make both to the maintenance of social order and to the support of economic development. These changes resulted in part from Portugal's changing place in a changing world and in part from internal developments.³¹ A major change within the state took place with the increasing substitution of the education

system and the church as the chief sources of the maintenance of social order by the 'state repressive apparatuses', which expanded considerably both in scope and power during the 1950s, partly in response to the vacuum created by the failure of the corporatist institutions to bring about the desired social regulation.³²

This was accompanied by economic developments. From the fifties onwards capital became increasingly concentrated in Portugal.³³ This is exemplified by the 'First Plan of Expansion' of 1953, although Álvaro Cunhal (Secretary General of the Portuguese Communist Party) has argued that the institutionalization process of 'monopoly capital' in Portugal began about 1945 with the 'Law of Industrial Reorganization', which promoted the concentration and centralization of capitals.³⁴ From 1960 onwards there was a big influx of foreign capital into Portugal. Cunhal argues that it was in the decade of the sixties that there first appeared in Portugal elements typical of what he terms 'state monopoly capitalism', that is,

'(...) the redistribution of surplus value through the budget, fiscal bias and advantages, credits to monopolist groups, enlarging of the market for monopolies through the raising of public consumption, the nationalization of non-profit sectors, economic planning and participation in large enterprises.'³⁵

This general expansion of industrialization and the beginnings of a change in the definition of national development further contributed to changes in the form of, and demands on, the state, as did Portugal's strategic position on the European continent. The effects of international organizations on

Portuguese development also began to be felt after the 2nd World War (as part of the administration of the Marshall Plan), with memberships of NATO and the OEEC, (which became the OECD in 1961) a bilateral agreement on the movement of capitals and foreign investment with the United States in 1948, and, later, membership of EFTA.³⁶

The education system responded to this externally stimulated and, to a large extent, guided economic expansion - most clearly, for example, when Leite Pinto, Minister for Education in the late fifties, invited the OEEC to finance a study of the Portuguese school system;³⁷ this was the origin of a more elaborate OECD study called the Mediterranean Regional Project, involving a statistical study of the relationship between manpower requirements and educational provision in Portugal, Spain, Greece and Yugoslavia.³⁸ This increasing emphasis on the role of education in the formation of 'human capital'³⁹ had the effect of expanding its availability especially for the preparation of technically skilled workers. Between the years 1950 and 1960 there occurred the largest increase during the post-war period in the number of pupils attending technical schools; this increase (of nearly 60,000 pupils) might be considered to reflect industry's perceived need for more technicians and skilled workers.⁴⁰ This same development led to a profusion of technical studies throughout the 1960s and brought about the creation of other bodies fundamental to the development of education in the by then dominant OECD 'human capital' mould⁴¹ (and significantly different in both form and function from the 'pure' corporatist model): for example the 'Fund for the Development of Labour',

Created by the Ministry of Corporations, 1963; the 'Cabinet for the Study and Planning of Educational Action', created by the Ministry of Education in 1965; and the 'Centre for the Study of Economic Statistics', set up by the Institute of High Culture.⁴²

From its nadir under the extremes of the Deus, Pátria, Família period - which we may take as being the Carneiro Pacheco Reform (1936), symbolizing a period where the number of years of official compulsory primary schooling was actually reduced, and where primary teacher training establishments were closed, as we have seen above, on the grounds of their irrelevance to the sharply restricted purposes of education current at that period⁴³ - the education system rather rapidly found itself confronted with a set of objectives qualitatively and quantitatively far beyond anything its history and structure had prepared it to meet. Not surprisingly it was not very successful in its new role of contributing to economic growth by meeting manpower demands.⁴⁴ The extent of its failure in these terms was set out in a 1965 report of education entitled the 'Recent Evolution of the Portuguese School System'. Some of the shortcomings listed were: 1) shortest period of compulsory schooling in Europe; 2) poor attendance; 3) very low continuation in school beyond compulsory schooling; 4) inadequate coverage of the country with official schools and shortage of teachers properly qualified; 5) low productivity of almost all parts of the system, aggravated by the increasing number of dropouts; 6) students' level of low interest in economically necessary subjects; 7) inadequately structured

teaching system, the non-completion of many programmes as well as the shortage of courses for specialists necessitated by developing Science and Technology; and 8) insufficient and frequently deficient professional training after leaving school.⁴⁵ It is very clear and significant that none of these things would have been regarded as a 'shortcoming' of the education system in the earlier part of Salazar's rule, thirty years previously; education as ideological inculcation had little to do with the formation of human capital. At university level the pattern continued to be that of, for the most part, 5-year degrees, which were certainly not oriented towards providing qualifications for the job market; jobs were still largely allocated by patronage and university qualifications merely confirmed the requisite social standing.⁴⁶

The new definition of education as contributing to economic growth had contradictory effects on the country, and certainly effects not taken into consideration by an international organization such as the OECD which, particularly in the sixties - it was only in the seventies that the OECD started talking seriously about equality of opportunity - applied its prescriptions for development in blanket fashion to all countries, prescriptions which were considered to be technologically efficient, rational, neutral, and hence above both politics and national differences.⁴⁷ However, while what was considered education in Salazar's Portugal, Deus, Pátria, Família, was ignored in the OECD prescriptions, the idea of education as a particular form of ideological inculcation continued to have its effects on

the shape and content of Portuguese education. It continued to have these effects in spite of increasingly specific labour requirements of industry and commerce, and in spite of the increasing dependence of the regime on the strictly repressive apparatuses of the state. This is clearly evident in the following comment by Galvão Teles, Minister of Education during the early 1960s:

'In my view, education must never lose, indeed must continually re-emphasize, that spiritual seal which the shining Christian tradition has stamped upon it. And that is why I cannot regard without apprehension the onset of a particular educational internationalism, which tends to subordinate education entirely to the economy, as if the former only existed as a function of the latter.' 48

Gradually, though, the increasingly competitive nature of Portuguese society, particularly in the economic domain, but also in other areas sensitive to international contact - areas like education and the contact between catholic organizations -,⁴⁹ and the greater access of the Portuguese public to domestic and international news - mass television was introduced into Portugal in the mid-1960s - made it possible for the urban working class and the petty bourgeoisie to see education not only as a possible way to fulfil their social aspirations,⁵⁰ but also as a means of gaining entry into the political system. This became particularly important as the failure of the 'New State' corporatist institutional framework became even more apparent, due, among other things, to the brutality of the repressive apparatuses of the state. Another important factor was the increasing irritation between opposing financial and commercial interests, which underlay and underlined the growing inability of the state/church

to capture, organize, enmesh and articulate the demands of civil society through a form of state corporatist sociopolitical organization.⁵¹ The radicalization of certain sectors of the population augmented with the advent of colonial war in the early sixties. The opposition of students in the universities was gradually matched by the opposition of principal sectors of the industrial bourgeoisie whose main interest was in endogenous industrial growth and who consequently opposed the state's role as supporter of a war which protected only the interests of a comprador bourgeoisie (Portugal's 'paleo-capitalists' as Kenneth Maxwell termed them⁵²).⁵³ The most important reflection of this modernizing tendency by sectors of the industrial bourgeoisie was the creation of the voluntary organization SEDES in 1970. Initially sanctioned by Salazar's successor, Marcello Caetano, as a means of allowing a controlled opposition, SEDES soon established its independence from the Government and became a pressure group of the opposition.⁵⁴

The colonial wars appeared to make little sense economically, for during the 1960s and early 1970s there was a marked move by Portuguese trade away from the colonies and towards European markets - between 1960 and 1969 the percentage of Portugal's exports to her overseas territories fell from 43 to 25%, and by 1973 only 10% of her trade, both in terms of imports and exports, was with the colonies, while 45% was with the EEC.⁵⁵ Hermínio Martins has argued that the colonial wars acted as a 'full-scale ideological renewal' for the regime - a process he characterised as 'refascistization'.⁵⁶ Certainly this would have been a logical

response by the regime for

- a) '(...) the old regime's conception of Portugal's national identity and of its survival as an independent polity was linked to the belief that all the overseas possessions had to be retained regardless of the cost', 57

and b) the ideological scope of the education system (and the church) had been effectively curtailed by the increasingly repressive form of the state. The repressive rather than consensual control of civil society, together with economic expansion, resulted in the gradual redirection of the education system to activity less concerned with ideological dominance and more concerned with economic dominance. This displacement of the ideological function of education and the increase in economic activity, within both the economy and the state, expressed essentially the altered role and orientation of the state which developed in the period from the 2nd World War up to the early 1970s. The culmination of this process was the 'dramatic' Veiga Simão Reform in education in the early 1970s, which highlighted its complexity and its contradictions.

Veiga Simão, a Cambridge-educated physicist, and former rector of the University of (then) Lourenço Marques (Mozambique), and at the time (1971) Minister of Education to the Caetano Government, proposed a radical reform of national education, and, for the first time in the history of the corporatist regime, invited a national debate and criticism of the Reform. The reforms promulgated by the Caetano Government stated as their objective 'the democratization of education', and, indeed, were far-reaching in scope.⁵⁸ Officially, in terms of the

expansion and reform of schooling, they included the following:

- 1) the increase of the period of compulsory schooling from 6 to 8 years - four years primary, four years unified secondary (of a polyvalent nature and with the proviso that this would occur when compulsory 6-year period was functioning well);
- 2) age of compulsory attendance lowered to 6 years of age;
- 3) introduction of period of two years pre-school education (when possible);
- 4) reform of higher education, to include not only universities but polytechnic institutes and other institutes of a professional or occupational type;
- 5) reform of teacher training through Higher Teacher Training Schools and graduate departments of education.⁵⁹

In addition, the Reform included a number of measures that while not part of the reform law approved in the National Assembly did make up an important part of the educational activity of Veiga Simão during his four short, but notorious, years at the Education Ministry. These included: the creation of a number of new schools, the initiation of a variety of pedagogical experiments throughout the country, an increase in school social action (i.e. in the school welfare programme), the development of night school and the reinstatement of university teachers dismissed by previous education ministries.⁶⁰

In general, the reforms were conceived, according to Veiga Simão, so as to guarantee the embodiment of certain basic characteristics: an open, equitable, diversified, individualized and interrelated, in short a modern, school system on the OECD pattern. Priority was to be given to the reform of higher education according to the

* (...) constant recommendations of recent international documents which support

priority being given to the treatment of problems affecting post-secondary education.' 61

This was to overcome the aristocratic nature of the university sector, to extend higher education to regions of the country other than those possessing universities, and to meet the vital shortages and shortcomings of scientific research.

We would like to argue that Veiga Simão, in the early seventies, was bridging the gulf between, on the one hand, corporatist (Deus, Pátria, Família) and popular (equality of opportunity in education) notions of education as national development - in the sense that both conceived of it as something extra-economic - and, on the other hand, national development as conceived of by modernization theory, that is, primarily in terms of economic growth. It is important to stress that while Veiga Simão's reforms in education had the effect of promoting educational planning objectives entirely consonant with the human capital model, a conception of modernization as a whole was intrinsic to them; that is, they were also concerned with the making of modern people and modern institutions, with the repair and rebuilding of Portuguese civil society. In this double sense they symbolised a radical shift both from Salazar's notion of education as teaching your place in life, to the more popular and meritocratic notion of education as equality of opportunity, and from the notion that education is intrinsically political to the notion that it can be the object of 'a-political' planning. Veiga Simão himself said that his project of reform had been designed to express:

'(...) a philosophy of education which would embody the double principle that the education

of the individual is the main aim of the education system and that all, on the basis of equal opportunity, should find in any such system the paths able to guarantee the inalienable right to be educated. From this we may conclude that the education system should not be directly subordinated to the demands of economic development, even though we understand that to ignore such a relationship may lead to individual cases of frustration: the concept of educational structure should make it possible to obtain concrete qualifications for the exercise of a profession considered to be socially useful. This, in fact, is the manner in which we seek to embody in educational matters the humanistic principles and the community vocation of the Social State, which recognise the rights of the citizen, considered as an individual and as an element of an integrated collectivity.' 62

The Veiga Simão Reform, then, offered a partial solution to the problem of popular mobilization, to the problem of allowing the masses entry into politics, by attempting to strengthen educational institutions. This attempt was crucial, for the regime's formula for survival, 'organization without mobilization'⁶³ was in tatters. Nevertheless, it was insufficient. Instead of resolving contradictions, it further stretched the credibility of the largely discredited principles of corporatism. The gap between the masses and the ruling sectors widened, opening the way for the explosion onto the scene of the mass popular discontent which occurred on the day of 'liberation', on the day of the military coup d'etat, April 25, 1974.

Revolution and the Rebirth of Civil Society

With the revolution of the 25th of April, 1974, there occurred a tremendous expansion and renewal of the institutions

of civil society. Associations and organizations representing the mass of the population at both the institutional and voluntary levels, grew up almost literally overnight. A system of democratic parliamentary representation, free press, trade unions, political parties, professional associations, housing committees, neighbourhood and parents' associations, school committees, pressure groups of all kinds suddenly became part of 'Portuguese realities'. As a result of the sudden vacuum in state power, caused by the military coup and the tremendous popular response it received, the repressive apparatuses of the state either ceased to operate or became concentrated in the military organizations representing the revolution, for example, in the Armed Forces Movement (the 'MFA'). The MFA identified with, and took its values largely from the mass organizations constituting Portugal's suddenly mushrooming civil society. Consequently, and in spite of the officer class it represented,⁶⁴ the MFA found itself subject to many of the same divisions that existed in civil society.⁶⁵

The sudden subservience of the state to civil society brought about by the MFA's adherence to the latter, naturally altered radically the form and functions of the state (although as we shall see below there were fundamental continuities). Ideology once again became dominant in the social formation through the need for the state to respond to the demands of civil society. This was concretized in the literacy and political education campaigns initiated by the Armed Forces Movements - though these met some strong resistance especially in the northern parts

of the country, where small landholders in alliance with the church gave a hostile reception to the 'red agents' of the MFA.⁶⁶ In another sense this confirms the extent of the need of the state to respond to the demands of civil society. It was indeed evident throughout the education system in general, where radical extension of the popular democratic aspects of the Veiga Simão Reform were taken to the point that there were serious attempts to either construct the socialist school or actively use education to construct the socialist society.⁶⁷ Education's important role during the revolutionary conjuncture - though with different emphases in different provisional governments - was thus a return to notions of consensus and also of ideological inculcation, but now through popular operation and control. The role of the state as regulator of economic activity suffered a severe change as important sectors of economic activity were nationalized by the Armed Forces Movement, and as the goal of integrating educational activity with capitalist economic activity was replaced by the goal of using education to help define new organizing principles for social reproduction. The revolution broke the link between the great financial groups and the political elite of the state. A land reform which expropriated the great landed estates in the South that had been among the strong pillars of the Salazar regime was introduced after the 'mini-coup' of March 11th, 1975, when the MFA also nationalized the banks, insurance companies and great financial groups.

The great mobilization and participation of particularly the urban working and middle classes and the southern rural

proletariat in exerting strong pressure on the state is one of the essential characteristics of the revolutionary period. One could go so far as to say that there was a move towards the non-corporatist dissolution of the state/civil society distinction (rather than the state dominating and subsuming civil society as had occurred during the Salazarist era, civil society began to dominate and mould the state), and thus, in embryonic form, the self-regulation and expansion of civil society to the detriment of the state.⁶⁸ We can find evidence of this in the concrete measures that were taken after the 25th of April, and in the Constitution of 1976,^s which apart from calling for the 'transformation of present society to a society without classes' (Article 1) and for 'the transition to socialism by way of the creation of conditions for the democratic exercise of power by the working classes' (Article 2), expressed far-reaching political reform in terms of

'(...) a strong municipal system, administrative regions with increased representation, the recognition of the autonomous organs of the people as voluntary organs, the representation of local interests, and the acceptance of workers' control.' 69

In terms of education, such forces as the Socialist Party, the Communist Party, and parties of the 'revolutionary Left', articulated as part of the process of popular mobilization such measures as: 1) the establishment of free expression, meeting and association in schools and throughout society generally; 2) the realization of school assemblies governed by democratic procedures; 3) the formation of student associations and the creation of autonomous teacher unions in the various zones of the country; 4) the 'defascistization' of school curricula;

5) the general actualization of reforms conceived prior to the 25th of April (or, on the other hand, their substitution by more radical reforms), that would provide for expansion in every sector of the education system; 6) the institutionalization of humanist pedagogy in schools; and 7) the comprehensivization of Portuguese secondary education. In addition, cooperative forms of schooling and educational activities designed to integrate the 'world of work' with the 'world of education' with the eventual aim of abolishing the division between mental and manual labour, were high up on the list of priorities. We find evidence of this in the Constitution: Article 74 suggests a policy of positive discrimination towards socially dominated groups - the state must 'stimulate the formation of scientists and technicians from members of the working classes'.⁷⁰ The emphasis on mass adult education, on literacy campaigns, on a study grants system, on the elimination from the labour market of children under 14 years of age, and on the creation of nursery school education on a nationwide scale, was expressed not only in terms of modernising Portugal's education system, but primarily as part of the desire to rid Portugal of an elitist class-ridden education system. In short, the revolutionary period represented in terms of education a dynamic calling for the maximum utilization of Portugal's resources in order to achieve social and economic equality and to put into gear the wheels of transition that would lead Portugal to socialism. Education in a wider sense, then, could be regarded as having for a short period led the revolution, rather than having followed it.

The revolutionary period, the period of tremendous political

and ideological activity within civil society when essential associations and organizations for the participation of the mass of the population in politics were set up, and when the institutions supporting those associations and organizations were strengthened and/or revitalized, was relatively short-lived. That is, it was short-lived as a period of minimum state regulation. With the events of the 25th of November, 1975 (still another coup within the coup),⁷¹ and the taking of power by the 1st Constitutional Government at the end of the summer of 1976, a process of 'normalization' began, a process which would lead to the gradual consolidation of the state, and consequent rolling back of the institutions of civil society.

'Normalization': Rolling Back Civil Society'

The 'normalization' of education in Portugal after the revolutionary period refers mainly to the process whereby the state regained and reasserted control of education, defining and limiting what would count as education. This process of definition and limitation which was propelled by a desire to replace politics with planning, occurred throughout the education system.⁷² For example, new limits were placed on the acceptability of teachers, with only those recognized as officially 'credentialled' -either in terms of the recognition of a diploma or through particular qualifications needed to teach a subject - allowed to enter the system.⁷³ Limits were also put on those applying for credentials by way of a system of numerus clausus.⁷⁴ Where education could take place was also controlled,

and as a result many popular initiatives aimed at providing various types of schooling, often in new sorts of environment, particularly in the area of nursery schooling or forms of cooperative schooling, rapidly died out during the 'normalization' period.⁷⁵

Curricula were limited through the proscription of certain subjects (sociology, introduction to politics⁷⁶) and activities (e.g. the contact activities of the Teachers Training Colleges which were designed to put students 'in contact' with children from mainly local peasant populations). Pedagogy was controlled through the selection of teachers (particularly effective in the area of teacher training, except for schools in the interior where there were no teacher trainers other than those of the revolutionary period). Assessment procedures were in many cases redefined, nearly always in the direction of traditional procedures. Finally, the process of popular mobilization, particularly in terms of the dynamic of 'alfabetização' (literacy campaigns), came to be institutionalized within limits defined by the state.⁷⁷ Of course, there have been 'resistences' to the 'normalization' process; these will be discussed below and again in later chapters.

At the base of the 'normalization' process were attempts to plan rationally the basic ingredients needed to ensure the requirements of the reascendant project of social modernization: economic stability provided by the intervention of international organizations like the IMF and World Bank, and the manipulation of bilateral aid,⁷⁸ social control provided by the dominant sectors of the military (the MFA had been 'deradicalized' after the 25th of November 1975) and legitimation provided by some of the newly curtailed and redirected institutions of civil society,

along with the institutions of representative democracy. The state thus managed to regain the initiative in determining 'Portuguese realities', in determining the educational needs of the country. Indeed, education in terms of national development, in this period of 'normalization', has come to mean a return to the early seventies duo of economic growth plus equality of opportunity in education (restricted now to the right to education, legal equality in terms of access).

At the same time the current polytechnic education project, funded largely by the World Bank, symbolizes in many ways the change in the form of the state (i.e. its reassertion, its return to a major role in capitalist economic regulation) since the revolutionary period.⁷⁹ Here we have a programme for the reform of higher education, based on the creation of middle-level technicians to serve the demands of economic growth, a programme of reform already projected in the Veiga Simão Reform, which gives priority to changing the education system from the top (hoping change will eventually filter its way down to the bottom). It is thus a direct reversal of revolutionary strategy and spirit, which aimed at changing the system from the bottom (mass literacy campaigns, preschool education, concentration on the primary sector, positive discrimination in favour of the working classes).

One might wonder how the Constitution of 1976 can be made to fit the process of 'normalization'. For instance, section 2 of Article 74 (unrevised version) states:

'The state shall reform education so as to eliminate its function of perpetuating the social division in labour relations.' 80

Indeed, the Constitution of 1976 has provided a rallying point for opposition that has arisen both within civil society and within the state apparatuses themselves, to the new form of economic regulation now taken on by the state. There now exists an ensemble of organizational reserves, a complex of power structures, effecting, moderating, compromising, resisting the activity of the state as 'the enlightened foresight of technocratic planners'.⁸¹ And there are abundant ideological raw materials available for articulating this opposition, among them the revolution itself, and the continuing project of the creation of a socialist alternative, the effect of the international context - dependent capitalism, and the actual material conditions of the country - glaring inequalities, and the traditions of Catholic social thought.

The international organizations, IMF, World Bank (the latter following the guidelines set by the OECD in the sixties and early seventies) and the EEC (through its obvious economic influence, and, increasingly, through the possibility of political stability it offers Portugal) have been essential to meeting the perceived need to reassert the state. It is arguable for at least two reasons that this reassertion would not have been possible without them. First, the reassertion of the state could not have been achieved solely through repression in 1976 and still maintained the democratic nature of the regime (essential, furthermore, to stable economic and political ties with Europe and the U.S.A.). Second, the kind of reassertion/redirection required could not have been achieved through internal resources alone.

'Normalization' could not be confined to negative interventions; the existing system had to be kept going and it still appeared to require direction towards meeting economic needs. Internal resources, both of personnel (in planning, for instance), and of finance, to achieve this kind of 'normalization' were lacking and could be willingly supplied by international organizations who had in any case been major influences on the restructuring and re-direction of the education system during the sixties and early seventies. Furthermore, the strength and availability of the alternative approaches and structures generated during the revolution meant that the state would have had difficulty undertaking the process of 'normalization' within the framework of democratic institutions on the basis of its own resources alone.

Summary

In the course of this first chapter we have provided a characterization of four periods in the relationship between the state and civil society in Portugal. This characterization has focussed upon the main functions of education during each period, the nature of those functions and the sorts of problems education, and other ideological systems, have had to face, and upon the relationship between education and national development in each particular period.

The first period, from the military coup of 1926 to 1945, has been characterized as a period when the ideology, Deus, Pátria, Família dominated the education system, articulating the domination of the state over civil society, which was at that time not only

recuperating from the exhaustion it had suffered during the Republican period, but also incapable of using its complexity and range of institutions to produce coherence among heterogeneous sectors. Education during this first period was little more than ideological inculcation, and meant in terms of national development the assertion and articulation of national identity and independence in a context where sociopolitical organization was both authoritarian and corporatist. The prominence of both of these aspects of national development can be seen as largely a reaction against modernization and the instability associated with dependent industrialization both of which were held to have contributed to the chaos of the preceding Republican period.

The second period, from 1945 up to the early 1970s before the revolution, was a period of economic growth, of capitalist expansion. It was argued that the state maintained its dominance over civil society during this period not so much through education, or other ideological systems, but through the increasingly powerful repressive apparatuses of the state, particularly the secret police, and through the increasing economic influence of the international context, particularly as mediated through an influx of capital. There was a new emphasis on educational planning and policy oriented towards economic goals. Education meant, in terms of national development, economic growth, and increasingly, with the advent of popular mobilization - resulting from the corporatist regime's gradual inability to capture, organize and articulate the demands of civil society - equality of opportunity in education. The Veiga Simão Reform in the

early 1970s represented the culmination of both of these notions of national development, within the limits of the regime in force.

The third period, from the date of the revolution - April 25, 1974 - to the events of the 25th of November, 1975, and finally the assumption of office by the 1st Constitutional Government in the late Summer of 1976, meant a return to a period when the ideological aspects of education were dominant, this time through the energies and organizations of revitalized civil society, and in terms of influence within the Armed Forces Movement. Education in terms of national development came to mean the construction of a democratic and socialist society and there were the first signs of a non-corporatist dissolution of the distinction state/civil society through the self-regulation of civil society.

Finally, the fourth period, from the Spring of 1976 up to 1980, has been characterized as a period of 'normalization', a period of definition of the boundaries of the state and of civil society, with the former coming to re-establish its dominance over the latter. Education has meant economic growth coupled with the construction of a 'modern' meritocratic society on the pattern of North West European social democracy. An essential role is played in both these aspects by international organizations. Further, although the state has attempted to reassert its dominance, the strength and influence of civil society, through its ensemble of organizations and associations of both a class and popular nature, remains a very potent factor

in moderating and modifying, resisting and redirecting the activity and objectives of the state.

Footnotes to Chapter 1

1. The phrase is Filomena Mónica's. see M.F. Mónica (1978), Educação e Sociedade no Portugal de Salazar, Lisbon: Presença; for the English version, see M.F. Pinto Coelho (1977), "Education and Society in Salazar's Portugal", D. Phil. Thesis, Oxford University.
2. see N. Portas and S. Gago (1980), "Some Preliminary Notes on the State in Contemporary Portugal", in R. Scase (ed.), The State in Western Europe, London: Croom Helm; also M. Lucena (1979), "The Evolution of Portuguese Corporatism under Salazar and Caetano", in L.S. Graham and H.M. Makler (eds.), Contemporary Portugal, Austin and London: University of Texas Press. M.F. Mónica argues that 'while industrial growth continued slowly, the New State actively built roads, bridges and dams, and Salazar succeeded in stabilizing prices and the budget.' see op. cit., p. 105.
3. Augusto Joaquim (1979), "Todos Fomos de Mais: Introdução a Ensaio Sobre a Topologia Qualitativo de Salazarismo", Análise Social, no. 59, p. 681.
4. Portuguese historians have referred to the 1st Republic (1910-1926) as both the 'decadence of the liberal political system initiated in 1820', that is, 'not the beginning of something structurally new but (...) rather the last phase of something which had started much before', and as the 'elevated capacity of a society to rethink itself and to act'. (The first quote is from leading Portuguese historian Oliveira Marques, quoted in Douglas L. Wheeler (1978), Republican Portugal: A Political History 1910-26, London and Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, p. 254; the second quote is from Manuel Villaverde Cabral in an article written for the newspaper Diário de Notícias, published 26 October 1982.) There appears to be no doubt, however, that its sixteen years were stormy ones, to say the least. D.L. Wheeler has termed the Republican period 'a kind of uninterrupted civil war on a small scale.' To prove

his point, Wheeler refers to the fact that '(...) for some time (in France) the chaos of Lisbon politics (...) led to the coinage of the verb "to Portugalize" which was meant to mean "bring chaos to a political situation".' see D.L. Wheeler, "A República Pesadela (1910-1926)", Diário de Notícias, 13 July 1982. For the purposes of this thesis, we would like to emphasize in the experience of the 1st Republic what Wheeler has suggested were its most original aspects: its unprecedented capacity to mobilize the Portuguese population, politically, socially and militarily, and its effort (by no means completely successful) to put into practice ideas of social justice and reform. D.L. Wheeler, 1978 and 1982, *ibid.*

5. A. Joaquim, *op. cit.*, p. 679.
6. Manuel Braga da Cruz, writing on the origins of Salazarism, concludes: 'The construction of the Estado Novo was, from an ideological point of view, the result of the various ideological currents making it up. Coming into existence by way of a military coup, whose political intention was more the negation of a regime than the clear affirmation of an alternative system, the Estado Novo ended up combining an original Christian-Democratic matrix with various other political and ideological influences, integralismo lusitano having among them (...) an important place.' see M. Braga da Cruz (1982), "O Integralismo Lusitano nas Origens do Salazarismo", Análise Social, no. 70, p. 137. (Emphasis in the original.) see also on this subject Hermínio Martins (1968), "Portugal", in S.J. Woolf (ed.), European Fascism, London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson; and Howard Wiarda (1977), Corporatism and Development: the Portuguese Experience, Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press.
7. There are, in fact, many different accounts of the corporatist state in Portugal, most tending to argue that corporatism was anything but 'pure'. L.S. Graham, for example, argues that Salazar's state was 'administrative' rather than 'corporatist'; Hugh Kay argues it was a synthesis of pluralist

and Italian corporatist states; M.V. Cabral argues it was fascist and corporatist. see Lawrence S. Graham (1975), Portugal: the Decline and Collapse of an Authoritarian Order, Beverly Hills: Sage; Hugh Kay (1970), Salazar and Modern Portugal, London: Eyre and Spottiswoode; and M.V. Cabral (1976), "Sobre o Fascismo e o seu Advento em Portugal", Análise Social, no. 48.

8. see Philippe Schmitter (1975), Corporatism and Public Policy in Authoritarian Portugal, London and Beverly Hills: Sage, pp. 8-9. see also Schmitter (1974), "Still the Century of Corporatism?", in Frederick B. Pike and Thomas Stritch (eds.), The New Corporatism, Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.
9. The phrase is Manuel Lucena's (op. cit., p. 73), who in addition lists the new compulsory structures, some of which were a unitary workers' syndicate, new labour tribunals, employers' associations and state bodies for economic coordination.
10. see Adriano Moreira (1977), O Novíssimo Príncipe: Análise da Revolução, Lisbon/Braga: Intervenção.
11. Harry Makler (1976), "The Portuguese Industrial Elite and its Corporative Relations: A Study of Compartmentalization in an Authoritarian Regime", Economic Development and Cultural Change, 24, pp. 495-97.
12. P. Schmitter, 1974, op. cit., p. 100. Howard Wiarda argues that a major problem with Schmitter's definition is that it 'makes no provision for the dynamics of change within a single corporatist regime, that is, from the dynamic of the social-justice-oriented corporatism of the early Salazar regime, to the repressive state corporatism of the middle years, to the revitalized Estado Social of Caetano.' see H. Wiarda, op. cit., p. 92. While our analysis, like Schmitter's, stresses the state corporatist nature of the regime from the beginning, we do agree with Wiarda that the dynamics of change within the regime are important. Where we differ from Wiarda is in our

conception of how that change occurs. This subject is discussed again further below and especially in Chapter 2.

13. Schmitter has written that: '(...) although not a country having very distinctive regional, ethnic or linguistic sub-cultures, it could be argued that the formation of the Estado Novo in the early thirties involved the mobilization of Portugal's periphery - its provincial towns and rural masses - against its centre or, more particularly, against Lisbon.' (in P. Schmitter (1979), "Modes of Interest Intermediation and Models of Societal Change in Modern Europe", in P. Schmitter and G. Lehmbruch, (eds.), Trends Towards Corporatist Intermediation, London: Sage, p. 12.) However, perhaps it would be more accurate to characterize the process as a 'counter-mobilization' made possible by the Republic's collapse. Salazar's success probably resulted from his main preoccupation with a way to 'normalize', to 'demobilize' Portugal - as the following quote (from Salazar, speaking on the 'Blue Shirts' of Rolão Preto) reveals: 'They like to live an intense, frenetic life (...) the tumultuousness of German or Italian life, the style of Hitler or Mussolini fascinated them. They wanted to inspire themselves with some sort of sacred hate toward our enemies. But that is not my purpose. I want to normalize the Nation: I want to make Portugal live routinely.' see M. Lucena, 1979, op. cit., p. 58.
14. Howard Wiarda (1974), "Corporatism and Development in the Iberic-Latin World: Persistent Strains and New Variations", in Frederick B. Pike and Thomas Stritch (eds.), The New Corporatism, Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, p. 15.
15. see Aiden Foster-Carter (1978), "The Modes of Production Controversy", New Left Review, 107.
16. Salvador Giner writing on the regimes of Southern Europe, Italy, Spain, Greece and Portugal, points out that these countries have had their own 'home-grown bourgeoisies with

a fully "modern" and "western" outlook which did not, in any correct sense of the work, "import" capitalism (...). They are societies which have always been European in many a substantial sense, save to the unperceptive minds of certain travellers in search of exoticism.' see S. Giner (1982), "Political Economy, Legitimation and the State in Southern Europe", British Journal of Sociology, Vol. 33, no. 2, June, pp. 172-3.

17. Nicos Poulantzas (1976), Crisis of the Dictatorships, London: New Left Books.
18. see Manuel Villaverde Cabral, 1976, op. cit., for a discussion of this 'historic compromise', especially pp. 889-93.
19. Nicos Mouzelis (1978), Modern Greece, London: Macmillan.
20. Industrial backwardness and the existence of the colonies and their markets provided Salazar with two ready-made stabilizers. Later, however, when seeking consent through the denial of the 1st Republic had worn thin, and particularly after World War II when Portugal was 'isolated internationally, denied Marshall Plan aid, looked down upon abroad, and refused entrance into both the United Nations and the European Community' (Wiarda, 1977, op. cit., p. 176), and when a certain industrializing mentality had begun to take hold (in spite of the regime's efforts to the contrary), corporatist institutions found themselves increasingly under attack. They were under attack not just in terms of a possible credibility gap between what they were held to be in theory and what they were accomplishing in practice (in this regard, Marcello Caetano, one of the regime's founders, was to say in the early 1950s: 'Portugal is a corporatist state in intention, but not in fact.' - H. Wiarda, *ibid.*, p. 189), but also in terms of a questioning of corporatist principles. The Portuguese sociologist Sedas Nunes asked, for example, if the corporatist idea of social group or class was in line with modern sociological analysis: 'Do men with the same

common economic considerations necessarily form a unit in the corporatist sense?'; see the series of articles written in Revista do Gabinete de Estudos Corporativos under the directorship of J. Pires Cardoso, especially A. Sedas Nunes (1954), "Situação e Problemas do Corporativismo, Princípios Corporativos e Realidades Sociais", Lisbon.

21. This argument has also been put forward by Schmitter. He suggests that 'Intervening in the relation between civil society and the state by deliberately and concertedly obfuscating the institutional distinction between these two realms of collective choice, corporatism functioned to prevent the emergence of obvious class hegemony or polarized group confrontation, and the consequent loss of state autonomy which might otherwise have been produced as the result of capitalist development.' P. Schmitter, 1975, *op. cit.*, p. 59.

22. Joyce Riegelhaupt, writing on participation - or, rather, the lack of it - at the local level in Salazar's New State, has the following to say on the state of civil society during Salazar's reign: '(...) Both communities (São Miguel and Vila Velha - the two communities forming the base of Riegelhaupt's study) were characterized, like virtually all of Portuguese society during the New State, by the absence of political, religious, or workers's associations, or even of social groups where it would have been possible to articulate individual interests or provide group influence. In summary, at almost all levels of society, the Portuguese were not able to organize or mobilize themselves in order to exercise influence.' see Joyce F. Riegelhaupt (1979), "Os Camponeses e a Política no Portugal de Salazar - o Estado Corporativo e o 'apoliticismo' nas Aldeias", Análise Social, no. 59, p. 520.

23. Manuel Lucena argues that '(...) for twenty years the work of Salazar was guided by three major preoccupations: to counter-balance the influence of the English, to have the

Portuguese state recognized as an indispensable interlocutor, and to integrate foreign penetration into the established order.' M. Lucena, 1979, op. cit., p. 73.

24. The family's importance to education in the Salazarist state resided in the fact that the family was considered the foundation unit of society: 'The family, the core of society, produces more than citizens; it provides believers. Christ himself had a brother and a father. Thus, the family has inalienable rights, prior to the state, and sacred autonomy.' M. Lucena cites this Salazarist 'slogan' as a means of demonstrating a major difference between the Italian fascist state and the Estado Novo (i.e. the only relative sovereignty of the latter when compared to the former) -- at least in theory. see M. Lucena (1976), A Evolução do Sistema Corporativo Português: o Salazarismo, Lisbon: Perspectivas e Realidades, p. 51. With regard to the relationship between church and state, Oliveira Marques points out that in the 1933 Constitution the state and the church remained separate. And the Concordat, '(...) although making law some of the demands of the Catholic Church, such as the abolition of divorce between couples married in the church and the teaching of religion in schools, did not put an end to civil marriage nor to civil divorce, nor did it restore to the Church patrimony confiscated during the Republic.' A.H. Oliveira Marques (1981), História de Portugal, Lisbon: Palas Editores, Vol. III, p. 453. Of course, our argument is that the Church acted as if it were a state body, above all in the realm of education where its influence was tremendous. see also in this respect Luisa Cortesão (1982), Escola, Sociedade: Que Relação?, Oporto: Edições Afrontamento; M. Fátima Bivar (1975), Ensino Primário e Ideologia, Lisbon: Seara Nova; and José Salvado Sampaio (1977), O Ensino Primário 1911-1969, Contribuição Monográfica (in 3 volumes, Lisbon: Fundação Calouste Gulbenkian. Finally, see also M.F. Mónica, op. cit.

25. M.F. Mónica, *ibid.*, p. 133.

26. see Rui Grácio (1981), "Perspectivas Futuras", in Manuela Silva and M. Isabel Tamen (eds.), Sistema de Ensino em Portugal, Lisbon: Fundação Calouste Gulbenkian, p. 689.
27. Discrimination against the female gender was nothing short of rampant in the education system during the Salazar era. DL 27 279 of November 1936, for example, which came to be known as the Carneiro Pacheco Reform (after Education Minister Carneiro Pacheco), required 'that all female teachers (in the primary school) apply for permission to the Ministry in order to marry, such permission only being granted (however) in certain circumstances, namely: when "the potential spouse" has "good moral and civil behaviour" and has "(...) earnings, or revenues - proven by possession of the appropriate documental evidence - equivalent to the earnings of a teacher".' Some argued that the logic of this ruling was that the primary school teacher earned so little that without an 'appropriate' husband, duly approved by the Ministry, she would be open to 'ideological persuasion'!! (see the periodical Opção, no. 31, 25-11-1976, p. 39) Also, with DL 40 964 of December 1956, girls discovered that they had one year less compulsory schooling than boys (boys were increased from 3 to 4 years, the girls remaining with 3 years). Only with DL 42 994 of May 1960 did girls recover their lost year. see Luisa Cortesão, op. cit., pp. 85-6; also J. Salvado Sampaio (1978), "Insucesso Escolar e Obrigatoriedade Escolar", Análise Psicológica, no. 1, vol. 2.
28. see Cabral Pinto (1977), Escolas do Magistério Primário: Reforma e Contra-Reforma, Lisbon: cadernos o professor, 6, p. 13. The União Nacional - National Union - was the only political party allowed by the 1933 Constitution.
29. By 1940 the regentes escolares represented 18% of the entire primary school teaching force. see Cortesão, op. cit., who also points out that in 1946 the regentes escolares earned 390 Portuguese escudos per month while school caretakers were paid 486 Portuguese escudos per month! (p. 101)

30. see Cabral Pinto, op. cit., p. 15.
31. These changes are also discussed in Chapter 2.
32. While M.V. Cabral situates the 'rebirth' of the workers' movement at the time of the strikes of 1942-3 (indicated by the fact that the Portuguese Communist Party managed to implant itself firmly within the working class), Howard Wiarda points to the regime's need to answer an increasingly vocal opposition (particularly after World War II):
'The opposition's challenge had to be met, and in the absence of any alternative, the authority structures of the central state and especially its secret police emerged to fill the vacuum.' see Cabral, 1976, op. cit., p. 897; Wiarda, 1977, op. cit., p. 185. Hermínio Martins refers specifically to the Decree-Laws of 1945, 1949 and 1956 which allowed special penalties for political crimes, and granted the political police, PIDE, a wide range of powers. see H. Martins, op. cit.; also Tom Gallagher (1979), "Controlled Repression in Salazar's Portugal", Journal of Contemporary History, Sage, London and Beverly Hills, vol. 14.
33. By the time of the revolution in 1974 seven conglomerates controlled a very large proportion of the Portuguese economy; the extent of this domination can be gauged from the fact that their nationalization in 1975 meant that not only the country's banks but its major supermarket chains came into public ownership! see Álvaro Cunhal (1976), A Revolução Portuguesa: o Passado e o Futuro, Lisbon: Edições Avante, pp. 25-7. see also Américo Ramos dos Santos (1977), "Desenvolvimento Monopolista em Portugal: 1968-73", Análise Social, 49.
34. A. Cunhal, ibid., p. 30.
35. ibid., p. 29.
36. On the implications of these developments see J. M. Rolo (1976)

"Multinacionais: o Problema do Controlo da sua Actividade em Portugal", Análise Social, no. 45. The effects of international organizations on Portuguese development are studied in more detail in Chapter 5.

37. The advent of Leite Pinto signalled the new orientation of education in Portugal: '(...) in general terms, one may say that the monolithism of the school system was overcome, at the level of the Government, in a decisive way, in the middle of the decade of the fifties. If its height of rigidity was attained through Carneiro Pacheco, in the 1930s (1936-40), the rupture which occurred with the end of World War II, in 1945, was crowned in July 1955 with the nomination of Minister Leite Pinto (1955-61) who represented the developmental sectors of the regime and the predominance of industrial and financial interests over rural traditionalism.* J. Salvado Sampaio (1982), "O Sistema Escolar Português", Análise Psicológica, no. 4, April/May/June. Leite Pinto's intervention is pursued further in Chapter 2.
38. see Herbert S. Parnes (1967), "The OECD Mediterranean Regional Project in Retrospect", in George Z.F. Bereday and Joseph Lauwerys (eds.), World Yearbook of Education 1967, London: Evans; and Mediterranean Regional Project: Portugal (1965), Paris: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.
39. This is confirmed by H.S. Parnes: 'The MRP reflects the increasing attention that has been accorded during the past decade to the role of human resources in economic development and to the contribution of education to "human capital" formation (...).' *ibid.*, p. 149.
40. This is S. de Miranda's argument in (1978) "Portugal e o OCDE: Expansão Económica e Planificação Educativa", Vértice, May/June; see also Appendix III for statistical confirmation of the expansion of technical education between 1950/51 and 1964/5.

41. On 'human capital' theory and the part played by the OECD in its development, see Jerome Karabel and A.H. Halsey (eds.) (1977), Power and Ideology in Education, New York: Oxford University Press, especially pp. 12-16.
42. see Miranda, op. cit.; also Sérgio Grácio (1982), "Escolarização e Modos de Integração na Formação Social Portuguesa (1950-78)", Análise Psicológica, no. 4, April/May/June.
43. The reduction in both compulsory primary schooling (from 5 to 4 years in 1927, and from 4 to 3 years in 1930) and in teacher training does not mean that official education decreased in its importance to the state during the 1930s. On the contrary, we have argued that its importance, as 'ideological inculcation', actually increased. In this respect, it is important to refer to the official Portuguese Youth League (Mocidade Portuguesa - modelled to some extent on Hitler's youth movement) which was created in 1936 (with the Carneiro Pacheco Reform), and which became compulsory in that same year '(...)' for all Portuguese between the ages of 7 and 11, whether students or not, and for all students attending the first two years of secondary education (the "Liceu").' see L. Cortesão, op. cit., p. 84; also Lopes Arriaga (1976), Mocidade Portuguesa - Breve História de uma Organização Salazarista, Lisbon: Terra Livre.
44. Which, of course, doesn't mean to say there wasn't success (always relative) in other respects. Sérgio Grácio, for example, has argued convincingly that the increase in schooling of the 1950s and 1960s was above all aimed at legitimating new forms of modes of domination and social control. That is, schools increasingly came to emphasize selection and competition in order to favour a 'meritocratic representation of the social hierarchy'. This has been called, in the words of American sociologist Ralph Turner, the passage from 'sponsored to contest forms of mobility'. see Grácio, op. cit.; also Ralph Turner (1961), "Modes of Social Ascent through Education: Sponsored and Contest Mobility", in A.H. Halsey,

Jean Floud, and C. Arnold Anderson (eds.), Education, Economy and Society, Free Press.

45. see S. Miranda, op. cit.
46. Again, the recognition of these 'shortcomings' in official reports - '(...) About half the youth who finish primary school, that is more than 50,000 per year, suspend their studies, and there is a tendency for this number to increase. How can a country allow itself the luxury to waste so much potential and have the courage to deprive from social promotion such an important part of society?' - may have contributed, as Grácio suggests, to the production of a new integrating social role for education; that is, it was an integral part of the process, culminating in the Veiga Simão Reform in education and later in the April revolution, of making Portuguese education more meritocratic (and we shall argue also, though this is not Grácio's argument, more democratic). The above quotation is from M. Rocha, quoted in Planchard; see Grácio, op. cit., notes 31 and 32.
47. see Roger Dale and Ann Wickham (1980), "International Organizations and National Education Policies", paper presented to the International Sociological Association meeting on Sociology of Education, Paris.
48. Quoted in S. de Miranda, op. cit., p. 11.
49. In addition, the regime was forced to compete with its own opposition which became particularly evident at the time of the Delgado presidential campaign in 1958. Delgado, a General in the army stood for the presidency in 1958, opposing Salazar's candidate, and succeeded in mobilizing considerable popular support. After the elections, which Delgado 'lost', Salazar abolished direct suffrage for the presidency (DL 43 528). Some years later Delgado's body was found in a shallow grave, all evidence indicating that he had been murdered by the Portuguese secret police, PIDE.

50. S. Grácio argues that the increase in school population between 1960 and 1970 was due largely to changes in the Portuguese class structure. At least there was a 'concomitant growth of secondary schooling and of the petty bourgeoisie' during this period. see S. Grácio, op. cit, p. 486.
51. Nicos Poulantzas devotes considerable space to conflicts between 'blocks of capital', between what he terms the 'domestic bourgeoisie' (a national bourgeoisie not completely independent from foreign capital) and the comprador bourgeoisie in Portugal. see op. cit. Américo Ramos dos Santos refers to frequent collisions between monopoly groups within the state apparatus as a result of tactical contradictions in the 1968 to 1973 period. see op. cit., p. 94.
52. see Kenneth Maxwell (1974), "The Hidden Revolution in Portugal", New York Review of Books, 22, 6.
53. Within the military apparatus opposing interests also developed: 'With adherence to NATO the military apparatus quickly developed its own "domestic bourgeoisie", spokesmen of new values and tactics, derived from technocracy and meritocracy and opposed to traditional ascription.' see J. Correia Jesuino (1982), "Anomia e Mudança na Sociedade Portuguesa", in Mudança Social e Psicologia Social, Lisbon: Livros Horizonte, p. 101.
54. see Norman Blume (1977), "SEDES: An Example of Opposition in a Conservative Authoritarian Regime", Government and Opposition, 12, 3. (SEDES = Sociedade de Estudos para o Desenvolvimento Económico e Social, 'Society for the Study of Economic and Social Development').
55. see Douglas Porch (1977), The Portuguese Armed Forces and the Revolution, London: Croom Helm, in particular pp. 12-13. Also see L.S. Graham, 1975, op. cit., particularly pp. 16-28.

56. Hermínio Martins, op. cit.
57. see L.S. Graham, op. cit., p. 26.
58. see J. Veiga Simão (1972), "The General Reform of Education in Portugal", West European Education, Spring/Summer.
59. ibid.
60. Chapter 2 is devoted specifically to an analysis of the Veiga Simão Reform. From the measures listed here, selected by Veiga Simão himself as the major elements of his reforms, the general mobilizing character of the Reform becomes apparent. see J. Veiga Simão (1977), "The University of Today: The Portuguese Experience", Journal of American-Portuguese Society, 11, 2.
61. J. Veiga Simão, 1972, op. cit., p. 111.
62. ibid., p. 107.
63. The phrase is Harry Makler's. see op. cit., p. 496.
64. Eric Hobsbawm discusses the problems of officer class solidarity, in (1975), "Military Revolutionaries", New Society, 22 May; see also Clyde Magarelli (1981), "Crises of Convergence: Military Professionalism and Working Class Struggle: Portuguese Case Study, March 16, 1974 - November 25, 1975", Ph.D. Dissertation, State University of New York at Binghamton; and J.M. Pereira (1976), O Socialismo, A Transição e o Caso Português, Amadora: Bertrand.
65. see Ben Pimlott (1978), "Soldiers and Politics in Portugal: The Armed Forces Movement 1973-76", Journal of Iberian Studies, 7-1, Spring; also Rona M. Fields (1975), The Portuguese Revolution and the Armed Forces Movement, New York: Praeger.
66. Rona Fields discusses this, in ibid. see also Chapter 4 for

a discussion of the literacy campaigns.

67. Here again there was resistance, particularly in the rural North, to what was considered 'red pedagogy' (see note 53, Chapter 3 for further details). The attempts to construct the socialist school (through poder popular), or to actively use education to construct the socialist society (alfabetização) are elaborated further in Chapter 4.

68. During the revolution, the legally drawn line of the state's monopoly of coercion became virtually indistinguishable. This is discussed in some detail in Chapter 4 below. With regard to the dismantling of state corporatism, H. Wiarda makes the following comment in his study of the process: '(...) by the end of the first year of the Revolution, virtually the entire formal structure of the corporate state had been dismantled or restructured.' see H. Wiarda, 1977, op. cit., pp. 112-13.

69. N. Portas and S. Gago, op. cit., pp. 239-40. As one might expect, studies carried out on local government in post-revolutionary Portugal demonstrate that 'Portuguese realities' contrast at times sharply with the idealism of the Constitution. L. Graham's study, for example, concludes that '(...) in essence (there exists) a situation in which the current system of local self-government is strong in representation but weak in its developmental capacity.' This weakness, suggests Walter Opello, is due to 'administrative centralization' and 'inadequate local financial autonomy' which after the revolutionary period reimposed themselves on elected functionaries. Additionally, it should be pointed out that the 1976 Constitution has recently undergone its first revision. In the new text Article 2 differs somewhat from the original version. It now calls for 'the transition to socialism by way of the creation of cultural, social and economic democracy and the expansion of participative democracy.' (Constituição da República Portuguesa, Primeira Revisão, 1982, Imprensa Nacional, Casa da Moeda, Lisbon, p. 19. see L.S. Graham (1981) "The Portuguese State: the view from

below", Conference on Contemporary Portugal, 1900-1980, Fundação Calouste Gulbenkian/G.I.S., December; Walter C. Opello (1979), "Administração Local e Cultura Política num Concelho Rural", Análise Social, no. 59, p. 658.

70. In the revised version (1982), positive discrimination towards the working class is referred to in Article 76 only (and in terms of 'the workers and their sons', rather than the 'working classes'). See Appendix VI.
71. On the 25th of November, 1975, there took place the suppression of a Left-wing revolt among some sectors of the Armed Forces, small in scale, and according to some commentators provoked by Right-wing sectors to end the deadlock of the 'hot Summer' of 1975. see, for example, J.P. Faye (1976), Portugal: The Revolution in the Labyrinth, Spokesman Books. Another version of the same story is provided by José Freire Antunes who argues that the events of the 25th of November amounted to a 'legal conspiracy' to institutionalize democracy in Portugal, which meant returning to 'civil society full control of its own destiny' (i.e. rescuing it from the hands of the Communist Party). see José Freire Antunes (1980), O Segredo do 25 de Novembro, Lisbon: Publicações Europa-América.
72. Not that the process escaped unnoticed nor without being criticized. Journalist Luís Ribeiro, for example, wrote in the monthly education journal, O Jornal da Educação: 'Political was the closing of the Teachers Training Colleges decreed by Salazar in November 1936, only to reopen some of them six years later; equally political was the restructuring of the courses of the same Colleges carried out by the Directorate-General of Basic Education for the academic year 1975-6; also political, unequivocally, was the priority given to the discussion, at times surprisingly vigorous of the future of the Colleges (at times exclusively by political parties generally considered "right-wing") during the last electoral campaign for the Assembly of the Republic

(...); and finally, political was the restructuring of the Colleges (...) initiated at the beginning of this academic year.' see Luís Ribeiro (1977), "Banco Mundial: relatório 'técnico' procura esconder estratégia política", O Jornal da Educação, no. 3, June, p. 11. (Emphasis added.)

73. The measures taken by Sottomayor Cardia, Minister of Education for the 1st Constitutional Government had the effect of removing from the education system - particularly from teacher training institutions - teachers who had obtained their qualifications during the 1960s and 1970s in other European countries, especially France. Naturally, many of those teachers had been exiled by the Salazarist regime. On the form and consequences of Cardia's method of selection of teachers in training colleges, see Cabral Pinto, op. cit.; also Luís Ribeiro who wrote an article on this subject in O Jornal da Educação, no. 3, June, 1977, p. 30.
74. Numerus clausus was considered an important means of making the education system function not only 'normally', but also 'efficiently' - by attempting to link numbers for entry into the education system directly with places available in the labour market, or with places available in the education system itself (in terms of installations).
75. Controls were placed on who could enter schools by conditioning the entry of persons foreign to the school establishment. Although this measure was introduced to combat vandalism, Rui Grácio has argued that it gravely affected the capacity of schools to operate as regional centres of cultural association and pedagogical aid to teachers. see R. Grácio, 1981, op. cit., especially note 20, p. 692.
76. Before being completely removed from the curriculum of secondary schools, the discipline entitled 'political sciences' was amended, according to the Lisbon press, in order to delete the citation classifying 'social democracy' as a 'political form for saving capitalism'. In the Teacher

Training Colleges, the new discipline 'Dialectic Theory of History' was substituted by 'Introduction to Politics'. see Opcao, no. 1, 28 April 1976, p. 35 and no. 21, 16 September 1976.

77. 'Lei' 3/79 of 10 January 1979, drawn up by the Communist Party and approved by the Assembleia da Republica, set in march the PNAEBA (Plano Nacional de Alfabetização e Educação de Base dos Adultos) under the auspices of the Directorate-General of Life-Long Education.
78. see Chapter 5 for detailed discussion.
79. The Polytechnic Education Project is also discussed in some detail in Chapter 5.
80. The revised version of this paragraph reads: 'Education should be modified in such a way so that it is capable of overcoming any function permitting the conservation of economic, social or cultural inequalities.' While the revised version of this particular paragraph is certainly a milder form of the original, on the whole the revised version of the 1976 Constitution maintains, or even increases, the profound democratic spirit in the field of education and culture found in the original text (which is not necessarily true of the revised text as a whole). For a discussion of the changes in education in the Constitution, see José Salgado Sampaia (1982), "Os Direitos e Deveres Culturais na Revisão Constitucional", O Professor, 45, October.
81. The phrase is Philippe Schmitter's, in 1974, op. cit.

Chapter 2

The Veiga Simão Reform in Education:

project of social progress or 'humanist disguise'?

The project for educational reform that appeared in Portugal at the beginning of the decade of the seventies had repercussions far beyond the boundaries of the education system. The Prime Minister at the time, Marcello Caetano, introduced the reform in his radio broadcast to the nation on January 17, 1970, proclaiming that his Government was intent on carrying out 'a great, urgent and decisive battle in education'.¹

The exceptional importance of the reform became even more apparent in the broadcast to the nation made by the Minister of Education to the Caetano Government, Professor José Veiga Simão, on January 6, 1971. During the course of the broadcast, Veiga Simão presented to the nation his general reform of education in Portugal, in the form of two texts to be issued for broad general discussion: 'Projected Educational System' and the 'Guidelines of Reform of Higher Education'.² For the next two years (the reform finally became law in April, 1973) these two documents attracted the attention of all Portuguese, 'becoming, in certain respects, the crucial focus of sociopolitical life',³ which was hardly surprising, for they were seen to 'embody a series of aspirations, of necessities, long felt by the Portuguese people and by the institutions of education, but whose satisfaction (had) been constantly delayed.'⁴ Further evidence of the impact of Veiga Simão's general reform (henceforth referred to as the Veiga Simão Reform⁵) can be ascertained from the following quotations extracted from the debate on the Reform in the

National Assembly,⁶ which, in spite of political rhetoric,⁷

leave little doubt about the Reform's importance:

'In simple words, the Minister of National Education (M.E.N.) justified his project: "(...) In the Portuguese world there exist millions of men who need instruction and education; there exist immense lands waiting to be cultivated (...). Educate all Portuguese, educate them promoting an effective equality of opportunity independent of the social and economic conditions of each one (...)" - this is the objective of the "battle in education"; 8

'(...) there's no doubt that, in terms of its ambition and its extensiveness, in addition to its projects which cover globally different levels of education, it is possibly the greatest effort, the most daring attempt at reform yet made in Portugal'; 9

'The reform of the Portuguese education system represents one of the most significant marks of the reformist politics of the Government of Professor Marcello Caetano, an important step of governmental action in the programme of "renewal within continuity", (...) of "evolution without revolution".' 10

It is tempting to interpret the Veiga Simão Reform as the final elaboration of more than a decade of projects of educational reform, starting in the fifties with the Education Minister Leite Pinto, continuing with Minister Galvão Teles and the elaboration in 1968 of the Project of the Status of National Education, then the proposal for the law of reform of intermediate education ('ensino médio') under Education Minister José Hermano Saraiva, arriving finally at the epoch of Veiga Simão. This sort of interpretation, however, apart from linking projects that were in many aspects contradictory, tends to become excessively economic, reducing the reform process to the one element supposedly weighing heavily on all four education ministers, i.e. the demand

for skilled manpower to aid economic expansion. Sacuntala de Miranda adopts a more subtle interpretation, arguing that the Veiga Simão Reform, 'tentatively and subject to various types of pressure', was the outcome of 'developmental objectives' conceived during the fifties and sixties. She maintains that it is fundamental

'(...) to recognize that (these) development-
alist objectives, in the field of education,
have their roots in an historical period prior
to Veiga Simão, who as part of the Marcellist
epoch, opened them to discourse and conquered
for them a relatively large sector of public
opinion.' 11

Although one might agree basically with this statement, it seems important that one shed some light on the latter part of it. This we shall attempt to do. To avoid an overly simplistic interpretation of the Veiga Simão Reform, it is imperative to take into account, to illustrate, the differences, even conflicts, between the Ministers of Education of the 1950s and 1960s and the project of Veiga Simão. Further, one needs to account for the new elements appearing in Veiga Simão's programme and actions (as well as for the old ones dropping out). The fact that the phrase 'the democratization of education', considered subversive prior to 1970,¹² suddenly became the clarion call for educational and social change in governmental communiqués needs to be explained, particularly in light of the fact that a crucially important aspect of 'liberalization' policy (discussed further below) was the emphasis placed on making political policy 'available' to the public a) through 'open, public discussion' and b) through governmental media broadcasts. Additionally, the following reference by the then President of the Republic, Admiral Thomas, by all accounts a very reactionary figure who occupied himself

with attempts to block Caetano's 'liberalization' process and who was a staunch defender of the interests of large industrial groups,¹³ is in need of clarification:

'The President of the Republic recognized with lucidity (sic) that the most shocking and intolerable aspect of inequality in Portugal is the lack of attention paid to the right to education (...) which has to do with dignity of the people, with national solidarity and with the economic, social and cultural development of the country.' 14

The two most salient aspects of the Veiga Simão Reform which we want to draw attention to in this chapter, and which point to the Reform's importance in view of the fact that we are talking about a repressive authoritarian regime, without democratic parliamentary representation and with strong censorship, are, on the one hand, its populist nature - that is, in addition to its core element of educational expansion, the manner in which the Reform was presented and promoted by both Veiga Simão and Marcello Caetano - and, on the other hand, its more general role in the extension and development of the 'Estado Social',¹⁵ its importance in stimulating basic changes in the form of organization of the state, its part in the

'(...) attempt to extract Salazarist corporatism from its fascist mould in order to transform it into another, neocapitalist and "European", in which the basis of society and state would continue to be the organic and permanent collaboration of social groups and classes.' 16

A great deal of the importance of the Veiga Simão Reform is attributable to the importance of education generally to the Portuguese state during the reign of the Estado Novo. Education, as we glimpsed in the last chapter, was important for

two main reasons. It was important because of the heavy reliance on education, and more generally ideology, by Portuguese rulers, to deal with the stresses and strains produced within a regime which proclaimed the 'harmonization of classes' when, in fact, it was based on adversary patterns of class conflict.¹⁷ And it was important because the inability of the Portuguese state to resolve tension and crises through the production and distribution of economic and social goods on a scale comparable to that enjoyed by the industrially advanced nations (i.e. the latter's capacity to raise general living standards and to provide extensive welfare measures) led it to depend heavily on the production and distribution of symbolic goods (glorifying Deus, Pátria e Família) hopefully (for the state) capable of substituting economic ones.¹⁸ Both of these aspects were facilitated by the historically prominent role of the state in Portuguese education.¹⁹

We argued in the previous chapter that the relationship between education and national development experienced two distinct phases during the period 1926-1973. From an initial position as ideological inculcator, based on strong nationalist ideology derived from the trinity Deus, Pátria e Família, the education system moved to a role much more closely linked with the economy and economic intervention by the state. Accompanying this move was a break (albeit incomplete) with the formerly dominant ruralist and anti-development aspects of nationalist ideology.²⁰ Education thus came to assume a more complex position: it had to take into account not only the demands of educational planners and a division of labour stretching far beyond

Portuguese borders, but also, gradually, it had to come to terms with the formation of citizens for a modern, if not democratic, society. Education was forced to assume this more complex position because the Portuguese state could not ignore domestic demands for more education (irrespective of the source of those demands),²¹ nor could it simply ignore, once agreements had been undertaken, the pressures for the modernization of the country coming from international organizations investing advice and expertise in Portugal. Portuguese social analyst António Reis argued,²² in 1971, that this new (renewed) role for education in Portugal - in effect, the institutionalization of equality of opportunity in education - meant a second break with 'nationalist ideology', this time parting company with what Reis termed 'its elitist aspect'. Reis exemplified this break with the following quotation from Veiga Simão:

'Decidedly, the future of the nation (wrote Veiga Simão) does not reside only in small closed "elites". In opposition to the aristocracies of culture, we place the education of the masses, a constant preoccupation of the rulers of today, essential for our own national survival. Those nostalgic for the past, for great dreams of long-ago, must give way to the democratization of schooling in extension and depth, a primordial factor for the progress of the country.' 23

The stress that Veiga Simão placed on the process he termed 'the democratization of education' inevitably had an impact on the struggle for the democratization of Portuguese society generally, a struggle where the main issue at hand was the right of the citizen to participate in political power; this was in marked contrast to the heyday of the Estado Novo when

'Equality between men was a myth; political power did not reside in the citizen, simply an abstract concept, it derived rather from

concrete entities (the family, the municipality) which had a logical existence ontologically prior to the political community.' 24

Essentially, then, what we want to argue in this chapter is that the Veiga Simão Reform took on a special importance at the beginning of the decade of the seventies: 1) because of the general importance in Portugal of education to the state, 2) because the Reform acted as a pivot for debates on the development/modernization of the country,²⁵ and 3) because of the Reform's impact in a specific political conjuncture (a conjuncture of crisis) that gave the Reform a general importance and autonomy that education in general lacked in its condition of contributor to economic development and modernization during the decades of the fifties and sixties.

There are basically two sets of interpretations of the Veiga Simão Reform, of its significance and objectives at the time of its appearance and discussion in Portugal: those based on a cultural/historical explanation and those based on explanations supported by economic arguments. In the pages that follow, we shall look firstly at the reasons Veiga Simão himself gave for his Reform, and at the arguments advanced by M.P.s during the debate in the National Assembly either in support of, or in opposition to, the Reform. Afterwards, we shall examine the principal cultural/historical explanation of the Reform, elaborated by Howard Wiarda in his work on Portuguese corporatism. Wiarda uses as a principal point of reference the study of Portuguese education by Henry Keith.²⁶ Next we shall outline two interpretations, both conjunctural, based mainly on economic

phenomena: the argument, prominent at the time of the Reform, in opposition circles, that its essential purpose was to serve the interests of the modernizing sectors of a capitalist economy in crisis, and secondly, the interpretation that can be drawn from the work of Sedas Nunes, which, while not always centred specifically on the Reform, does offer a position on it. Such an interpretation would argue that the Reform had arrived at an opportune moment enabling, particularly, the democratization of the University without its subordination to the interests of multinational capital.

The Veiga Simão Reform: a 'condition of survival'

Marcello Caetano termed 'liberalization'²⁷

'(...) an effort to allow greater expression of opinions, a wider information service, a more intimate participation of people in public life.' 28

Veiga Simão, however, went much further, challenging the apparent superficiality of Caetano's words:

'The complete concretization of the present project for the Portuguese school system will certainly take some time and will demand huge financial resources, but it presents itself as a significant transcending task for the future of the Portuguese people; a possible task, a condition of survival.' 29

Veiga Simão thus spoke of his education policy as a possible solution to a grave crisis he openly identified as being above all 'spiritual' in nature:

'(...) And because this society became less human and less humanist, directed more towards matter than spirit, it entered into profound crisis.' 30

To replenish the lack of humanism in Portuguese society,

Veiga Simão called for the long-term planning of education which he claimed the primary and dynamic factor of the future of developing countries. 'Humanization' would result in modernization, which necessarily involved a policy of the intensification and creation of human and material wealth - hence his slogan 'Educate All Portuguese' as a battle cry in the struggle for survival:

'Educate all Portuguese, wherever they may be, from the hidden village to the industrialized city, from the dry prairie to the green meadow; this is the sacred principle of absolute value and transcending importance on a national scale.' 31

The University, at the summit of the education pyramid, would be the motor for development, thus it could not be sectarian, would have to base its actions on the fundamental principle of the authentic democratization of education, would be a public institution of universal and national character - teachers and students having the right and means to work and study -, and would be managed through constant dialogue with the public.

Veiga Simão's 'condition of survival' meant for many liberal M.P.s,³² and for developmentalists in general, a call to accompany the rhythm of industrial Europe. This was seen by some as absolutely necessary to avoid 'loss of independence' through the invasion of techniques and intelligence from other more industrially advanced countries:

'(...) a country incapable of understanding what is happening in the world community of science risks losing gradually all cultural, economic and even political independence.' 33

There are, indeed, constant references in the developmentalist and educational literature of the two decades preceding the Veiga Simão Reform to the need for the planned development of advanced technology in Portugal, to the need for contact with,

and development through, international organizations, to the importance of external influence in Portugal:³⁴

'Let's not be afraid of losing our cultural independence; let's not be afraid of bastardization (...). Portuguese genius does not consist of copying. It consists of translation, transformation and application of all (such) knowledge to Portuguese reality, so that it at last takes off and begins to be a truly modern and European society (...). We never were, throughout our history, more Portuguese than in the 16th Century. We also were never more European. Europeanization is not contrary to "Portugalization" (...).' 35

One might also take Guerra's plea as a condemnation of the failure of Portuguese society to produce by whatever means possible, either in quantity or in terms of necessary skills, the scientific and technical manpower indispensable for economic, cultural and social development. This also comes across in the frequent references by Portuguese developmentalists to the Mediterranean Regional Project, which was a study

'(...) about (Portugal's) needs in terms of specialized labour (...) in terms of the rapid changes in technique and in terms of (its) adaptation to world economic growth.' 36

The 'MRP' came to act as a kind of guide, a reference point for 'expert advice' grounded in empirical study.³⁷ Not that development was conceived exclusively in economic terms:

'(...) it is necessary to create a plan of Cultural Fermentation, without which a Plan of Economic Expansion makes no sense, nor can it be efficient.' 38

Leite Pinto also paid tribute to foreign influence: '(...) they convinced us of the necessity to better the Portuguese cultural structure.'³⁹

As Guerra's words above reveal, many developmentalists were aware not only of the advantages, but also of the dangers involved

in a policy that recognized economic development as essential to independence; they realized that economic development could in itself imply the forsaking of political independence, even national identity, as a result of ensuing subordination to foreign economies. Thus Leite Pinto warned:

'Economic development begins as a political problem - for only politics can balance the internal social implications of recourse to foreign technical assistance.' 40

And Mario Murteira spoke of the dangers of external influence, which he nonetheless considered vital for change in Portugal, dangers only surpassable in a political structure capable of producing reform:

'(...) the acceleration of development postulates a policy of reforms; it is necessary that the political structure be capable of carrying out the necessary reforms; but to obtain this objective, the less doctrinaire political power, the better the possibilities for concrete results via reforms.' 41

Development by itself, Murteira continued,

'(...) is an abstraction, it needs content, which can only be given by a concept of social progress - thus the problem is not only accelerating development: it is also choosing a path to social progress.' 42

Murteira thus warned against a technocratic vision of the problem of development; knowledge and capital must be placed at the disposal of a doctrine of social progress. Technicians (economists, engineers) must participate in the reforms but they must not become enclosed in a 'strict neutrality on doctrinal and ideological terrain'.⁴³ We also argued for the creation of 'denationalized technicians' (i.e. 'internationalized technicians') who would be useful in national development for they could 'cut through the tendency of traditional elites to

close themselves off in a world of traditional practices and irrationalism.⁴⁴

It can be argued that developmentalists like Murteira saw economic development as an excellent means for breaking out of the Salazarist mould. Salazar, himself, was aware of this possibility. In the mid-1960s he replaced his Minister of Education Leite Pinto, who had come to be known as the 'mouthpiece for circles worried about industrial liftoff and the adaptation of new techniques for the integration of Portugal in Europe',⁴⁵ with Education Minister Galvão Teles, a man less obviously 'developmentalist' who, in Rogério Fernandes's words, represented 'a regression in relation to Leite Pinto'.⁴⁶ Indeed, due to the highly repressive nature of the regime, the details of a 'societal project' were difficult to make explicit, and for this reason they often appeared in code, disguised in such notions as 'human infrastructure', 'national conscience' and the 'cultural aspirations of the people'.⁴⁷ Murteira's distinction between juridical and cybernetic decision-making processes amounted to a fundamental critique of the 'traditionalists'⁴⁸ by the 'developmentalists':

'(...) the former (i.e. juridical decision-making) is normative in essence, what should be hides what is (...), it lacks an empirical basis, and real historical time is disdained (dogmatic)'; the latter (cybernetic) 'involves a critical attitude towards developmental paths, temporal sequences are important and thus so is an understanding of the past, present and future (dialogic).' 49

Salazar's governments contained both 'traditionalists' and 'developmentalists' (although they were clearly dominated by the former⁵⁰), hence they were unable to delineate a clear model of development in the 1960s.

Veiga Simão conceived his Reform in terms of a national challenge, a challenge to educate all Portuguese in spite of scarce material resources, a shortage of human resources, and, importantly, 'the painful existence of a certain obstructive and paralysing conservatism'.⁵¹ He argued that the nation must come to appreciate the value of intelligence - 'science and technology and the participation of Portuguese intelligence in the great international centres of research' he considered fundamental for progress.⁵² Progress, according to Veiga Simão, as we have seen above, meant the creation of a more just and perfect society resting on a base profoundly human and spiritual that would ultimately allow man to control the developmental process, thus preventing him from becoming subservient to other nations or a slave of technology. Education was the key to this model of development, for it

'(...) makes possible a human life worthy of being lived, facilitating a complete process of social justice, inherent to any formula for bettering the condition of mankind.' 53

He suggested the promotion of the social sciences to avoid the 'Brave New World' syndrome, to liberate man from the nightmare of absolute control by technology. And education, he exclaimed, that 'precious good', must be granted to all Portuguese, on a meritocratic basis, to allow those most capable to integrate the nation's elite, independent of social and economic determinations.

'Proposta de Lei' No. 25/x⁵⁴

The interventions made in the National Assembly during the introduction to the debate and the general discussion of 'Proposta de Lei' No. 25/x were largely favourable to it.⁵⁵ The proposed

Law set out the general reform of the Portuguese education system drawn up by the Minister of Education, Veiga Simão. Considering the fact that the 'Deputies' of the National Assembly did not constitute a homogeneous group, this is at first glance surprising. However, on closer observation the apparent consensus over the Reform becomes understandable.

As stated earlier, the general reform of Portuguese education was announced by the Prime Minister for the first time on the 17th of January, 1970, (in his 'fireside chat' - conversa em família - to the nation). Education Minister Veiga Simão appeared on television a year later, on January 6, 1971, to announce to the country the distribution ('for wide public discussion') of the two documents "Projected Education System" and "General Lines for the Reform of Higher Education". Public debate over the proposed reform was intense:

'Schools of all levels and types, official as well as private; teachers, pedagogues and pupils; parents' and students' associations as well as institutions dealing with educational problems received copies of the two documents (...). It is sufficient to say that it became necessary to print 50,000 copies of each project, and that does not include the wide coverage given the texts by the press (...). One can affirm that those programmatic texts were delivered to the entire nation.' 56

The projected reform also stimulated wide debate among sectors in opposition to the regime. The remainder of this chapter, and the bibliography which accompanies it, are evidence of this fact. Finally, the proposed law was introduced and debated in the National Assembly during the first four months of 1973, becoming law on the 25th of July 1973.

One of the most frequent criticisms of the law arising

during the debate was the accusation that it contained no introduction, nor any justification for the principal modifications of the education system contained in it.⁵⁷ This is particularly interesting in light of the observations made by opponents of the Reform outside the corridors of power. For example, political analyst and opposition leader Sottomayor Cardia⁵⁸ termed the proposed reforms 'predominantly vague' (which he argued became even more vague as law).⁵⁹ The influential pedagogue, Jofre Amaral Nogueira, termed the whole project 'vague and abstract in character' arguing further that it was impossible to respond to

'(...) two nebulous documents, loaded more with vague intentions and abstract declarations of principle than with concrete and defined plans (...). One doubts whether it is worth the effort to put to the country a discussion so poorly defined.' 60

Cardia accused the Government of 'pale reformism' as an answer to an extremely serious crisis:

'(...) public opinion suggests deterioration of education, modern sectors of capitalism manifest new needs, students protest, and the flow of youth to schools has completely overrun a decrepit system.' 61

Although originally conceived as a wide-ranging democratic Reform, Cardia claimed the Reform arrived at its final stages without teeth. Its methods for action were not made explicit nor guaranteed in the law; its reform of higher education, once considered a priority, was left in the end to the 'catedráticos' (chaired professors) who were considered the most vociferous opponents of change in education;⁶² and, most surprisingly, not only did the Reform not contain a single word on the depoliticization and disarticulation of ideology in the content of schooling, nor in any form did it mention student participation

in the running of schools and universities, but it also failed to adopt the expression so often invoked by Veiga Simão and his most ardent followers, 'the democratization of education'.⁶³ In a similar vein, an anonymous article appearing in the journal O Tempo e o Modo, in 1973, argued that the 'atmosphere' in the country at the time the Reform was first announced differed considerably from the 'atmosphere' in the country at the time of the distribution of the two reform projects.⁶⁴ The article went so far as to identify two phases in the Reform: a first phase - the democratization of access phase - when the Reform was primarily concerned with meeting the needs of all 'capitals' through the preparation of competent technicians regardless of social class, and a second phase - the selection phase (selection devices being introduced within courses rather than prior to courses) - when it was claimed that economic constraints on the Reform (the job market) led to the need for numerous clausus and the consequent subordination of 'democratization' to 'economic demands' (producing in effect a shock between the interests of different sectors of capital).⁶⁵

We shall return to several of the aforementioned authors to look in more detail at their arguments further on in this chapter. For the moment, the important point to note is that by the time the Reform was actually voted in the National Assembly it had changed fundamentally: from the moment when it was first introduced to the public, in terms of its concept of progress and in terms of its notion of a societal project. In effect, the populist appeal of the Reform - voicing that which had hitherto been officially silent -, so characteristic of the Reform in its early stages, had gradually disappeared.⁶⁶

Now, does this imply that the Reform had evolved into a symbol of 'soulless technocracy' or that it had become directly subordinated to 'big capital', and thus to a role of producing qualified technicians at a rate determined by multinational companies?⁶⁷ This seems hardly likely. In fact, the very first chapter of the Reform, which set out its fundamental principles, continued to enunciate what Reis had termed 'nationalist ideology':

'The orienting principles of educational activity are: a) to guarantee the integral formation of the Portuguese through the development of intellectual faculties and physical development, with a view to the formation of character, of professional value and of all moral and civic virtues oriented by the principles of Christian morality and doctrine, traditional to the country; b) to prepare all citizens to take an active part in social life as members of the family and of all other primary groups and as participative elements of the progress of the country; and c) to stimulate love of country and for all its values, as well as the superior interests of the Lusitanian community, within a spirit of comprehension and respect for other peoples and in the atmosphere of active participation in the international community.' (In other words, respectively, Deus, Família e Pátria.) 68

The actual criticisms made by M.P.s of the Reform - criticisms which did not necessarily exclude the possibility of voting in favour of the Reform - are perhaps more enlightening about the actual content of the Reform than are the praises of it (due to the inevitable heavy doses of political rhetoric accompanying the Reform). In general, the praises focussed on the democratizing effects of the Reform:

'(...) the education programme proposed points to guaranteed access to the various levels of education and to cultural goods in general for all citizens, without distinction, according to capacity and merit, thus providing a basic education for all Portuguese and preparing

all citizens for participation in the progress of their country.' 69

Likewise, critics of the Reform focussed on its democratizing aspects - but from a different point of view:

'Democratizing education is the same as giving any citizen the right to be a "Dr.", which is nothing more than giving a donkey the right to be a horse.' 70

Also 'democratization' should not interfere with the right to private education:

'Education belongs in the first place to the family, aided by educators and the state, the representative of civil society (...). This fundamental principle (equality of opportunity in education) can only be guaranteed through a pluralist school system (...). True democratization of education should permit families the possibility of choosing their school, whatever be their economic or ideological situation.' 71

Furthermore, democratization of education, critics argued, would inevitably mean loss of quality and an inexorable 'massification' of education: hence the cry, 'God deliver us from the university of the masses!'⁷²

Another concern of critics was the lack of clear justification for principles in the Reform having to do with the religious, moral and civic values making up Portuguese culture and civilization, and thus the Portuguese nation:

'To begin with a commonplace: Portugal is a pluri-continental and multinational nation, which, in fact, is not a commonplace. On questions of national survival there are no commonplaces which one should cease to remember only because they are commonplaces; there are principles, there are ways, there are forms which define us as a people, which individualize us in the world and which integrate us in that world according to our mission (...). An education system which attempts to impose itself, disarticulated from the socio-economic context of the nation, cannot truly serve. And

if that nation is pluri-continental and multi-racial, therefore with a variety of different socio-economic contexts, then even more obvious and more perturbing becomes the gap between system and reality.' 73

And further,

'One always finds man, in space and time, in a given sociopolitical context, from which sprout the links to institutionalized values created in the light of the spirit of, and with respect for, supreme order - God, Fatherland, Family, the individual; morality, justice, law (...). The proposed law of the Government relating to the reform of the education system represents a human document of the superior civilization and the high degree of spiritual and cultural development of a people; it reveals the maturity and the independence of a political society well-placed on the road to progress, situated in a position of respect with regard to the fundamental principles of the Portuguese Constitution (1933), as an essential hallmark of the secure realization of the corporate social state (...) from whose spirit derives the affirmation of the family as the natural base of education (Article 12), the recognition of the right and duty of parents to educate their children (Articles 13 and 42) (...). One rejects, in this fashion, the totalitarian conception of the state, because one denies it the right to dominate education, as called for and exercised in some socialist and communist states and by certain liberal tendencies that defend certain rights of man, like free love and divorce.' 74

We find, then, in the proposed law itself, and in the praises and criticisms made of it in the National Assembly, considerable resistance to technocratic, or purely economic, readings of it. In summary, the debate in general in the National Assembly revolved around, on the one hand, the importance of a democratic - meaning meritocratic - education system considered important for the economic progress of the country and for integration with Europe, and, on the other hand, the importance of maintaining, and of defining more carefully in the light of

Portugal's 'world obligations', the principles embodied in Deus, Pátria e Família.⁷⁵

The Veiga Simão Reform: a broadening of elites

Howard Wiarda, basing his comments on education in Portugal on a rather short essay written by Henry Keith,⁷⁶ briefly elaborates a cultural-historical explanation for the Veiga Simão Reform in education. Institutional change in Portugal, argues Wiarda, especially that change resulting from educational reform, has traditionally served the function of maintaining a particular elite in power by broadening its base of support:

'When the elite could not, or would not, accommodate itself to this "code", the regime was overthrown, as occurred in the Liberal Revolutions of 1820 and 1836, and the Republican Revolution of 1910 (...).' 77

Marcello Caetano, coming in the wake of this tradition, aimed at broadening the base of his regime through the process of what was known at the time as 'liberalization', a misnomer, according to Wiarda, for Caetano did not mean to open the way to 'genuine democratization', but rather to widen the appeal and the base of the official party, and to curb somewhat the power of the secret police in order to better implement corporatism:

'He aimed at preserving, strengthening, reinvigorating, and institutionalizing the corporative system that had become moribund under Salazar, not at substituting some other system for it.' 78

Consequently, even the regime's most 'progressive' programmes, such as the Veiga Simão Reform, must be looked at, according to Wiarda,

'(...)' not so much in terms of the supposed

"democratic" opportunities they opened up but in the more limited light of regime attempts to loosen the Salazar rigidities and extend the loyal elite.' 79

Thus, in these terms, the Veiga Simão Reform was not designed to 'democratize Portugal', even the phrase 'democratization of education' is misleading, for its real value, as a base for broadening the ruling elite of the country, not only did not have as its principal objective making Portugal's population politically active and participating, but, on the contrary, aimed at maintaining and further consolidating control over the polity through the guise of extended educational benefits. Indeed, both Wiarda and Keith compare educational reform in the 1970s in Portugal with the experience of 'other technocratically authoritarian regimes', such as Brazil and Spain, whose educational benefits have been consistently manipulated by ruling elites to maintain strong control over potential student or popular dissidence.

Wiarda's argument rests on a base of historical and cultural determinism. In it, social change is conceived as moving from the top downwards through the broadening of elites resting on co-opted institutionalized popular movements. The political process is centred on competing elites and their relations with the Crown or the state apparatus. Corporatism in Portugal is seen as an indigenous framework for national development - thus Wiarda questions modernization theory's insistence on only one route to modernization, i.e. democracy and pluralism - resting on an older corporative-patrimonialist system which is traced back as far as the 12th Century (when Portugal as a country came into being). The essence of the corporatist system in Portugal, for Wiarda, is that it maintains traditional structure while

concurrently providing for change through the incorporation of new social and political units into the state administration. Thus corporatism is an agency of controlled social change, the change mechanism being education. The main problem for regime stability thus becomes, for a highly centralized bureaucratic state, how far it can go in 'liberalizing' and 'democratizing' education before it finds such a course counterproductive to its own best interests.

The main drawback to Wiarda's explanation, we would argue, is its determinism: Portugal is condemned to corporatism.⁸⁰ Social change is always initiated from above, either in calculated fashion to reproduce the existing elite structure or in order to adjust the system to the negative effects of conflicting personalities and private political rivalries. Abrupt and more thoroughgoing social change is explained as error: the lack of foresight by a charismatic leader to judge correctly the dosage of social change needed to maintain the status quo. The continued existence throughout history of bureaucratic structures (and a 'closed, hierarchical, stratified society'), and a particular type of mental structure, is left unexplained and matters of unequal and restricted economic development get hardly a mention in Wiarda's work. Paradoxically, all this having been said, Wiarda's notion of corporatism as an agency of controlled social change, with education acting ultimately as a set of blinders to mask real power relations,⁸¹ does appear to go some way towards providing an explanation for the appearance of the Veiga Simão Reform in the early 1970s: it was a smokescreen designed to aid the floundering oligarchy that was the Salazar/Caetanist regime. Of course, for Wiarda, the 'failure' of the

Veiga Simão Reform to provide controlled social change is attributed directly to Marcello Caetano:

'In seeking to blend and balance (...) diverse tendencies (...), Caetano remained cautious to the point of indecisiveness, refusing or failing to grasp more firmly the levers of power or to take the decisive actions called for when the opportune moments came. Trying to juggle a variety of balls in the air on a political base that was always weak to begin with, Caetano eventually started losing control of his own juggling act, the balls started falling, and one of them finally, in April, 1974, hit him on the head.' 82

The Veiga Simão Reform: 'economizing nationalist ideology'

A similar conclusion with regard to the purpose of the Veiga Simão Reform, but with a very different set of explanations, is given by authors António Reis and Sottomayor Cardia writing independently, but arriving at similar conclusions on the Reform in the early 1970s. For Reis and Cardia, Veiga Simão's Reform was a

'(...) cautious adaptation of the political machine to satisfy the necessities of the development of the capitalist mode of production in the interests of the most technologically advanced sectors and thus those most capable of confronting European competition (...)', 83

or, more succinctly, 'a transfer of power from the Right, traditionalist and archaic, to the Right, modern and capitalist'.⁸⁴

A combination of various factors led, during the late 1960s/early 1970s, to a blocked restructuring of the state, to a regime incapable of internal renewal. The model of economic lift-off, so successfully applied in the late 1950s and the early 1960s, had reached a point of relative exhaustion by the mid

1960s.⁸⁵ Originally the model was based on industrial development through the reinforcement of private initiative by the state. World War II provided several key conditions making such a model possible: 1) it allowed for the accumulation of capital that urged application to avoid inflationary effects, 2) it provided for a linkage of the political personnel of the state apparatus with big industrial interests, through the projects of the post-war period (electrification, transports, basic industries), and 3) it created vast opportunities for administrators.⁸⁶

Portugal also contained the necessary conditions to produce high profits: state protection of industry to severely limit foreign competition through the use of customs's rights and a policy of permitting high prices internally coupled with low labour costs to allow for cheap exports. Dr. Correia de Oliveira, Minister of Finance in the 1940s, declared the following in an interview given to the "Diário de Lisboa", a daily Lisbon newspaper, in August, 1966:

'(...) true to the fashion of the epoch, we constructed customs barriers to free us from the competition of foreign industrial production; we created constraining systems, or a reserve internal market, with the theoretical objective of avoiding over-equipping and with the practical result of stopping competition (...). We planned, projected and built the big base industries; we agreed upon and assured, directly or indirectly, a high profit to industrial investment, at a level which permitted truly capable entrepreneurs, not only to make considerable progress and create new areas of industrial wealth, but also to finance such progress and growth largely at the cost of capitalized profits (...). We based our industrial growth on low salaries, which were based on cheap food, which was based on the fixing and freezing, for long periods, of prices for agricultural products, which discouraged investment in that sector.'

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The price to be paid for this 'model' was twofold: agriculture

was allowed to stagnate in the hands of the 'untouchable' latifundiários (large landed-estate owners), and labour was repressed (lack of union rights, control of strikes, vertical organization only, etc.), both of which led to very high levels of emigration.

Several reasons are presented in the literature for the tailing-off of the lift-off model: basic industries suddenly found customs's controls working to their disadvantage (there occurred a lack of basic raw materials and a problem of substituting imports in general); there was a tendency towards autonomy in the African possessions (colonial wars broke out in 1961 in all three provinces); industrialization based on the sacrifices of the working classes began to have negative effects (particularly with adherence to EFTA in 1960 and thus closer European integration, which helped perspectives for growth, on the one hand, but accentuated differences in salaries between Portuguese and European workers, on the other - which helped to provoke even further the emigration phenomenon); and, finally, the economic and political system showed itself incapable of adjusting to new demands.⁸⁸ With respect to the latter, F. Pereira Moura makes reference to the 'three refusals' of the Salazarist regime: refusal of new forms of international organization, refusal of demands for transformation of the system to avoid emigration and refusal of the autonomist and nationalist tendencies of the African colonies which meant the domination of personal interests over the country.⁸⁹

In actual fact, 'model' may be the wrong term to use when referring to the industrial expansion of the late 50s/early 60s. Almeida and Barreto, for example, are adamant in their claim

that the expansion was due to the utilization of the potentialities of the actual socio-economic structure and not due to an alteration in the line of action of public powers in some decisive attempt at development. In addition, they declare:

'In the absence of an economic policy decidedly innovatory, a policy that would necessarily have to begin to find solutions in terms of an alternative to the distortions and structural contradictions of the society, the recent economic growth became more a fact of emphasis and of creation of social imbalances, visible in its spacial and sectorial appearances' (reference is made here to the phenomenon of 'dualism': 'modern society' versus 'traditional society'). 90

For Almeida and Barreto, expansion took place mainly as a result of three factors: the African wars, the massive influx of foreign capital coupled with 'aid' and 'advice' from international organizations (mainly EFTA, OECD, World Bank), and the availability of underemployed cheap manpower. The massive influx of foreign capital represented, as Armando Castro confirms, an abrupt change in government policy:

'The most significant evolution in the financial area is without doubt the change in attitude of the Government of Lisbon with respect to public and private foreign capital. During many years Portugal showed itself distrustful of capitals coming from abroad. But the necessities of the IIInd Development Plan (1959-1964) and the military effort in Angola produced an about face.' 91

The colonial wars, which are given great emphasis by Almeida and Barreto, were considered essential in determining the country's economic destiny. With the start of the wars, military spending suffered considerable expansion. This fact not only provoked increased economic growth through the increased demand caused by the redistribution of soldiers' and officers' earnings⁹²

and by the production of war material, but also, later, in 1963-64, provoked high rates of inflation. Eventually industrial expansion exhausted the structural potentialities of the regime, making apparent the need for 'radical and global transformations in the structural framework of the country'.⁹³ The colonial wars played a central role in this scenario:

'If the wars in Africa contributed to induce, at the level of the economy of the country, a situation of maximum output of the productive apparatus, in a short time they would highlight its limits and its structural imbalances, making evident the contradictions existing between the productive forces and the relations of production.' 94

Industrial expansion, without structural and institutional change, explained for our two authors the limits of the system and hence its increasingly severe crisis. Portugal, inevitably caught up in post-war capitalist expansion, moved toward European integration under the direct guidance of the state. However, the dominant classes within the state found themselves involved in a profoundly contradictory policy; for while a policy of development was proclaimed, many traditional socio-economic and political structures remained the same:

'(...) on the one hand, an anachronic agricultural activity is protected, while on the other, a policy of expansion is initiated, with a base mainly in the industrial sector, considered the propelling force of all economic activity, to create economic planning, which will permit a certain ordering of cooperation between public powers and big capital.' 95

And the colonial wars conditioned all socio-economic development:

'(...) not only through the credits they consume that could be productively applied elsewhere (for example in education), not only because of the links between domestic and international capital, but also because they block any process

of the readjustment of socio-economic and political structures (which neo-capitalism itself needs for expansion and consolidation of the system).⁹⁶

The change in the regime in 1968 with the assumption of the reins of power by Marcello Caetano ushered in a so-called 'new legitimacy'. Arguably it was based on a conception of progress essentially conceived in the following terms:

'(...) 1) it is desirable for all that we adopt the standards (political, production, consumption) of Western Europe; 2) it is possible to overcome the country's backwardness (finally recognized); 3) in order to achieve such, it is necessary to follow an evolutionary path determined by those in power, without social or political solutions based on discontinuity; and 4) no one will have to make a great effort, or change in any way, his/her life style to achieve such objectives.'⁹⁷

Accordingly, the Veiga Simão Reform had its role to play in the strategy of capitalist development: a) in the preparation of new cadre and of qualified technicians, and b) in the transmission of 'collective values' inherent to this process.⁹⁸

António Reis interpreted this role as an integral part of a 'modification of the composition of the social bloc in power',⁹⁹ involving a consequent 'shading of the nationalist ideology of the Estado Novo, "economizing" it'.¹⁰⁰ Changes in personnel within public administration and reformist proposals like the Veiga Simão Reform in education were deemed the right, if not the only, measures to take, argued Reis, in view of the fact that the contradictions within the state apparatus prevented more concrete, thorough measures at the level of basic structures.

Reis's criticism of the Veiga Simão Reform concentrated on 'the ideological presuppositions of its fundamental principle', that is the democratization of education. Veiga Simão had stated:

'A fundamental principle which I never tire of repeating and which must be always present in the minds of university professors is the necessity for an authentic democratization of education, which, without exception, will permit any youth to occupy in society that place which he deserves in exclusive dependence of his intellectual capacity and without social and economic constraints.' 101

Basically, for Reis, 'democratization of education' in the Reform acted as an affirmation of its humanist character, and was, thus, a central preoccupation derived from the necessity to find an ideological base with sufficient virtues to justify the necessity of the democratization of education. At the same time, it acted as a cover for the underlying technocratic character of the Reform. Proof of the pudding was the fact that the 'disguising and justificatory humanist ideology of the Reform disappears if considered within the limits of the political regime in force.'¹⁰²

Only apparently, therefore, did the proposed humanism present itself as a doctrine that could transcend the parameters constituted by the correlations education/social functions or education/demands of economic development. In practice, the humanist and economic objectives coincided harmoniously (on the basis of the subjugation of the former to the latter) - from the conjunction of these objectives would result a school system simultaneously 'individualized' and 'diversified'. The gap which remained, therefore, between the inspiring humanist aspirations of the concept 'democratization' and the measures forecast to effect it, were enormous. Consequently, the school system found

itself abstracted from the socio-economic constraints surrounding it,

'(...) as if it were to be placed within a giant protective bell-shaped glass that would impede the intervention of the reflexes of the social division of labour that continue to exist outside.' 103

Reis argued further that the three aspects of the Reform providing for the perfect democratic system - i.e. 'openness', 'interrelatedness', 'equality' - would end up coinciding with criteria of efficiency and profitability:

'(...) one should point out that the adoption of the criterion of interrelation will allow for greater profitability of the human and material means available.' 104

Openness and equality were merely formal since they were

'(...) abstracted from a society that will lead the great majority of the school population to end its studies after eight years of obligatory schooling.' 105

Finally, pre-primary education would only be effected, according to the Reform, in the near future and in collaboration with private bodies, which, in addition to compromising the openness and equality of the system, would also corroborate the economic criterion of profitability, for,

'(...) on the one hand, it is the need for feminine labour that is going to dictate, in the end, the restrictive expansion of pre-primary education, and, on the other hand, it is its weak intrinsic profitability that submits it to being put into operation by the state "as far as is deemed possible".' 106

One possible explanation for what is effectively the masking (this time with a humanist façade) of the 'true' nature of the Reform (that is, its role as a 'neocapitalist solution to a blocked restructuring of the state'), in Reis's analysis, is that the Reform

was an audacious (yet also naive?) attempt to attenuate the perceived 'ravaging of an underdeveloped people by modern capitalism'.¹⁰⁷ For the major problem for modernizing sectors was how to rationalize education in order to provide efficient public administration and prepared cadres for modern labour processes, to introduce rigorous planning, to build a meritocracy and a technocratic system capable of providing scientific legitimacy, in the midst of a repressive, failed corporatist regime blighted with mass poverty and illiteracy. The insolubility of this problem, without profound structural change (that could also lead to the conditions necessary for political liberty - termed by Cardia 'the Portuguese dilemma: Fascism or Democracy'¹⁰⁸), had led to the divorce of education from society, and to the need for the Veiga Simão Reform as a 'condition of survival' to narrow the gap between the mass of the population and the elite groups in order to give renewed credibility to the regime. This fact partially explains the populist character of Veiga Simão's campaign with its constant appeals to the 'agricultural workers labouring in the fields' and to 'workers struggling away in factories'.¹⁰⁹ Through the use of symbolic goods it was hoped that the national interest, in the interests of the people, would be identified with the interests of modernizing groups (themselves often subordinated to international pressure groups).

The Democratization of the University

During the late 1960s, in the wake of student upheaval, both in Portugal and abroad, several works were published by Portugal's best known sociologist, A. Sedas Nunes, on the reform

of the Portuguese university (at times he was joined by other authors, one of the most prominent being J.P. Miller Guerra, M.P. in the National Assembly very active in the education field).¹¹⁰ Sedas Nunes's main concern was the 'crisis' of the traditional university in Portugal, its failure to produce either in quantity or in terms of necessary skills the scientific and technical manpower indispensable to economic, social and cultural development. Sedas Nunes had written previously that the modernization of Portugal, was absolutely essential to adapt the country to the new conditions of international capitalism.¹¹¹ And modernization required not only technological change but also a change in the mental attitudes of the Portuguese people, to make possible 'the ability to demand the most efficient structures and methods'.¹¹² Major technological change, however, would lead inevitably to what Sedas Nunes termed 'an accumulation of dissatisfactions' on the part of the people. Therefore, both state and industry had the social responsibility to struggle for social cohesion by creating the conditions capable of alleviating such dissatisfactions - this was in a sense a prelude to what later became known under Caetano as the Estado Social, which in the words of Wiarda, was supposed to permit

'(...) transition from an essentially capitalistic-monopolistic economic system profiting only a few to an Estado Social benefitting the many - to create a nation more in accord with the social-service oriented nations of Western Europe.' 113

In their article on the crisis of the Portuguese university, Sedas Nunes and Miller Guerra, in addition to outlining the failures of the traditional university, suggested measures for restructuring higher education in Portugal.¹¹⁴ They argued that the spectacular demand for higher education among people of all ages

and both sexes must lead to the creation of new schools and new universities: 'the elitist university must cede to the democratic university, to the university of the masses.'¹¹⁵ It was also argued that the internal efficiency of the Portuguese university system, in European terms, was exceptionally low and on the way to further deterioration. In 1960 only 1.2% of the active population with a job possessed education of a higher level. Further, the attendance of courses of engineering and the social and economic sciences was notoriously low. Law, on the other hand, acted as a stepping stone to status and positions of leadership. In sum, Sedas Nunes concluded that

'(...) assuming that national shortages are not filled by foreign administrators and technicians, such a structure of qualifications of the active population is effectively incompatible with a rhythm of scientific, technological, socio-economic and cultural progress that would allow the country to advance without growing gaps - dephasement - and at the same time protect an economic base of independence, in the wake of modern civilization.' 116

The restructuring of higher education would have to be global, far-reaching, particularly in view of the fact that the traditional university institution, 'of the Napoleonic-Latin type', could not reform itself. Sedas Nunes and Miller Guerra therefore proposed a reform that would require not only the transition from the traditional to the modern university, but also

a) a reform of the Ministry of Education -

'(...) the preparation and execution of a real structural reform will only be possible with the remodeling and transformation of the Ministry of Education into a modern organization (...)' 117 -

and b) a policy of national development which would completely engage public powers. For Sedas Nunes and Miller Guerra, the

essential point was

'(...) to undertake important and honourable reforms. Important refers to reforms which will modernize the Portuguese system of higher education, according to the necessities of a nation that must embark on the road to modern culture and technology, in other words, modern European civilization. Honourable means reforms that proceed from the firm intention to convert the system, bettering significantly the university system and, never, mere circumstantial alterations.' 118

Finally, a global reform of higher education was essential for 'stimulating actions that can liberate creative energies locked away in ageing structures.' 119

Sedas Nunes maintained that the requests for the reform of the universities, for creating a higher education structure capable of responding to the social necessities of modern Portugal, came, significantly, not from 'big' economic interests, which in other more industrially advanced countries had indeed attempted to control the universities, but rather from 'smaller' capitals.¹²⁰ In fact, he argued that the system of Napoleonic-Latin type universities, with its powerful 'catedratic' elites, favoured big capital, at the expense of small and medium capital, enabling it to draw on its own technicians, and thus produce a more visible and a more complete foreign domination of Portuguese development. The really big firms, amounting to a few dozen, could afford to pay high wages and thus easily absorb the university production of graduates. Therefore, the existing social structure did not favour the evolution of Portuguese society in the direction of a form of development conducive to modernization, or, even less, democratization. Rather, society saw itself deprived of the personnel essential to social progress, found private interests

absorbing all qualified personnel at the expense of the state sector (thus producing the degradation of public administration).

Sedas Nunes's fear was that eventually 'big capital' would sense the need for a reform, 'from a social point of view' (to provide basic welfare measures) and because of a need for managers. Consequently, he argued that the reform of education was crucial at that particular moment 'to avoid technocratic solutions dominated by big capital, that is, before economic rationality constitutes a technocratic reform.'¹²¹

Harry Makler's "Study of the Portuguese Business Elite, 1964-66"¹²² provides evidence which supports Sedas Nunes's assessment of the distinct needs of 'big capital', on the one hand, and 'small and medium capital', on the other. Makler found that in response to his survey question 'What are two main problems pertaining to your enterprise with which you are most concerned at the present time?', most heads of Portuguese business enterprises were 'primarily concerned about the lack of trained manpower (24%)'.¹²³ In addition, a relatively large percentage, 19%, was concerned 'about reviewing, improving or expanding factories or equipment' and approximately equal proportions 'about improving productivity, fighting competition and financing their enterprises'.¹²⁴ All types of business man, and especially founders and owner-directors of minor enterprises in the northern part of the country (that area most affected by emigration) expressed in general greatest concern about problems concerning manpower, particularly the lack of qualified workers. However, the directors of major enterprises (companies comprising more than a 1000 workers - situated mainly in the Oporto and Lisbon areas) stated that internal organization (and not manpower shortage) was their

number one problem.¹²⁵

Critics of Sedas Nunes argued either that his analysis did not take sufficiently into account the confines of the repressive political system in existence at the time, and that consequently his solutions would not be able to produce the authentic democratization of the higher education system, or that his position inevitably defended the interests of 'big capital'.¹²⁶ Concretely, those who saw Sedas Nunes blocked by the political conjuncture argued that the reform of the traditional universities to an Anglo-Saxonic type, supposedly demonstrating a) democratization of access to the university, and b) a national policy of development, would, in fact, contribute very little to the basic problem of the divorce between the governing elites and the people. This was because a) broadening elites was not equivalent to democratizing education, and because b) a national policy of development would have to have both a direction and objectives (hence the inevitable link between education and the social structure).¹²⁷ António Reis stated simply, in reply to Nunes:

'(...) it doesn't seem possible for there to be a "substantial and modernizing" reform within the confines of the present political system and the present socio-economic structure that will not come to serve interests other than those that preside over the "development" of these structures.' 128

In effect, the new university - the 'industrialized university' - in opposition to the traditional university, which operated on the base of a small elite of bureaucrats and transmitters of acquired knowledge, would have to be developed within

the framework of capitalist logic, merging agreement between the renovators of education and those of economic development:

'(...) the global process of development imposes the continuous expansion and modernization of the advanced industrial sectors; (...) the determining qualitative factor being the human factor (...) i.e. the capacity for imagination and organization that is both efficient and resourceful (...) to make possible the translation of technological advances into productive realizations.' 129

In essence, such a reform of the universities, it was argued, would be 'depoliticized and accomodating'. Indeed, those who at the time accused Sedas Nunes of being 'an ally of big capital'¹³⁰ pushed this argument to the extreme, arguing that large industrial and financial interests would, in fact, be served by Sedas Nunes's 'technocratic and liberal reform'. There was no half-way solution: a true reform of the university would require the basic condition of the collective appropriation of the means of production. Logically, then, the whole process of 'liberalization' was merely a guise 'to neutralize the opposition', and the Veiga Simão Reform nothing more than

'(...) a great demagogic manoeuvre aimed at consolidating the fascist dictatorship of the dominant classes, adjusting the school system to new economic needs resulting from the fusion of the monopolies with the state.' 131

Conclusion

Summing up what has been said in this chapter, it appears that the Veiga Simão Reform was interpreted prior to the April revolution, especially during the phase of its conception and during the public debate which followed, in one of two ways: either as a reform principally concerned with the mobilization of

educational resources in order not only to stimulate and spur on the economic development and modernization of the country, but also to accomplish such within a wider project of national development and social progress (here one might argue that 'the battle in education' and 'renewal within continuity' were actually conflicting slogans, rather than partners complementing the same process¹³²), or as a reform necessarily restricted to the mere reorganization of resources and thus without any intention or, at a minimum, without any hope, of coming to terms with a political, social and economic crisis that required much more than slogans and political rhetoric to encounter its solution. In terms of the latter position, the Reform was seen to disguise, rather than reveal, real power relations by 'economizing nationalist ideology', or by merely 'broadening the base of certain elites', in order to either legitimate and provide continuing currency for the corporatist and undemocratic Estado Social, or to neutralize and/or break down the unity of opposition to the Caetano regime. The consequences of the success of such a reform would have been the (further) subordination of education to technocratic rationality and/or to the interests of monopoly capital. The argument in support of the Reform was that it had arrived at a moment favourable to its own success, meaning that monopoly capital had still not recognized the need for it. Portugal, however, had need of the Reform in order to modernize and to 'Europeanize' -

'Contrary to that which one is often made to believe, the qualifications demanded by the new phase of the Portuguese economy cannot be met by workers who do not possess an education with an extensive base. It is necessary therefore that schooling not be prematurely interrupted nor exclusively narrow

and over-specialized' 133 -

and furthermore an opportunity could not be lost to improve the general situation of the mass of the Portuguese population by extending to it equality of opportunity in education:

'I felt myself independent, without party affiliation (affirmed Veiga Simão) conscious that my mission was to break with the structures that were, to open the school to the hundreds of thousands of abandoned children in the alleys and the slums. I didn't want to be ashamed of being Portuguese (...).' 134

It has been our intention throughout this chapter to demonstrate the special importance of a reform in education. We have attributed that importance to the fact that the Reform acted as a pivot for the debates, always officially bound within the limits of the defense of the ultramar (overseas provinces)¹³⁵ and of public order, but unofficially going far beyond (student movement, political activity both at home and abroad including open armed opposition to the regime), over the development/modernization of the country. Further, it appears undeniable that the Veiga Simão Reform did act to legitimate an attempted restructuring of a state form which had entered into acute crisis in the late sixties. It aimed to legitimate this restructuring process primarily by claiming the need to make available access to economic citizenship, that is, through planning the expansion of education to serve economic development. In this sense, the Reform was the final step in the process initiated by former Education Minister Leite Pinto. Also, in this sense, it was in consonance with what Miranda has termed 'OECDism', that is,

'(...) a fundamentally economic and profoundly technocratic approach based on educational planning as a prolongation of economic planning

to answer skilled manpower needs.' 136

But, importantly, the Veiga Simão Reform was more than 'OECDism'. As a pivot for debates over the 'future of Portugal', it also meant mobilization. Here, it inevitably involved calling up, taking into account, gathering together, simply stimulating, the demands and interests of dominated groups. It was as a response to opposition to the Estado Novo/Estado Social that the Reform manifested a concern to dilute political exclusion and to condition technocratic determinism. Not that this was accomplished by the Reform in any linear or necessarily conscious manner. Nor that it was recognized at the time by political opposition to Veiga Simão. As a reform, which became 'in certain aspects, the crucial focus of sociopolitical life',¹³⁷ the Veiga Simão Reform was an important part of the attempted rearticulation/reconstitution of political, economic and social forces that took place in Portugal at the end of the decade of the sixties and the beginning of the seventies. As such, it was obliged to take heed of pressures coming from below, pressures deriving from the attempt to arrive at a new organic regulation of social forces, if only by providing a terrain on which popular discontent could be voiced. It therefore was more than mere manipulation, by elites, by fractions or blocs of capital, by individual economists or by international organizations, of an educational reform. As it turned out, Portuguese (and other) 'realities' determined that the conditions necessary for successful, and sustained, mobilization were lacking. In the end, the Veiga Simão Reform saw its flame reduced to a flicker:

'One needs to emphasize the fact that the Minister appeared to be, if not blocked, at least limited by, on the one hand,

university student demands and protests and, on the other, the pressure of the young teachers of the Study Groups, both to the "left", and by the machinations of his adversaries within and outside his own ministry on the right.' 138

However, the revolution of 25 April 1974 'remobilized' the Veiga Simão Reform giving it renewed vigour and expanding it, indeed beyond recognition, to areas untouchable before the revolution (such as the democratic management of schools). The Veiga Simão Reform was unique as a focal point for the constitution of a new political and economic organization of social forces. An organization which was seriously threatened (but ultimately strengthened?) by the revolution of April 1974.

Footnotes to Chapter 2

1. see J. Pinto Machado (1973), "Separata" of O Médico, no. 1134, Oporto, p. 3 (based on an intervention by the author in the National Assembly on the Reform of the Education System).
2. see José Veiga Simão (1972), "Projected Educational System", Western European Education, Spring/Summer; also "The General Reform of Education in Portugal" (Broadcast to the Nation, January 6, 1971) in the same number of Western European Education.
3. J.P. Miller Guerra, Diário de Sessões, National Assembly, 1971, p. 1653.
4. *ibid.*
5. Very interesting are Rui Grácio's comments on such nomenclature. For example, he writes: 'One says "the Veiga Simão Reform" with good reason, including the convenience of being able to crystallize in one name the complex range of initiatives, studies, actions and vicissitudes of a process that has mobilized so many and so diverse persons and institutions.' He then goes on to point out the negative aspects of such terminology, which came to represent the Reform in its later phase as '(...) a sort of grandiose sculpture, complete and unified, destined to endure, closed upon itself, immobile and unalterable'. see Grácio, Rui (1973), Os Professores e a Reforma do Ensino, Lisbon: Livros Horizonte, pp. 20-21.
6. Prior to the 25th of April revolution the Portuguese parliament was called the National Assembly; it became the Assembly of the Republic after the revolution.
7. Political rhetoric also has its positive side. Once ideas or sentiments have been expressed in words, no matter how elaborately, some kind of commitment becomes possible. Although rhetoric may well have been frequently employed by M.P.s in the National Assembly during debates on the Veiga

Simão Reform, it is important to point out right here at the beginning of this chapter that we do not consider the Reform itself to have been simply 'rhetoric', that is mere 'window-dressing' for a regime in need of a new public image. As we suggested earlier in Chapter 1, we want to argue that an important element in the Reform was its concern with the making of modern people and modern institutions. Apart from the Reform's close links with the planning methods and models adopted by Portuguese economists during the 1960s (typified by the Mediterranean Regional Project - see below), the Reform was clearly conceived within the international parameters of overall modernization for Portugal. Over and over again Veiga Simão referred to the importance of the Reform's links with an assortment of international organizations: 'In the area of the Reform, we should draw attention to the report by the OECD on the programmatic texts. The report emphasizes their integration in modern educational currents and also points to the special contract drawn up with this organization which, in intimate collaboration with our specialists, will formulate proposals on the best manner to put into effect the "Projected Education System" project. Other organizations, namely the International Institute of Education of the United States, will also contribute, in this particular case in collaboration with the Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation.' José Veiga Simão (1972), recorded speech in Escola Portuguesa, no. 1376, February, p. 8.

8. Valente Sanches, Diário de Sessões, National Assembly, 1972, p. 3740.
9. Duarte de Amaral, Diário de Sessões, National Assembly, 1973, p. 5038.
10. Amílcar Mesquita, Diário de Sessões, National Assembly, 1973, p. 5117.
11. Sacuntala de Miranda (1978), "Portugal e a OCDE: expansão económica e planificação educativa", Vértice, nos. 408-9, May/June, p. 333. Calvet de Magalhães writes from a similar

position. He states: 'the Veiga Simão Reform grew out of Leite Pinto's decisions to promote the studies "Quantitative Analysis of the Portuguese School Structure" (1950-59) and "Evolution of the Portuguese School Structure (metropole), Prediction for 1975" (this study formed part of the Mediterranean Regional Project), and of the creation of the "Cabinet for the Study and Planning of Educational Action of Minister Galvão Teles"' (in "Educação Nacional: uma Nova Renascença?", Vida Mundial, Lisbon, 29 January 1971).

Miranda refers to 'developmentalist objectives'. During the 1950s and 1960s there developed informal political groups and factions trying to influence political power on the question of Portugal's future. According to L.S. Graham (see reference below), the four best known groups were the 'ultraconservatives', the 'integrationists', the 'federalists' and the 'developmentalists'. These groups were broad coalitions with representatives in the civilian bureaucracy, within the military and within the business community. The last group mentioned, the 'developmentalists', were advocates of a resolution of the 'African question' by negotiated settlement. They also favoured integration into the EEC. Made up largely of economists, the 'developmentalists' were not a homogeneous group. For example, while some were strong advocates of a policy of development on 'human capital' lines, others saw disadvantages in this model of development. We shall return to this subject again below. see Lawrence S. Graham (1975), Portugal: The Decline and Collapse of an Authoritarian Order, Beverly Hills: Sage.

12. Galvão Teles, Minister of Education during the mid-1960s had the following to say on the 'democratization of education': 'Observe that I speak of the "generalization of education" and not the "democratization of education". I avoid this latter formula because (...) it contains a tendentious political meaning. And I avoid it because it devalues, demagogically, the concept of selection, as if, within reasonable limits, and without the excesses at times apparent, one could really do without it.' (Quoted in Anonymous (1973), "A Situação

na Universidade", O Tempo e o Modo, no. 97, April, p. 6). Rui Grácio suggests that it was not Veiga Simão who first gave official sanction to the phrase 'democratization of education'. Nevertheless, Veiga Simão was the first Minister of Education since the 1st Republic to use it widely in public language and in official documents. see Rui Grácio (1981), "Perspectivas Futuras", in M. Silva and M. I. Tamen (eds.), Sistema de Ensino em Portugal, Lisbon: Fundação Calouste Gulbenkian, note 17, p. 691.

13. see Howard Wiarda (1977), Corporatism and Development: the Portuguese Experience, Amherst: University of Massachusetts; also Manuel Lucena (1976), A Evolução do Sistema Corporativo Português, Volume II: O Marcelismo, Lisbon: Perspectivas e Realidades.
14. J. Pinto Machado, op. cit., p. 6.
15. The Estado Social ('Social State') took on life officially in 1969 under the primiership of Marcello Caetano and followed on from the Estado Novo. It attempted to inject new life into corporatist principles and institutions, gave more autonomy to trade union activities (initially at least) and expanded social assistance. see H. Wiarda, op. cit.; see below for further discussion.
16. M. Lucena (1978), "Sobre a Evolução dos Organismos de Coordenação Económica Ligados à Lavoura (1)", Análise Social, no. 56, p. 831. Which does not mean that the 'new mould' would also be pluralist and democratic. Although the wealth of detail in Manuel Lucena's works on Portuguese corporatism makes his work indispensable, we should point out that we do not agree with the implicit assumption that can be drawn from his later work that pluralist democracy ('European and neo-capitalist') was somehow already present (merely waiting to be born?) in the Marcellist epoch.

17. see, for example, the argument of P. Schmitter (1979), "The 'Regime d'Exception' that Became the Rule: Forty-Eight Years of Authoritarian Domination in Portugal", in L.S. Graham and H.M. Makler (eds.), Contemporary Portugal, Austin: University of Texas Press; also H. Wiarda, op. cit.
18. Mouzelis refers to this process as 'additional reproductive tasks', meaning added political and ideological functions for the peripheral capitalist state where the difficulty of producing a relatively self-regulated and well-articulated civil society leads to 'inherent regime instability'. see N. Mouzelis (1980), "Capitalism and the Development of the Greek State", in R. Scase (ed.), European Theories of the State, London: Croom Helm.
19. 'From a comparative perspective, the role of the Estado Novo in education has no parallel. In contrast with 19th Century France - or even with Prussia - where the state never completely controlled education, in Portugal the state was from the 19th Century the only Master of the school, allowing only the existence of a small, restricted private sector.' M.F. Mónica (1978), Educação e Sociedade no Portugal de Salazar, Lisbon: Presença, p. 151. For works dealing with the history of the appearance of Portuguese state education, see the inventory of Portuguese works drawn up by Rui Grácio (1982), "A History of the History of Education in Portugal: 1945-1978", Die Historische Padagogik in Europa und den U.S.A., Historische Kommission der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Erziehungs-wissenschaft.
20. The role conflict inherent in Portuguese education from the beginning of the decade of the fifties (ideological inculcation in contrast to education's contribution to economic growth and modernization) is evident in the official speeches and publications of the decades prior to the revolution of April 1974. It is interesting to read, for example, official statements made by the Education Minister Leite Pinto, the minister who, more than any other, symbolized in the fifties the first break with the anti-developmental aspects of nationalist ideology.

The passage that follows contains some of his views on the 'civilizing mission' of education culled from two speeches, one made in 1960 and the other in 1963: 'Each nation, due to its foundation on a spiritual pact, is necessarily a mission (...), to be a missionary is to carry a message (...), is to colonize.' 'The mission of the Portuguese nation, a nation served by a complex culture, has been the expansion of the Christian ideal. In this we were accompanied only by our great sister-nation, Spain. But our mission was accomplished in Brazil, in Africa and in the Orient in such a way as to create a community with characteristics not found elsewhere!' '(...) to civilize a man is to increase his amount of education. To civilize a society is in the end to civilize many men. A very morose process because it requires the elimination of successive inferior levels of culture.' see F. de Paula Leite Pinto (1960), "O Cinquentenário do Liceu Camões", Lisbon: Ministry of National Education, p. 11 and p. 18; and (1963), A Educação no Espaço Português, Conference, 3rd of June, published by the Ministry of National Education, p. 88.

21. This is discussed in Chapter 1.
22. António Reis is today M.P. for the Socialist Party. Prior to the April revolution he contributed frequently to the debate on education in Portugal.
23. J. Veiga Simão quoted in António Reis (1971), "O Economicismo é um Humanismo", Seara Nova, no. 1506, April, p. 7. Veiga Simão stressed that he was not against elites, but that 'we cannot recruit them solely from particular classes as if elites had to be dynasties (...)! What we want is that elites be formed from all classes, and that the best occupy the places they hold because of their merit, and thus independently of the social and economic conditions of each one. Then, yes, we shall have authentic elites.' see J.V. Simão, Vida Mundial, 13, p. 6, April 1973. The role conflict that we referred to above with regard to Minister Leite Pinto, also affected Veiga Simão, who, in spite of his talk of the

meritocracy, of 'authentic elites' and of the modernization of the country, still retained in his conception of the Portuguese school and the Portuguese teacher something very much akin to the Salazarist, corporatist, conception of the school and the teacher epitomizing what Reis terms 'nationalist ideology'. Witness, for example, the following comment by Veiga Simão, from 1972, on the role of the primary school teacher: 'The primary school teacher is the symbol of idealism, of faith, of courage and of sacrifice. The primary school teacher is the soldier that ministers bread to the spirit and that strengthens the very root of national life. Therefore to pay tribute to the primary school teacher is to pay tribute to the Nation (...)', and further, 'and for all of us, teachers, we would do well to remember, in a special way, our colleagues who carry out the noble mission to educate in hidden villages, in the wilds of the jungle, in innumerable inhospitable places, in schools often poor in construction and in didactic equipment, but immensely rich in human warmth and in spiritual alimentation.' see J. Veiga Simão (1972), "Uma Revolução Pacífica", January, Ministry of National Education; also Escola Portuguesa, no. 1368, p. 15, 1972. Interesting to note here is that for both Leite Pinto and Veiga Simão the civilizing, missionary role of the teacher is conceived in terms of Portugal's overseas provinces, that is, in terms of Pátria taken in its widest sense. This contrasts with both the period of the 1st Republic (1910-26) and with the revolutionary period (1974-76) when the civilizing, missionary role of the teacher was conceived, in the first instance, in terms of finding, reaching and knowing the interior regions of the country - i.e. continental Portugal. Although this subject matter lies beyond the scope of this thesis, some questions pertinent to it are raised in Chapter 4.

24. M.F. Mónica, op. cit., p. 87.

25. We shall see below that the Reform's mobilizing capacity resulted directly from its role as pivot for such debates. The fact that the Reform carried out this role was probably partly due to the absence of a political party with any real

mobilizing capacity.

26. see M. Wiarda, op. cit.; also Henry Keith (1973), "Point, Counterpoint in Reforming Portuguese Education: 1750-1973", American Studies Centre, Lisbon, The Institute of Social Services and Overseas Policy.
27. see note 55, Chapter 1.
28. Marcello Gaetano, Diário de Sessões, National Assembly, 1968, p. 2732.
29. Quoted by J.P. Miller Guerra (1971), Diário de Sessões, National Assembly, p. 264.
30. J. Veiga Simão (1970), "Discurso de Abertura do Ano Lectivo de 1969/70 da Universidade de Lourenço Marques", in A. Sedas Nunes (ed.), O Problema Político da Universidade, Lisbon: Dom Quixote, p. 125.
31. J. Veiga Simão (1970), A Batalha da Educação, Lisbon: Ministry of National Education (M.E.N.).
32. These 'liberal' M.P.s later became known as 'opposition' M.P.s, two (Miller Guerra and F. Sá Carneiro) going so far as to abandon the National Assembly when the 'liberalization' process appeared to be compromised beyond redemption.
33. Mário Murteria (1970), Portugal, Anos 70, Lisbon: Moraes, p. 81.
34. Contact with Europe included not only foreign technology and assistance through multinational corporations and organizations such as the World Bank, the OECD, UNESCO, the EEC, but also through the Church - for example, Pacem in Terris, João XXIII (which had a great impact on Portuguese liberal Catholics, providing a rationale for a development strategy) -, through

draft dodgers and deserters from the colonial wars, political exiles, emigrants, training abroad, etc. (The 'number of draft dodgers reached at the date of the April revolution about 100,000, or about 10% of all emigration' - according to J. Correia Jesuino (1982), "Anomia e Mudança na Sociedade Portuguesa", in Mudança Social e Psicologia Social, Lisbon: Livros Horizonte, p. 101.)

35. J.P. Miller Guerra, Diário de Sessões, National Assembly, 1970, p. 680. The quotation is extracted from a debate on education and development in the National Assembly in 1970 (i.e. after the 'Battle in Education' had been announced by Marcello Caetano).
36. F. Leite Pinto (1963), Preface to Projecto Regional do Mediterrâneo, Lisbon: Instituto de Alta Cultura, Centro de Estudos de Estatística Económica, p. 12.
37. see, for example, the editorial of Vida Mundial, "Política", 13 April 1973.
38. F. Leite Pinto, Preface, op. cit., p. 22.
39. *ibid.*
40. *ibid.*
41. Mário Murteira (1970), op. cit., p. 46. Murteira was a 'developmentalist' wary of economic development for its own sake. His works in the 1960s and 1970s, outside official reports, show a constant preoccupation with the need to conceive a 'societal project' for Portugal (a project obviously disarticulated from colonialist Portugal).
42. *ibid.*, p. 49, emphasis in the original.
43. *ibid.*, p. 44.

44. *ibid.* Adriano Moreira, who held various posts in the Ministry of 'Overseas Administration' during the early 60s (including the post of Minister of the Overseas Territories - 'Ultramar' - from 1961 to 1962), has argued recently that the greatest danger to the survival of a Portuguese civil society based on what he terms 'natural authorities' - i.e. the family; the church - is the 'loss of the non-class nature of the solidarity of the faithful, dividing them through the influence of political ideologies'. Thus, for Moreira, still defending the practices of the Salazar elites, 'the basic error of the developmentalists (was that) they confused poverty with development.' Now, according to Moreira, 'Poverty never prevented the defense of a free civil society. Only the latter, i.e. development, which can be provoked by the systematic and internal destruction of institutions, or by the direct and indirect external action of foreign powers, annihilates the possibility of a poor life but one based on a complete respect for the rights of man.' (A. Moreira (1977), O Novíssimo Príncipe: Análise da Revolução, Lisbon/Braga: Intervenção, p. 210 and pp. 194-5.)
45. see Rogério Fernandes (1967), E ensino: Sector em Crise, Lisbon: Prelo Editora, p. 99. Fernandes argues that although Leite Pinto knew how to interpret the role played by science and technology in the 'technological society', he effectively reinforced the capacity of the state to control society via traditional values by creating a new job structure in a conjuncture of crisis that served to justify the status quo. (R. Fernandes, 1967, pp. 91-92.)
46. *ibid.* J. Salvado Sampaio refers to Galvão Teles as the most 'carneirista' of the education ministers from the 1950s onwards. (Carneiro Pacheco's extremely conservative 'reform' is referred to above in Chapter 1.) see J. Salvado Sampaio (1978), "Insucesso Escolar e Obrigatoriedade Escolar em Portugal", Análise Psicológica, no. 1., vol. 2.
47. For a brief discussion of codes, double entendres, underground

metaphors, etc. employed under the Salazarist regime, see Ben Pimlott and Jean Seaton (1983), "Political Power and the Portuguese Media", in L.S. Graham and D.L. Wheeler, In Search of Modern Portugal: The Revolution and its Consequences, London: University of Wisconsin Press.

48. The term 'traditionalists', while not satisfactory, is used here merely to group together Graham's categories 'ultraconservatives', 'integrationists' and 'federalists'. see note 11 above.
49. For all of Murteira's argument, see M. Murteira, op. cit., pp. 36-38.
50. Paul M. Lewis shows that of Salazar's 87 ministers, 24 were military men, 17 politicians, and 46 'technicians'. Of the latter category, 24 were university professors, 13 from law faculties and 1 from economics. Of the remaining 26, 10 were lawyers. He also argues that in the latter 1960s, '(...) the pattern of recruitment shows the regime evolving away from its military and semi-fascist beginnings in the direction of a modern technocratic state.' P.H. Lewis (1978), "Salazar's Ministerial Elite, 1932-1968", Journal of Politics, 40, August, p. 639.
51. J. Veiga Simão, 1970, op. cit., p. 9.
52. *ibid.*, p. 10.
53. *ibid.*, p. 8.
54. 'Proposta de Lei' is a proposal for a law. Under the 1933 Constitution, this meant that the 'proposed law' would a) be subject to the opinion of the Corporatist Chamber and b) be debated in the National Assembly. Once concluded this process, all amendments and/or deletions having been made, the final 'law' would be voted in the National Assembly.

55. The Church was also in favour of the Reform: 'Education, restructured in a more dynamic way and carried to all sectors of the population as projected (in the proposed law), represents, in our time, the most positive contribution and the most durable and beneficial effect for the well-being and progress of the Portuguese people. We are thinking above all of the rural population.' see Novidades (journal of the Catholic Church), 30 XI 1972.
56. Rita Pinto Leite (ed.) (1973), A Reforma do Sistema Educativo, Lisbon: Ministry of National Education, p. X. Further statistics on the debate of the Reform were published in Vida Mundial, 13 April 1973: the comments produced on the texts were distributed in 1700 documents (879 reports, 276 letters and 566 published articles in the press); the total number of people participating in the discussion exceeded, according to the journal, 40,000.
57. This was also the essence of the critique produced by Guilherme Braga da Cruz, 'catedrático' Professor of Coimbra University, who criticized what he termed the 'deaf dialogue' of the Ministry of National Education. Cruz wished to defend above all the 'purity' and 'excellence' of the traditional university. see G. Braga da Cruz (1973), Reforma do Ensino Superior, Lisbon.
58. Later to become Minister of Education in Portugal's 1st and 11th Constitutional Governments. see Chapter 3 for further comments on Sottomayor Cardia.
59. S. Cardia (1973), Por Uma Democracia Anticapitalista, Lisbon: Seara Nova, p. 25.
60. Jofre Amaral Nogueira (1971), "A Nova Orgânica do Ensino Pre-Universitário", Seara Nova, no. 1505, March, p. 8.
61. S. Cardia, op. cit.
62. see note 57 above.

63. Rui Grácio also refers to the backtracking of the Reform: while in 1971 the Government had proposed through the Reform a bill on religious liberty, suggesting that students older than 16 be allowed to have the right to choose, or reject, religious and moral training, the law itself, in 1973, stated that a student 'of any age' could only be exempted from religious and moral training by obtaining ministerial permission. see Grácio (1981), Educação e Processo Democrático em Portugal, Lisbon: Livros Horizonte, p. 23.
64. see Anonymous (1973), "A Situação na Universidade", O Tempo e o Modo, no. 97, April. An assessment which is supported by L.S. Graham: 'By late 1972 and early 1973, Caetano was moving in an entirely new direction. By then the policy of liberalization had ceased; greater emphasis was being placed on development schemes in Angola and Mozambique; and the prospects of changing the regime's economic policies on the mainland were remote.' see L.S. Graham, 1975, op. cit., p. 54.
65. This clash is discussed further below.
66. Apart from the fact that the Reform as law no longer spoke of the 'democratization of education', and apart from the fact that the Reform could not satisfy the expectations it had created by making public discussion of national development possible, the Reform as law also toned down the claims it had made as 'proposta de lei' for a more vigorous participation of the individual in society. see note 68 below for details of the changes.
67. see Anonymous, op. cit.
68. R. Pinto Leite, op. cit., 'Lei' no. 5/73 of 25 July, 1973, although more precise in its usage of technical language (changes imposed at the level of the Corporatist Chamber, particularly in terms of psychological terms and concepts), put a stronger general emphasis on civil and moral duties

than had been the case in the 'Proposta de Lei' no. 25/x. This is evident not only in the chapter on fundamental principles cited above, but also in the law's addition of clauses directly related to Deus, Pátria e Família. For example, the 3rd Section, paragraph b) (on the general objectives of basic education) adds the phrase, 'add to the development of the feeling for, and the consciousness of, the Fatherland'. In Section 4 (objectives of preparatory education - 'ensino preparatório'), where the 'proposta' states, 'as well as religious education, according to family option', the 'Lei' states: 'as well as physical, civic, moral and religious formation' (see note 63 above). This phrase is also added to Section 5 on secondary education. Also, where in the 'proposta de lei' there appeared reference to 'active and conscious participation' in the society (or community) 'in which integrated', this reference is dropped or reduced to 'responsible participation in society' (see Section 3, paragraph b) 'proposta'; paragraph c) 'Lei'; see also section on life-long education). In the 'proposta de lei', Section 4 ('ensino preparatório') talks of the introduction of human sciences; the 'Lei' talks of 'notions about social life and the political structure of the Nation'. Finally, there is a more rigid distinction in the 'Lei' between Polytechnic Institutes and the Universities.

69. José da Silva, in Diário de Sessões, National Assembly, 1973, p. 5053.
70. Moura Ramos, Diário de Sessões, National Assembly, 1973, p. 5051.
71. Maria Raquel Ribeiro, Diário de Sessões, National Assembly, p. 5109.
72. This phrase belongs to Paulo Cunha from the Faculty of Law, Lisbon University. see Paulo Cunha (1970), "Meditações Sobre a Universidade Portuguesa", in A. Sedas Nunes (ed.), O Problema Político da Universidade, Lisbon: Dom Quixote, p. 213. The

threat of 'an assault on the university by the masses' was a major preoccupation of university professors. It was felt that the Veiga Simão Reform would facilitate this 'assault', hence their objection to it: 'Let's simply remember the elementary truth that a university reform must start at the beginning and not at the end; and that the beginning is the "demassification" of our university courses.' see G. Braga da Cruz, op. cit., p. 120. (Emphasis in the original.)

73. Peres Claro, Diário de Sessões, National Assembly, 1973, pp. 5054-55.
74. Amílcar Mesquita, Diário de Sessões, National Assembly, 1973, p. 5114.
75. Perhaps it would be useful at this point, for reasons of clarification, 1) to summarize the praises made by legislators within the National Assembly of the Reform, 2) to summarize the criticisms of legislators within the National Assembly of the Reform, and 3) to briefly state the main arguments of the extra-parliamentary opposition (for a short summary of the principal innovations introduced by 'Lei' 5/73 of 5 July, see Chapter 1). The praises of M.P.s within the National Assembly during the debate on the Reform can be summarized as follows: 1) mothers would be able to work; 2) the Reform would aid the social stabilization of the country; 3) the Reform(s) were just and useful; 4) the Reform would aid the creation of 'modern men (and women)' in Portugal; 5) the Reform would bring Portugal closer to the rest of Europe and to the United States; 6) the Reform would lead to the betterment of Portuguese culture; 7) the Reform would promote the democratization of Portuguese society by democratizing Portuguese education, particularly in terms of a) the provision of pre-school education, b) the increase of the school-leaving age to 14, and c) the institutionalization of the concept of life-long education; and 8) the Reform would promote the development of a modern technological society, particularly through a) the creation of polyvalent secondary

schools, b) the creation of a larger range of options in higher education, and c) by providing for post-graduate courses, in-service training and other professional courses. The criticisms offered by M.P.s within the National Assembly on the Reform were as follows: 1) the proposed law contained no introduction, nor justification for the principal innovations contained within the Reform; 2) moral, religious, civic and patriotic formation was not considered sufficiently important by the Reform; 3) sexual education, to be carried out in schools, should be left to the family; 4) it was not explicit in the Reform how the religious values making up Portuguese culture and civilization, in short, the Portuguese nation, were to be divulged; 5) the teaching of the human sciences was contested for a) such teaching would be in contradiction with the Constitution of 1933 and b) it would be in contradiction with the Christian education of youth; 6) concern was shown over the uprooting of youth from Deus, Pátria, e Família; 7) there was a preoccupation with the possible state monopoly of education (as in 'totalitarian' societies); and 8) the democratization of education, particularly of higher education, would lead to inexorable 'massification' of the university and inevitable loss of quality. The opposition (extra-parliamentary) argued, in sum: 1) the Reform was vague, without sufficiently clear ideas of a societal project; 2) the Reform was insufficient, to handle or to deal with the crisis of education and of society; 3) the Reform as law was different from the Reform in its initial stages: in the end the Reform failed to attack the problem of the content and control of education, both of which remained undemocratic; 4) it was simply impossible to democratize education in an undemocratic society; and 5) the increasingly severe economic crisis of Portuguese society meant that the Reform in its later stages was totally subordinated to the needs of the economy.

76. Henry Keith, op. cit.

77. *ibid.*, p. 2.

78. Howard Wiarda, op. cit., p. 257.
79. ibid., p. 261. Salazar, it is argued, effectively 'froze' the elite turning the state into a gigantic national patronage agency dispensing goods, favours, jobs and governmental positions.
80. Wiarda spends 300 pages describing corporatism in Portugal. Yet he readily admits, in a later work, that 'The term "corporatism" is exceedingly ambiguous and often loosely employed (...), it (...) remains a frequently confusing and misleading term and framework. Moreover, it is often a highly emotive term (...).' see H. Wiarda (1979), "The Corporatist Tradition and the Corporatist System in Portugal: Structured, Evolving, Transcended, Persistent", in L.S. Graham and H.M. Makler (eds.), Contemporary Portugal, Austin and London: University of Texas Press, p. 89.
81. The terminology is more Bourdieu's than Wiarda's, but effectively this is the result of the process Wiarda describes, for although education may widen the base of the ruling elite, it still remains an 'elite'.
82. see H. Wiarda, 1977, op. cit., p. 258.
83. António Reis (1971), "O Economicismo...", op. cit., p. 6.
84. M. Sottomayor Cardia (1971), O Dilema da Política Portuguesa, Lisbon: Prelo Editora, p. 15.
85. This is the argument of C. Almeida and A. Barreto. see C. Almeida and A. Barreto (1970), Capitalismo e Emigração em Portugal, Lisbon: Prelo Editora.
86. see F. Pereira de Moura (1974)(1st edition 1969, Dom Quixote), Por Onde Vai a Economia Portuguesa?, Seara Nova.
87. see João Martins Pereira (1973), "A Longa Descoberta do Caminho

Marítimo para a Europa", O Tempo e o Modo, no. 73, p. 29.

88. see F. Pereira de Moura, op. cit.; C. Almeida and A. Barreto, op. cit.; A. Castro (1970), Desenvolvimento Económico ou Estagnação?, Lisbon: Dom Quixote; J. Martins Pereira (1971), Pensar Portugal Hoje, Lisbon: Dom Quixote, and op. cit.; Luís Salgado de Matos (1973), Investimentos Estrangeiros em Portugal, Lisbon: Seara Nova; Rui Grácio (1981), "Perspectivas ...", op. cit.; among others, for a discussion of the slowdown beginning in the mid-sixties.
89. F. Pereira de Moura, op. cit., pp. 27-31.
90. C. Almeida and A. Barreto, op. cit., p. 29.
91. Armando Castro, op. cit., p. 87, quoting from Bulletin no. 5 of the "Société des Banques Suisses". see Chapter 5 for further discussion of the effects of the international organizations, particularly in the education field.
92. *The military contingent went from 24,000 men in 1960 to 235,000 in 1974 - from 0.7% of the active population to 7% (...)* J. Correia Jesuino, op. cit., p. 101.
93. Almeida and Barreto, op. cit., p. 39.
94. *ibid.* (Emphasis in the original.)
95. *ibid.*, p. 57.
96. *ibid.*, pp. 63-64. *Developmentalists* such as Xavier Pintado, Rogério Martins and João Salgueiro - the latter became, in the early 1980s, Minister of Finance and Economic Planning - all saw the African territories as the main obstacle to integration with Europe (see S. de Miranda, op. cit.). The colonial wars not only *blocked* socio-economic and political structures, they also played a big part in breaking down the legitimization practices of the regime: '(...) after more than ten

years of inconclusive African warfare nobody among the junior officers any longer believed in those principles of Salazarist ideology that justified their presence in three rebellious colonies: namely that the ultramar was nothing less than a cultural-mystical extension of continental Portugal, which was supposed to form a nation state encompassing Europeans, Africans, Asians and Indonesians - all of them "Portuguese". A few weeks of active service sufficed to explode this fallacy in the mind of any junior officer.' M. Harsgor (1976), "Portugal in Revolution", Beverly Hills/London: Sage, p. 14. Some sectors of the Church were also unhappy with colonial policy. see R. Grácio, 1981, Educação..., op. cit., p. 26.

97. Luís Salgado de Matos (1970), "A Ilusão do Progresso e o Progresso de uma Ilusão", Seara Nova, no. 1492, February, p. 44.
98. Which was made clear by the Secretary of State for Industry at the time, Rogério Martins. see R. Martins (1970), Caminho de País Novo, Lisbon: Gris Impressores.
99. Reis, 1971, "O Economicismo...", op. cit., p. 6.
100. *ibid.*
101. *ibid.*, p. 7.
102. *ibid.*, p. 8.
103. *ibid.*
104. *ibid.*
105. *ibid.*
106. *ibid.*
107. see M. Sottomayor Cardia, 1971, op. cit.

108. in M. Sottomayor Cardia, 1973, op. cit.
109. see, for example, J. Veiga Simão in various numbers of the official journal published by the M.E.N., Escola Portuguesa, during the years 1971, 1972, 1973.
110. see note 5 of the introduction for a list of Sedas Nunes's works.
111. see A. Sedas Nunes (1960), Dois Aspectos de Modernização da Economia Nacional, Lisbon.
112. *ibid.*
113. H. Wiarda, 1977, op. cit., p. 269.
114. see J.P. Miller Guerra and A. Sedas Nunes (1969), "A Crise da Universidade em Portugal: reflexões e sugestões", Análise Social, nos. 25-6.
115. *ibid.*, p. 30.
116. A. Sedas Nunes (1969), "A População Universitária Portuguesa: uma Análise Preliminar", A Universidade na Vida Portuguesa, Volume II, Lisbon: G.I.S., p. 71.
117. A. Sedas Nunes (1970), "O Problema Social da Universidade" (interview with Sedas Nunes), in O Problema Político da Universidade, Lisbon: Dom Quixote, p. 280.
118. J.P. Miller Guerra and A. Sedas Nunes, 1969, op. cit., p. 43.
119. *ibid.*, p. 89.
120. A. Sedas Nunes (1970), "O Problema Social...", op. cit., pp. 263-302. Sedas Nunes uses the terms 'big', 'medium' and 'small' when referring to different sectors of capital.

121. *ibid.*, pp. 270-76; see also p. 306.
122. see H. Makler (1968), "A Case Study of the Portuguese Business Elite, 1964-1966", Raymond S. Sayers (ed.), Portugal and Brazil in Transition, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
123. *ibid.*, p. 236.
124. *ibid.*, p. 237.
125. *ibid.* It is interesting to note that Makler's study also found that more heads of minor enterprises (80%) than heads of major enterprises (60%) thought that some sort of limitation should be placed on the participation of foreign capital in Portuguese industry. One third of the major enterprises thought that no limitations should be imposed, while only 15% of minor enterprises felt this way. Practically all foreign capital, and most foreign technicians (it goes almost without saying) belonged to Portugal's major enterprises.
126. We are to some extent equating Sedas Nunes's position with that of Veiga Simão's (in the same political and economic conjuncture). It seems legitimate to suppose that Sedas Nunes's important distinction between the interests of 'big' capital and the interests of 'small' and 'medium' capital, and his notion of a 'moment (which) seems propitious for a substantial reform, modernizing but not technocratic' (quoted in A. Reis, 1971, "O Economicismo...", *op. cit.*, p. 7) may have characterized, or have been deemed to characterize, basic thinking on the part of Veiga Simão. Basic thinking not necessarily made explicit, but which may have underlain Veiga Simão's actions.
127. see José Manuel Barroso (1970), "A Crise da Universidade em Portugal", in A. Sedas Nunes (ed.), O Problema Político da Universidade, Lisbon: Dom Quixote.
128. A. Reis, 1971, "O Economicismo...", *op. cit.*, p. 7.

129. F. Correia, quoting João Salgueiro, at the time Subsecretary of State for Economic Planning, in A. Sedas Nunes, 1970, O Problema Político..., p. 256.
130. Student-body pamphlet, 1969-70 (first semestre), entitled "Sedas Nunes e a Reforma das Universidades - ou as Atribuições do Capitalismo em Portugal", reproduced in A. Sedas Nunes, 1970, O Problema Político...
131. António Teodoro (1976), "O Ensino no Período Fascista: uma Perspectiva Histórica", Seara Nova, no. 1564, February, p. 33.
132. In fact, Marcello Caetano criticized his own former Minister in his Testament for having '(...) opened the doors to subversion, and thus having been honoured by the social-communist revolution' (quoted by Veiga Simão in O Expresso, 10-6-1976). The latter part of the phrase refers to the fact that Veiga Simão, unlike all other ministers, 'survived' the revolution, at least up to the 'Hot Summer' of 1975, when he was dismissed from public administration for the specific reason of having placed political 'observers' - termed 'gorilas' by university students (and some staff) - in the universities to keep an eye on 'troublemakers' during the years 1971-2. Today he is M.P. for the Socialist Party and at present Minister for Industry in the IXth Constitutional Government.
133. From the journal Indústria Portuguesa, February, 1971, p. 119.
134. J. Veiga Simão in an interview given to O Jornal da Educação in April, 1979 (p. 7). In another interview to the weekly newspaper, O Expresso, Veiga Simão refers to a letter written to him prior to the April revolution, by the eventual President of the Republic, General Costa Gomes. In the letter, Costa Gomes had expressed his support for Veiga Simão in the following words: 'Believe that it is always with great interest that I follow your struggle considering it the best and most valid way to shake off the burden of centuries and permit us to raise our heads without having to look at the ground when

we meet our fellow citizens of the Western world.' see
O Expresso, 10-6-1976.

135. see Rui Grácio, 1 981, Educação..., op. cit., where it is argued that the Veiga Simão epoch was still very much linked to 'greater Portugal' with its overseas possessions. We have tried to reference this fact through Veiga Simão's own words throughout the chapter.
136. Sacuntala de Miranda, op. cit., p. 320. The following comments suggest not only the OECD's opinion of the Reform, but also show its part in the Reform's formulation (see also note 7 above): '(...) the two documents (Projected Education System and Guidelines of the Reform of Higher Education) reflect a very sound and advanced approach to the problem of new structures of higher education. They correspond in many ways, and some times rather closely, to OECD ideas on this subject as they have been formulated both in some OECD documents and in discussions with country representatives.' see OECD Secretariat, Paris, 23 April, 1971, in J. Pinto Machado, op. cit., p. 8.
137. J.P. Miller Guerra, Diário de Sessões, National Assembly, 1971, p. 1653 (see note 3 above).
138. Rui Grácio (1 981), "O Congresso do Ensino Liceal e os Grupos de Estudo do Pessoal Docente do Ensino Secundário: uma alternativa sob o Caetanismo", paper presented at Conference on 'Contemporary Portugal: 1900-1980', organized by G.I.S./^(p. 47) Fundação Calouste Gulbenkian, December. The 'pressure' of the Study Groups will be discussed in the following chapter.

Part Two

Chapter 3

Conquests of the Revolution:

The Democratic Management of Schools

Democratizing Education in a Vacuum

The well-known Portuguese educator, Rui Grácio, made the following comment during the period of the Veiga Simão Reform:

'It is not exaggerating too much to say, without mincing words, that democracy is the concept offered to the people each time their support is required.' 1

With the benefit of hindsight, Grácio's comment appears both cynical and revealing at the same time: cynical, in the sense that 'offer ing democracy to the people' was no mean feat in dictatorial Portugal, and revealing, because Grácio neatly managed to put his finger on one of the regime's crucial weaknesses, its need for legitimation. A decade later, Grácio was to write:

'It is permissible to think that, beyond the explicit objective whose implementation was put in the hands of an official body, the consultation of public opinion (...) was intended, if not to legitimize the reform projects, at least to establish through them a sort of national consensus, attempting here to replace authoritarian political and social integration with a "participatory" integration. In this manner a "liberal", or liberalizing, image was made available.' 2

As we pointed out in the previous chapter, making available a reform project which it might be assumed would provide legitimation was bound to produce effects that went beyond some attempt to 'continue the same' with the aid of 'a new image' (implied in the Grácio quotation). For, 1) the reform project shattered

official silence on the subject of democratic reform, thus providing a space for discussion, if not practice, of 'participatory integration', and 2) the reform project provided an important arm for resistance, as Grácio himself recognizes, especially for

'(...) those who wish(ed) to use, through their own "free will" and ability, the "liberty" and "participation" granted to them by the very power (they were struggling against) - (thus) demonstrating the limits imposed on power.' 3

Before moving on to look in more detail at this 'resistance', it might be useful to consider a) to what extent the Veiga Simão Reform was democratic in principle, and then b) to consider to what extent the Veiga Simão Reform escaped the charge of being 'dogmatic' by casting a glance at the forces that were to be responsible for putting it into practice. Turning to Rui Grácio, once again, we get a concise idea of what was democratic in the Reform, for Grácio argued that elucidation of the concept of democratization - made necessary by the official presentation of the Reform project for public discussion - led one to three accepted meanings:

'a) one to do with the social bases of the recruitment of the school population; b) another to do with values objectively carried by the content of schooling; and c) a third meaning to do with the nature of the institutional relations - administrative and pedagogic - of the school system.' 4

Thus,

'(...) "a" is democratic if the probability of carrying out school studies increases for sons of workers and of the petty-bourgeoisie, for girls and for children outside urban areas; "b" is democratic if instead of values based on a nationalism that is mythical, conservative and autocratic in nature, it is based on realistic patriotism, that is both prospective and drawn from the people; and "c" is democratic if there is a decentralization

of the school and a change in authority relations within the school.' 5

Now, according to Grácio, and indeed what we have said so far would seem to support him, the Veiga Simão Reform project was particularly lacking in terms of 'c'. Indeed, Veiga Simão himself was to comment later, in the post-revolutionary period, that the revolution had overtaken his Reform in the area of authority relations within the school:

'The advances and retreats gave origin to a situation in which the management of the schools went beyond the Reform (...).' 6

In the last chapter we saw that a major criticism of the Veiga Simão Reform, developed by those in opposition to the Caetano regime, was that the Reform was conceived in a social vacuum, as if it were situated on top of social reality, oblivious to the constraints and contradictions generated below it.⁷ How, indeed, was the Reform to be put into practice? Where were the forces necessary to carry it through? Grácio remarked at the time:

'(...) the deep and global remodeling of the education system depends to the greatest extent on the quality and the practice of the teaching force; quality and practice that reveal pedagogic, professional and civic status achieved through free association. The increased status of the teacher is, truly, a condition and an effect of active intervention in the definition of education policy.' 8

Inevitably, then, the Reform, to institutionalize participation (an accepted condition of democratization), would have to depend, firstly, on the teaching force, and secondly, on the student body. But at the time there existed a 'dangerous lack of qualified teachers',⁹ and the conditions under which teachers were obliged to perform their duties worked, if anything, against the success

of the Reform. Furthermore, the expansion of education called for in the Reform aggravated this situation even further. Consequently, Grácio was to state ironically,

'(...) now that one talks of education as a battle, we lack the infantry and the staff officers to win it.' 10

One of the chief focal points of opposition to the Veiga Simão Reform was a group of secondary and preparatory school teachers who constituted in the last years of the Salazarist regime

'(...) the only organized and progressive pro-associative movement of Portuguese teachers in defense of their interests and rights, professional and civic, and for a real democratization of schooling and education in Portugal' (known as the GEPDESP, Grupos de Estudo, here referred to as the 'Study Groups'). 11

A study of the history of the Study Groups reveals some of the contradictions that occur when the democratization of schooling is attempted within a political dictatorship. Their basic demand, made in the first years of the decade of the seventies, was simply that teachers should have the right to hold meetings in educational establishments. At a more general level, they aimed at mobilizing teachers on issues related to professional conduct and integrity in order to combat what had been a long period of social devaluation of the teaching profession¹² (after the April revolution they were to become part of the present-day Sindicato dos Professores, i.e. trade union of teachers). The Ministry of Education's attitude towards these groups can be calculated from the following dispatch, issued in February 1974 - a mere two months before the revolution - by the Secretary of State for Instruction:

'(...) the constitution of an association of teachers as a social collectivity - with the objectives indicated above (i.e. to make teachers aware of their position in society; to defend professional, individual and collective interests of its members) give it a notoriously trade union-like character, (which is) in flagrant violation of constitutional and legal imperatives (i.e. public functionaries are prohibited by Article 39 of the National Work Statutes of DL N. 23048, of 23 September, 1933, from organizing themselves in private unions or joining corporatist organizations).' 13

At the heart of the Study Groups's platform lay, arguably, a demand for the recognition of the class nature of Portuguese society.¹⁴ For more than four decades the concept of social class had been living underground, in a state of clandestinity.¹⁵ Effectively, the Study Groups were out to test the limits of the regime, to see just how far it was prepared to go in its proclaimed 'battle' for the democratization of education. The Groups's literature is full of references to the 'battle in education' and to the need for meeting its ideals. In this manner, 'the regime's idealist and populist oratory'¹⁶ was constantly used as a basis for arguments against the regime.¹⁷ In short, the Study Groups were the forerunners of the teacher and student explosion to occur after the revolution. Already in 1971 they were arguing, as Grácio suggests above, that democratization included participation in structures that decide school life. The following is a paragraph of a proposal sent by the Study Groups of the North of Portugal to the Ministry of National Education on March 29th, 1971:

'It is proposed that the right to participate in decision-making processes, in that which concerns the management of school establishments, namely the School Councils (Conselho Escolar), which shall in the

future have the function of choosing the Director or Rector of such establishments, be guaranteed to all teachers.' 18

Educating Citizens for a 'Democratic' Society

From what has been said so ^{far} about the Veiga Simão Reform, both in this chapter and in the previous one, there appears to be a great deal of truth in the comment that 'the policy of Veiga Simão required a repressive framework to be functional.'¹⁹ At least in purely practical terms. How else could it have overcome the limits of the regime? But a 'repressive framework' was also acutely dysfunctional for the proclaimed objectives of the Reform. Indeed, it is impossible to democratize an education system in a political vacuum. With the revolution of the 25th of April, however, conditions were profoundly altered. There occurred, virtually overnight, a shift in power from the Ministry of Education to the schools, from the Directors of the schools and the traditional teaching staff to progressive teachers and the student body. Local initiative after the 25th of April, that is initiative at the level of the school population, commanded events, at least for the first six months of the revolution, and for much longer in terms of enduring effects.²⁰ After the 25th of April, the schools were to all effects and purposes occupied - by their own students and teachers:

'(...) and thus occurred (...) "the taking of power" of the management of the schools, substituting old directive bodies with commissions of students and teachers - a tendency which central power would (even today) only come to recognize in a weak form (and in an unsatisfactory manner) by creating the democratic management of the schools (Gestão Democrática).'

And, further, in the words of António Reis (now a leading spokesman for the Socialist Party):

'(...) it is essential to point out what we may consider the second victory of this revolution (the first one being the liberation of the colonies), and which will be decisive for its consolidation: the progressive control of power by workers in their factories, and in state bodies, and by students in their schools, thanks to the authentic explosion of the trade union and student movements.' 22

The occupation of the schools and the installation of forms of local 'participatory' control were the first 'spontaneous' steps towards a democratization of decision-making within education. In this way, the revolution not only 'remobilized' the Veiga Simão Reform in terms of its own content,²³ but stretched its action of democratization enabling the Reform to make contact with society. In this sense the Reform was, indeed, 'overtaken'; overtaken because education now, apart from supplying the mechanisms necessary to ensure the democratization of education (e.g. structural changes, changes in methods and content), would also mean educating citizens for a democratic society. This latter objective, directly linked to the call for 'free associations' by the Study Groups and to Grácio's demand for a change in the 'authority relations within the school', later became a major plank not only in the Socialist Party Statutes of 1974, and in teachers' union documents such as the Declaration of Principles of Democratic Management in Schools approved by the SPGL (Teachers' Union of Greater Lisbon) in Conference, but also in the law on democratic management itself²⁴ and in the Portuguese Constitution of 1976. Naturally the link between a democratic education system and a democratic society was not a new fact in Portuguese history. The

Republicans at the beginning of the twentieth century, taking their cue from 19th Century Liberalism, had argued that education ('instruction') should be the 'base of democracy, of public morality, of economic ^{prosperity} 25' Nevertheless, nearly fifty years of dictatorship, when education was deeply permeated with a suffocating nationalist ideology, certainly had, to say the least, made the link less than obvious (for many, at any rate).

Educating Citizens for a Democratic and 'Socialist' Society

But to talk of educating citizens for a democratic society alone is to ignore one of the vital components of the 25th of April revolution: its socialist nature. Apart from the various political parties, and isolated individuals or groups, operating underground, or later in semi-clandestinity, in opposition to the regime before the April revolution, there were, as we have pointed out, student uprisings and movements of teachers, not to mention of course, workers's struggles:

'From the last quarter of 1973, the struggles of the Portuguese workers reached a volume and a capacity of movement whose importance, however, was not perceived by the majority of the population, due to the silence that the media were obliged to observe on the subject.' 26

Thus, the 25th of April,

'(...) through the revelation/decompression of labour conflicts that it caused, obscured in a way the struggles that from approximately 1973 had come to markedly define an important stage in the creating of an autonomous political expression by the working classes.' 27

The combination of this fact with the popular, grass-roots, nature of the mobilization provoked by the April revolution, contributed

in a vital way to the reappearance in public, for the first time in nearly fifty years, of the concept of social class. It was out in the open at last, not merely as a new element in official and public pronouncement, but also as a focal point for popular struggle.

Protes da Fonseca, Secretary of State for School Administration during the revolutionary period (Ist, IIInd and IIIrd Provisional Governments), has argued that

'(...) the introduction of the democratic management of schools into official establishments of different levels of schooling constituted, certainly, one of the most significant expressions of the new social order created by the 25th of April. Indeed, this new type of management aimed at transforming the school from a simple bureaucratic service (...) into a live and participatory community in a global educational process which went far beyond the doors of the classroom, the workshop or the laboratory.' 28

Thus, the launching of a scheme of democratic management in schools by the Ministry of Education (mentioned as being - not only by Protes da Fonseca, but also in official legislation produced after the revolutionary period by the Socialist Party when in power - 'clearly advanced in relation to that existing in most countries'²⁹) was aimed at 'the construction of a new school which (would) be the foundation of a new society'.³⁰ What kind of society? According to socialist ideology (expressed later in the Constitution of 1976), one based on the 'end of exploitation of man by man', one on the road to 'democratic socialism', hence a society where social class differences would be reduced to an absolute minimum.³¹

The character of the Portuguese revolution was overwhelmingly socialist in nature, not meaning, of course, that socialism was achieved by it, but meaning that some form of socialism was its

proclaimed objective. This is clear in all demands, documents, slogans, struggles produced or fought during the period, and finds its expression in the Constitution of 1976, which we referred to in Chapter 1. The link education-socialism had, naturally, just like the link education-democracy, occurred (long) before the April revolution. The anarchists during the Republican period produced their critique of the so-called 'Republican dream', that is, of the Republican belief in the school as the 'first agent of equality',³² arguing, rather, that the free, secular school offering equality of opportunity was alien to a class-divided society. Much later, after the experience of several decades of Salazarist dictatorship, Rogério Fernandes (at the IIInd Republican Congress of Aveiro in 1969, that is, already in the period of Marcellist 'liberalization') warned, in a similar vein, but from a different perspective:

'The socialist battle for the democratization of education will have to emphasize (...) the correct location of the school in the process of democratization and social advancement in our country, refusing its subordination to the self-centred interests of the exploiting class and the social groups linked to it.' 33

The process of the installation of the democratic management of schools after the 25th of April was more than just a part of the democratization of the education system. It was also a process openly linked to socialism and the problematic of social class (although socialism may, in fact, be defined as simply a more extensive form of democratization). This meant immediately after the 25th of April, at the level of policy, an obligation to surpass existing educational policy, i.e. in the first instance, the Veiga

Simão Reform, which, we have suggested, was 'disconnected' from social reality and hence not articulated to the problem of social class. Rogério Fernandes (now as Director-General of Basic Education) made this clear:

'Recognizing (...) that the reform programmed in Law 5/73 contained useful aspects not realizable however within the regime deposed on the 25th of April, I pointed out (in an interview given in June 1974): "Its objectives have to be radically reformulated and that is important, for therein reside matters that will determine all the rest. The new reform that we must create has to be free of compromises, has to be entirely democratic." This included experimenting with other paths, proposing public debate on final objectives, means of achieving them and strategies of education, in order to launch a general and democratic reform of education demanded by all progressive and democratic forces.' 34

In fact, an 'entirely democratic' reform was never published during the relatively short-lived revolutionary period (as the 'social-democratic' opposition frequently enjoyed pointing out³⁵). However, when all the measures and innovations adopted and experimented during the period are added up they easily support the argument that the Veiga Simão Reform was, at a minimum, 'radically reformulated'.³⁶

It was not only the relative brevity of the revolutionary period, together with the cumbersome bureaucracy inherited from the past, that blocked any possible effort at formulating a new global educational reform.³⁷ It was primarily the fact that power was dispersed throughout civil society, caught up in many different forms of spontaneous movement (not all of them necessarily 'progressive') and certainly not in the hands of the Ministry of Education. It is evident that Fernandes recognized

this fact from his comments on the 'Melo Antunes Plan', a 'strategy' formulated by the IIIrd Provisional Government and published in February, 1975, as the Programme for Economic and Social Policy:

'A plan like that of Melo Antunes, in spite of its limitations, could only have been carried out if there had existed a centre of revolutionary political decision-making sufficiently cohesive to guarantee capacity to put it into operation.' 38

Now, before examining further the lack of central authority specifically in the field of education, and particularly with regard to the democratic management of schools, perhaps a digression here would be useful, making use of Fernandes's reference to the 'Melo Antunes Plan', in order to study in more detail just what conceptions of democracy were available and being struggled over during the revolutionary period.

Societal Project: 'Democratic Socialism'

The 'Melo Antunes Plan' stated:

'A new economic policy means a rupture with a system that was considered not only broken down, inoperant and corrupt, but also a system serving essentially layers of the population that accumulated privileges and benefits in systematic detriment to the large majority of the population. A rupture which does not mean, necessarily, violent and brusque transformations, especially in relation to the right to property. The "25th of April" did not put in question the right to private property, just as it now does not refuse, in fact the reverse is the case, the right to free enterprise and autonomy of the individual and private decision-making, as long as these do not collide with the real interests of the country (...). Revolutionary transformations carried out within Portuguese society have created a political will to follow an "anti-monopolist

strategy", essential to achieving a profoundly democratic and progressive society (...). The adoption of this strategy means, in fact, the control and orientation of economic power by political power (...).' 39

The role of education is specified as follows:

'Education policy has its place in the Programme of Economic and Social Policy as one of the fundamental supports for economic development and furthermore as a means of transmission towards a new society and a new humanism, which, in the last analysis, are the foundations of this programme.' 40

Finally, it states on the role of the school:

'From the transition that the Provisional Government proposes, a new model of the school arises. It should collaborate in development and transformation, be integrated in life and in work, promote a critical spirit and creativity and create habits of group work.' 41

These words, coming from a Provisional Government dominated by officers of the Armed Forces Movement (MFA), point to what several commentators have referred to as both the weakness and the strength of the Armed Forces Movement during the revolutionary period: the ambiguous nature of its declarations, programmes and intentions.⁴² There is no doubt that a major change in the economy was felt strongly needed:

'It is necessary to put into operation a new economy that leads to a true political, economic and social democracy. The crisis that we are experiencing will be overcome to the extent that we consolidate the conquests made for a more advanced economic system.' 43

And there is no doubt that there was a desire to find new, more extensive, forms of democracy:

'One must advance without hesitation in the search for formulas capable of synthesizing the electoral and revolutionary processes, on the basis that the former commands the latter and that our socialist democracy, if it is not to be the mere

mechanical application of the socialist experiences of other countries, will also not be mere adaptation to the schema of bourgeois democracy.' 44

But the inputs were often contradictory: how to reconcile forms of direct democracy (poder popular) with forms of leninist one-party democracy, or either of these with forms of 'occidental' parliamentary democracy? Hence we find Portuguese intellectuals scratching their heads, puzzling over what appeared to be basically irreconcilable strategies. Professor Teixeira Ribeiro wrote, for example, on the Armed Forces Movement Programme: on the one hand the Programme calls for 'formal democracy', that is,

'(...) the installation of democratic institutions after which the Army would return to the barracks, confining itself to a mission as guardian of sovereignty, and on the other, appeals for "socialist democracy", the launching of the bases for an anti-monopolistic economic and social policy aiming essentially at defending the interests of the working classes.' 45

And Correia Jesuino, Navy officer and Minister of Mass Media for the IVth and Vth Provisional Governments, supplies the following evidence:

'On the one hand, the MFA was persuing the achievement of democratic ideology, which implied the logic of political parties within a parliamentary structure, but, on the other hand, the same MFA devalued the democratic model, pejoratively classified as "formal", counterposing to it the model, if not the practice, of a direct democracy, by-passing the political parties.' 46

If, however, we remember that the Armed Forces Movement itself was a divided body,⁴⁷ largely dependent on developments within civil society, then the ambiguous nature of its programmes and declarations becomes more comprehensible. Both the debates over the real nature of 'Portuguese realities', and the relationship

between economic development and the democratization of education originated in civil society.

The fact that the MFA recognized that formal democracy by itself was incapable of providing a just and equitable society, or even of providing sufficient rationale for its impossibility, has an historical base in Portugal. During most of the 20th century, the struggle for formal democracy has been generally subordinated to ideological struggle either in the name of some form of Christianity ('Democracy is either Christianity or it is not democracy!'⁴⁸), or in the name of socialism ('Only socialism can guarantee democracy'⁴⁹). The former, in fact, according to Manuel Braga da Cruz, was first born as a response to socialist democracy, that is, as a means for struggling against socialism. Later, in a corporatist vein, it came to imply 'authority and division of labour according to the capacity of each one', meaning that Christian democracy came to rest its ideological case on 'the natural order of things'.⁵⁰ On the other hand, as evidenced in the Melo Antunes Plan, socialist democracy has consistently demanded some form of political control of economic power, either by the working class or by its representatives.

There have been periods in recent Portuguese history when the subordination of the notion and/or practice of formal democracy to either Christianity or to socialism has been less apparent. In these periods it has appeared linked with technocracy and capitalist economic development, gradually losing its more vocal and ideological overtones, eventually becoming dependent for its social legitimacy on the principle of equality of opportunity in education. The principle of equality of opportunity,

one of three principles of equality according to Bernard Williams (the other two being equality of respect and equality of distribution⁵¹), was indeed effective as a slogan of mobilization during the introductory period of the Veiga Simão Reform. It mobilized principally through Veiga Simão's own words, thus from a ministerial level, calling for a form of participation based more on an exchange of ideas than on the actual implementation of an educational programme. The revolutionary period, however, called forth mobilization through local activity, in civil society; the result being that both the mobilizing slogans developed at this level, that is 'alfabetização' (mass literacy) and 'poder popular' (popular or people's power)⁵² were dependent on, and determined by, a societal project that voiced, from different perspectives, the blatant lack of justice and equality in Portuguese society, a lack which the Veiga Simão Reform and its principle of equality of opportunity in education had shown itself unable to overcome.

A societal project of democratic socialism requires a project of democratic participation that not only recognizes society's class structure but actively strives to abolish it, or at least to reduce its effects to a minimum. Of the major political parties during the revolutionary period - at least during the first year - perhaps the Socialist Party made this most apparent:

'The school will not be an instrument of the diffusion of the ideology of class society, via the student-teacher relation according to the scheme dominated-dominant. Education will not develop in student behaviour, and in its reflexes, that which will lead the student to calmly accept the violence of an oppressive system. The school will cease to be an instrument of cultural exploitation thus it will cease to reproduce the relations of production of a class society. The transformation of the schools is inseparable from the

social revolution that has put at risk
capitalist structures (...).' 53

However, the Socialist Party, in spite of these weighty words, stressed as its educational priority 'access for all Portuguese to education in terms of equality of opportunity for mental and physical formation.'⁵⁴ In contrast, the Portuguese Communist Party, which at its Extraordinary VII Congress in October, 1974, termed the Portuguese revolution a 'democratic and national revolution', insisted that in the field of education the priority was the 'extinction of illiteracy'.⁵⁵ As we shall see in the next chapter, this ordering of priorities had important implications for mobilization, and thus for the most effective way of achieving what was considered the ultimate goal of the Portuguese revolution by all Portuguese political parties, with the exception of the CDS (the principle representative of Christian democracy) and extreme right-wing parties, that is, 'the transition to socialism'.

Phases in the Process of the Democratic Management of Schools

A. 'Power to the Schools'

The lack of central authority in education showed itself most evident in the process that led to the institutionalization of the democratic management of schools. In response to the proliferation of systems of management forced into operation through the local initiative of school communities after the 25th of April revolution, DL 221/74 was promulgated as law. This brief law, bearing the signatures of the Prime Minister of the 1st Provisional Government, Adelino da Palma Carlos, and his Minister

for Education, Eduardo Correia, and also that of the 1st President of the Republic after the 25th of April, António de Spínola, stated in its preamble that

'Considering the urgent necessity to support democratic initiatives for the establishment of bodies of management truly representative of all the school community and without prejudice to other measures which may come to be taken to regularize academic life in the various levels of education (...), the direction of these same establishments will be granted by the Ministry of Education and Culture to commissions democratically elected or to be elected after the 25th of April, 1974.' 56

In effect, the transfer of power from the Ministry to the schools had achieved official recognition. And, indeed, the law was 'an urgent necessity' if centralized power was to maintain any contact at all with secondary (lyceum) and higher (university) education,⁵⁷ for with the revolution school directors accused of corruption and clientelism, and with having 'asphyxiated all aspects of school life',⁵⁸ not to mention charges of widespread anti-pedagogic and anti-social authoritarianism, were swept away. In their place was initiated a process of constant interrogation of all categories of knowledge and of hierarchy. A very positive assessment of such rapid change, which affected structures, content and methods, and which led to many different sorts of 'mobilization activities' (dealt with in more detail below), is nicely captured in the following quotation from a former member of the directive council of the Faculty of Letters of the University of Oporto:

'Immediately after the military coup and when the popular revolutionary torrent imposed a massive participation on all things Portuguese, school management structured under fascism fell roundly, and in its place arose, alternatively,

the marvellous spontaneity that was democratic management in its early days.' 59

'Democratic management in its early days' was more than a call for representative democracy in schools; it was a call for direct democracy,

'(...) it being considered that (representative democracy) was unable to allow for the full participation of school members in the debate and decisions on matters directly affecting them.' 60

Effectively, it was a challenge to the contradiction that arises between the principle of equality and the delegation of sovereignty that often is the source of political alienation. For the movement in the schools and universities immediately after the April coup d'etat was essentially one striving to remove boundaries, it was about politicizing that which had been hitherto 'removed' from politics, within a regime of equality.

Thus, in addition to questions of management and hierarchy, another crucial focal point was the assessment of knowledge. One of the first major demonstrations by students, which took place less than a month after the revolution, was precisely over the question of exams: 'Secondary school students say NO to exams'; 'Students marched through the streets chanting the slogan, "Popular education, yes!; Fascist education, no!"'.⁶¹ Students of the 'liceu' Passos Manuel in Lisbon issued a circular stating that the school had decided, in assembly, that: (among other items)

'All education administered in secondary schools is intimately linked to the fascist regime and serves it globally through that which it transmits, as well as via the methods it uses; (...). It is a CRIME, an aberration, to fail students for not studying that which is going to be abolished, that which was taught by condemned methods (...). Exams

are a form of individual selection, highly repressive, that students reject and denounce as serving the interests of those that have always exploited the Portuguese people.' 62

The consequences of the process of the politicization of the school, within a regime of equality, were, in the short term, devastating for what was formally a highly centralized power, the Ministry of Education. An indicator of this fact is Raul Gomes's (Director-General of Secondary Education from the IIIrd to part of the VIth Provisional Governments) bitter comment that the slogan 'all power to the schools' was a 'joke, in bad taste'.⁶³ Gomes attempts to argue that the 'agitation' in secondary education after the 25th of April - more precisely in the 'liceus' - was purely political in nature and not pedagogic. And, of course, it was political, but those of 'poder popular' claimed it was also pedagogic.⁶⁴ However, for Gomes, whom we might situate broadly within the current we have termed 'alfabetização',⁶⁵ 'all power to the schools' meant above all 'bourgeois' agitation (in 'liceus') linked with extreme politics based on, in the last analysis, pure destruction. Hence, he was able to produce the following statement:

'The deep psychological motivation of these youths is the "revolt against the father" (...) - the Ministry of Education and Culture has become the scapegoat for a bourgeois youth socially maladjusted.' 66

And as for student demands relating to assessment, rather than appreciating their proclaimed objective of enforcing and protecting equality, Gomes called them 'opportunistic practices', for

'(...) a system of assessment with only two possible classifications - one positive (pass) and the other negative (fail) - can only be considered, in whatever system

it may operate (capitalist or socialist),
as profoundly deforming of human reality.' 67

In fact, Gomes, along with others of similar political persuasion within the Ministry, was concerned above all to re-establish central power in education, to halt the race within the schools to find a substitute for the Ministry, to counteract what was termed the 'undefined policy available after the 25th of April' which had resulted, according to Gomes, in the schools becoming a kind of 'no man's land', open to all sorts of political and 'pedagogical' experimentation (uncontrolled), and eventually arriving at the point where they were mere 'political and ideological battlegrounds for political factions'. 68

B. The Sovereignty of the School Assembly

Gomes claims that 'when the Ministry wanted to regain control (with DL 735-A/74⁶⁹), it was already too late';⁷⁰ 'too late' because the student-teacher relationship had already become established as an overt 'power relationship' (rather than as an overt pedagogic one). To make matters worse, the parity between teachers and students implicit in the new laws on democratic management⁷¹ contrived to foster the illusion that, indeed, the student-teacher relationship was one of power.⁷² 'Poder popular' groups, however, whose principal demand was that the school assembly should continue as the deliberative body, contested the new laws, some resisting to the point where the Ministry had to appoint delegates to the directive bodies of the establishments in question.⁷³ The actions of these groups, claims Gomes, effectively turned schools into an open 'site of class struggle' (which appears logical in view of the objectives of 'poder popular'), 'teachers entering onto the

scene as the dominant classes and students as the exploited classes as if the school corresponded to social relations of production'.⁷⁴

Consequently,

'(...) instead of democratization of the school as an institution, the political practices of the extreme-left introduced a process of alienation of supporters and of violent struggle against other political organizations; a process which only finds a parallel in the fanaticism of the holy wars.' ⁷⁵

In contrast, those 'liceus' refusing to put into practice the new law pointed to the authoritarian practices of the Ministry, arguing that a particular form of school management was being imposed on the schools mainly as a result of the Ministry's incapacity to 'come up with an alternative to the Veiga Simão Reform'.⁷⁶

Decree-Laws 735-A/74 of December 21, 1974, and 806/74 of December 31, 1974, continued, in fact, to accept, in principle (at a minimum, 'in spirit'), the sovereignty of the school assembly and its capacity to decide over all matters. A number of observers agree on this point.⁷⁷ The laws themselves stress in their preambles their experimental nature (a self-imposed revision taking place before the beginning of the following school year), and their attempt to

'(...) strengthen representative structures, removing authoritarian forms of school management, but assuring efficiency of operation and full participation in their work by teachers, students and investigators.' ⁷⁸

Santos, Pina and Varandas argue that the laws were poorly adapted to certain schools or universities in which, for example, certain subjects depended greatly on the competence of the teaching staff (they give the example of the Higher Technical Institute).⁷⁹ A broader criticism of the laws, and the democratic management process

in general, is the following one, offered by a self-proclaimed maoist student during a round-table discussion on the subject (the quotation is certainly illustrative to the extent that its violent rhetoric manages to capture superbly the contrast between 'alfabetização' and 'poder popular' while at the same time it voices what many people were undoubtedly thinking at the time, including, of course, right-wing opposition not only to democratic management of schools, but to the revolution as a whole):

'After the 25th of April, teachers and other sectors linked to the "Disciplinary Councils", and thus compromised with the fascist regime, were removed. From that time onwards the demagogic control of the schools by students became widespread. The Ministry of Education, by that time already having been infiltrated by social-fascists (derogatory title given to members of the Portuguese Communist Party), launched a project proposing the election of management commissions (DL 735-A/74 and DL 806/74 referred to above). The social-fascists of the schools, and all their faithful followers, defended the project warmly as "the most progressive in Europe" (...). On the other hand, the adventurists (rival extreme-left groups) proposed aberrant and utopian theories such as "student control", "self-management of schools", "control of the schools by the working class"! The application of these theories opened the way even further for the imposition of a climate of anarchy favourable to the social-fascists, which, for example, and this I am sure of, clearly exists in some schools (meaning here university faculties) such as the Higher Technical Institute. This Institute is today Portugal's Vincennes. Its diplomas/degrees, like those of many other schools/colleges/universities, will soon have no value at all. I, for one, wouldn't want to cross over a "bridge" constructed by engineers graduating from this Institute!! (...).' 80

The sovereignty of the school assembly finally reached its zenith (its logical destination?), with the actual encirclement by teachers and students of the building that was the Ministry of Education:

'(...) the Minister Major José Emílio da Silva and the Secretary of State for School Administration, Captain Almeida (IVth Provisional Government) had to stay all night in the Ministry, which was besieged by demonstrators which COPCON did not want to disperse.' 81

Although mainly symbolic, such an act brought to a climax the spontaneous process in the schools which, as one would have expected, did not have the cohesion nor the organizational structures to continue. By the time teachers and students returned to their schools after the long summer break, the events of 25 November 1975⁸² and 'normalization' were just around the corner. A period of frantic political activity in the schools was suddenly followed by a political vacuum in the schools.⁸³ Politics in schools, which for a period of more than a year had meant defining new content and forms of schooling, gradually became structured within the bounds of representative politics via political parties (a process which, as we shall discover further in the next chapter, occurred generally throughout Portuguese society).

'Normalization' and the end of 'total chaos'

The academic year 1975-6, after the fury of 1974-5, can best be described as a year of education 'pending'. In many ways, it was also both a year of consolidation and a year signaling the beginning of the retreat from 'advances' made previously. Gradually, the dominance of the struggle against 'the school as an instrument of cultural exploitation serving a class society',⁸⁴ gave way to, particularly at the level of official pronouncement, the need to eradicate 'anarcho-populism'. The sudden vacuum in

the schools and the lack of definition at ministerial level - only resolved after the promulgation of the Constitution in 1976 and the election of the Socialist Party to power shortly thereafter - was interpreted by the Centre and Right as a state educational system gone impotent:

'Meanwhile, the schools don't function. The Ministry of Education has become inoperant. The Minister lives sequestered in his building in the 5th of October (name of a Lisbon street) and cannot deal with important matters. He limits himself to receiving delegations of students, teachers, functionaries, to deal with all in this world, and in another (...).' 85

The programme of the first Constitutional Government to take office after the 25th of April (dated August, 1976), was the responsibility of the Portuguese Socialist Party. It contained an assessment of the then current state of affairs in education:

'After the 25th of April one witnessed a wave of protest and demands that overtook what was reasonable, thus one entered into the realm of demagoguery, of easy careerism and, in the end, of total chaos.' 86

Education, it was argued, saw itself infested with 'party infiltrations', 'arbitrary purges', 'nominations based on party affiliation rather than on competence', 'the creation of parallel decision-making bodies', etc. It concluded:

'Thus, in summary, we have a school system that does not function globally, or at the most charitable, that functions very badly.' 87

In the debate that followed the presentation of the Government's programme, the new Minister of Education, Sottomayor Gardia, defined the tasks of his ministry in terms of a 'duty to reconstruct a building in ruins'.⁸⁸ He claimed further that, in truth, 'the 25th of April had not managed to get to the schools'.⁸⁹ What

had occurred, rather, was the imposition in the schools of a 'premature 11th of March framework',⁹⁰ meaning that the schools, in his view, had been immediately taken over by totalitarian forces bent on rendering unsuccessful the true democratic nature of the revolution. To put the situation straight, he concluded, it would be necessary to see that the post-25th of November epoch got to the schools: 'This we will do — that is our purpose.'⁹¹

Leaving aside the political rhetoric,⁹² the important points to take from the Government's programme and the Education Minister's remarks are 1) that radical measures were considered necessary to make a clean break with the revolutionary period (in some quarters this was interpreted as removing 'socialism' from the declared objective of democratic socialism⁹³), and 2) that to accomplish this break it would be necessary to remove - 'purge' - politics from the school. These measures would thus enable the Government

'(...) to obtain a climate of normality (...), to neutralize coups and obstructions, block sectarianism, restore confidence, conquer fear and inhibition, put an end to anarchy.' 94

In response to Cardia, and the Government, the question that inevitably came to mind at the time was: 'How can education be neutral (...) when according to the Constitution (and hence the revolution) it is to contribute to the progress of a democratic and socialist society?'⁹⁵

During the life of the 1st Constitutional Government (1976-7), approximately one hundred official documents for higher education alone were published by Sottomayor Cardia's ministry:

'(...) almost all of this legislation reflects, in sum, the following aspects: destruction of the pedagogical experiments in course in schools, before it was possible to get past the initial phase of disorientation;

centralization of the Ministry of Education in all respects, particularly with regard to those having to do with school life; reestablishment of power via a hierarchically superior minority.' 96

Two of the most important pieces of legislation were Decree-Laws 769-A/76 (for preparatory and secondary education) and 781-A/76 (for higher education).⁹⁷ Both aimed at 'normalizing' the democratic management of schools, and both were promulgated in October 1976. The preambles to these laws contain the following major points: it is declared 1) that a 'legal vacuum' was created through the lack of observance of aforementioned DL 735-A/74; 2) that DL 806/74 was too vague, opening the door to 'manipulation' and 'coercion' by minority activists; 3) that it was time

'(...) to separate demagoguery from democracy and to launch the bases of (school) management that, to be truly democratic, demands the attribution of responsibility to teachers, students and non-teaching personnel of the school community'; 98

and 4) that the present law

'(...) compared with that which exists in other regimes, from diverse political and social quadrants, is, without doubt, a most daring and progressive initiative, conjugating democracy and responsibility, as is proper for a society governed by the principles of democratic socialism, where all elected bodies must account for their actions.' 99

In purely operational terms, Decree-Laws 769-A/76 and 781-A/76 appear to have been relatively successful. As stated earlier on, the experimental nature of Decree-Laws 735-A/74 and 806/74 was never in question. The new laws were obviously able to benefit from the experience of the older ones. According to Santos, Pina and Varandas, the new laws brought about two basic innovations (the second applies only to higher education): 1) a separation

of duties and competence between previously confused decision-making bodies; and 2) the substitution of the school assembly by an assembly of representatives as the decision-making body for all questions of a general nature not specifically scientific, pedagogic or administrative.¹⁰⁰ These innovations made possible in turn 1) attribution of decision-making to the body technically capable of doing so, and 2) the creation of a structure whose representativeness was beyond question,

'(...) making it possible for decisions by managing bodies to have general acceptance within the schools and consequently making a climate of tranquility progressively possible within the university.' 101

Those who criticized the new laws did so mainly on a much wider basis, concentrating their criticism on the entire strategy of 'normalization'. Others argued that the laws would end direct democracy through the reduction of the role and power of the school assembly, and a major criticism was directed towards the appearance of a new body, 'the Scientific Council', which it was feared would simply be 'a new edition of the old School Council':

'(...) thus he (Cardia) tried to recreate the School Council through the composition and powers of the Scientific Council and through the reduction of the spirit of democratic management by relegating elected bodies to a secondary level.' 102

Further, and on a more general note,

'We tried to reestablish old curricula where these had been modified. We tried to reintegrate personalities heavily compromised by the fascist repression of the universities.' 103

Finally, some argued that 'the witch-hunt of the Cardia Ministry aided the recuperation of certain obscurantist and retrograde forces (...).' ¹⁰⁴

Less severe critics have argued that the 1st Constitutional Government, and practically all governments since then, have made the big mistake of not taking advantage

'(...) of experiences already started by improving their organization and eventually altering some of the characteristics most politically controversial left over from the periods in which they were created.' 105

Instead, 'totally new models' are chosen, which demand 'a new effort of preparation and thus fatally run the same kinds of risks'.¹⁰⁶ In a phrase, the baby is constantly thrown out with the bath water.¹⁰⁷

Conclusion

The whole process of the democratic management of schools and universities outlined here can be taken as a clear example of the educational prowess of the Portuguese revolution, and, further, as an example of the vitality of Portuguese civil society and its capacity to create, in the words of Brederode Santos, '(...) parallel educational forms that can stand up to and confront economic, social and cultural changes that the formal educational system cannot accompany.'¹⁰⁸ Returning to a theme tentatively dealt with earlier on in this chapter, we would argue that first DL 735-A/74 and DL806/74, and then later DL 769-A/76 and DL 781-A/76, arrived to give judicial form to the democratic impulse which finally had need of institutionalization. Hence, the ambiguous nature of the laws; ambiguous because on the one hand they represented an acceptance, with inevitable modifications, of an educational process initiated outside the state, a process that particularly with 'normalization' and the alteration and

republishing of the laws was largely taken into the domain of the state, yet, on the other hand, meant that the state was obliged to accept a new form of schooling not created by it. The revolution forced the democratic management of schools onto the state. And, as we mentioned earlier, it did this by making the democratic management of schools a major plank in the Socialist Party Statutes of 1974, by making it a priority for the Trade Union of Teachers of Greater Lisbon, and by making it implicit in the Constitution of 1976. This fact partly explains the tendency for the exclusion of certain elements of the democratic management of schools by the state,¹⁰⁹ that is the exclusion of elements that might be considered potentially dangerous to a production system that in spite of the revolution remained capitalist and which in the late seventies continued a process of reorganization under a regime of crisis management. It is interesting to note in this respect that a principle like equality of opportunity, which, as we have seen above, was, during the Veiga Simão Reform period, able to serve the expansion of the education system, able to bring more people from different social classes into the education system, was, later, during the post-revolutionary period, able to serve a process of exclusion, where in the name of normalization, broader, more profound, notions of equality were expelled under the banner of equality of opportunity in education.

The democratic management of schools has given additional meaning to educational democracy in Portugal. C.B. Macpherson has argued that a fuller, more participatory notion of democracy depends firstly on a stronger sense of community than that allowed by liberal democracy where the substantive attributes of citizenship are often sacrificed to a method of government (which in itself

can stand considerable improvement), and that, secondly, it depends on a greater reduction of social and economic inequality.¹¹⁰

The socialism of the Portuguese revolution revolved precisely around the struggle for these two properties. The democratic management of schools, with all its rough edges, was an outcome of this struggle. As a 'substantive attribute of citizenship', it depends on a strong sense of community to survive. In the following chapter we shall take a look at the centrally-planned and controlled 'dynamization' campaigns of the revolutionary period, and in Chapter 5 we shall raise the question of Portuguese national independence, in order to see to what extent the revolution contributed to the strengthening of Portugal as a community.

Footnotes to Chapter 3

1. Rui Grácio (1971), "Democratização do Ensino", Seara Nova, no. 1512, October, p. 10.
2. Rui Grácio (1981), "O Congresso do Ensino Liceal e os Grupos de Estudo do Pessoal Docente do Ensino Secundário: uma alternativa sob o Caetanismo", paper presented at Conference on 'Contemporary Portugal: 1900-1980', organized by G.I.S./Fundação Calouste Gulbenkian, December, p. 4.
3. *ibid.*, p. 5.
4. R. Grácio, 1971, *op. cit.*, p. 10.
5. *ibid.*
6. J. Veiga Simão, in an interview published in O Jornal da Educação, April, 1979. Veiga Simão went on to say, about 'retreats', that 'the structural development of the education system and the application of the principle of equality of opportunity (had) suffered a dangerous retrogression.'
7. Veiga Simão in a retrospective glance at the Reform claims that he was aware of at least some of the constraints and contradictions (see interview referred to above): 'At the time, to be minister was to carry out, creatively, a plan of educational and cultural development which (...) implied recognizing the bitter and crude reality that we started from a position of marked backwardness which it was necessary to overcome in giant steps'; 'we lived the horrors of backwardness (...)'; 'In clearing the path for the future, I was seduced by the struggle against the stale forces of power for whom "to educate was to subvert".' J. Veiga Simão, *ibid.*
8. Rui Grácio, from the 'summary' on the cover of Os Professores e a Reforma do Ensino, Lisbon: Livros Horizonte, 1973.
9. *ibid.*, p. 50.

10. *ibid.*, p. 75.
11. A. Reis Monteiro (w/d), Educação, Acto Político, Lisbon: Livros Horizonte, p. 167.
12. see Chapter 1 for a number of references on this subject.
13. Quoted in Monteiro, *op. cit.*, p. 211.
14. As Reinhard Bendix argues, two fundamental prerequisites for the entry of the 'lower classes' into the arena of national politics are 1) the right to form associations, and 2) the right to receive a minimum of formal education. see R. Bendix (1964), Nation-Building and Citizenship: Studies of our Changing Order, New York, London and Sydney: John Wiley and Sons, especially Chapter 3.
15. The concept of social class lived underground, along with the works of Marx. A fact which may partially explain the overwhelming Marxist connotation the concept social class has in Portugal.
16. A. Reis Monteiro, *op. cit.*, p. 156.
17. Just as civil society was enriched by opposition to the colonial wars, so it gained from the 'opposition's' utilization of the regime's own attempts to restore its lost or weakened legitimacy. With regard to education, one might mention, in addition to the Study Groups, the following example. The regime's attempt to provide basic literacy, mainly through the generalization of access to primary school, '(...) had consequences that the governing bourgeoisies did not desire nor foresee (...). Namely, it served as the basic condition necessary for the later development of the sindicalism of the masses and the formation of political parties of a popular base.' See A. Seda Nunes (1970), O Problema Político da Universidade, Lisbon: Dom Quixote, p. 290. Even 'election-rigging' provided unforeseen results: 'The political elections which "Marcellism"

allowed and controlled, in 1969 and in 1973, gave way (...) to the development of a grass-roots popular political literature (...). Initially legal, during the election period, then becoming clandestine, it was basically composed of pamphlets of agitation, pamphlets of community action, texts of political analysis and documents of political formation. It was an appeal to a grass-roots dynamic, an invitation to association and meeting, an incentive to mobilization on the basis of the defense of the end of the war and of liberty and individual rights (...). see Manuel Braga da Cruz (1978), "Resistência e Dissidência Populares à Informação Salazarista" and "A Informação Popular Anti-Salazarista: da cripto-informação à contra-informação", both in Economia e Socialismo, no. 30 (September) and nos. 32/33 (November-December).

18. Quoted in A. Reis Monteiro, op. cit., p. 175. (Emphasis in the original.)
19. António Mespanha, former Director-General for Higher Education - during the two-year revolutionary period - in O Jornal da Educação, November, 1978, p. 11.
20. see Appendix IV which documents this process and also other intense activity at school level during the first three months of the revolutionary period.
21. M.E. Bredierode Santos (1981), "Inovação Educacional", M. Silva and M. I. Tamen (eds.), Sistema de Ensino em Portugal, Lisbon: Fundação Calouste Gulbenkian, p. 396.
22. António Reis (1974), "Uma Via Portuguesa para o Socialismo?", Seara Nova, no. 1543, May, p. 6.
23. see comments in the conclusion to Chapter 2.
24. see Appendix V which contains the five major Decree-Laws on the democratic management of schools; see especially the preamble

to DL 221/74.

25. M.F. Mónica (1980), "Ler e Poder: debate sobre a educação popular nas primeiras décadas do Século XX", Análise Social, no. 63, p. 500.
26. M. de Iurdes Lima Santos, Marinus Pires de Lima, and Vitor Matias Ferreira (1976), O 25 de Abril e as Lutas Sociais nas Empresas, vols. I and II, Oporto: Edições Afrontamento, p. 21, vol. I.
27. *ibid.* (Emphasis in the original.) The academic crisis of 1962, the revolts of the late 1960s (inevitably influenced by sentiments against the colonial wars, by the May Events of 1968 in France, and the movement of student opposition throughout the Western world to U.S. involvement in Vietnam) and the outbreak of student opposition to Veiga Simão from 1971 to 1973 were also important focal points of opposition to the regime. see, among others, Luisa Cortesão (1982), Escola, Sociedade, Que Relação?, Oporto: Edições Afrontamento, especially pp. 121-3; Daniel Ricardo (1982), "A Crise Académica de 1962", História, no. 42, April.
28. J.M. Protes da Fonseca (1981), "Gestão do Sistema do Ensino", M. Silva and M.I. Tamen (eds.), Sistema de Ensino em Portugal, Lisbon: Fundação Calouste Gulbenkian, pp. 129-30.
29. see Appendix V, DL 769-B/76.
30. J.M. Protes da Fonseca, *op. cit.*
31. see Appendix VI for extracts from the Constitution of 1976.
32. M.F. Mónica, *op. cit.*, p. 512.
33. Rogério Fernandes (1969), A Batalha Socialista pela Democratização do Ensino, 'Separata' of the "II Congresso Republicano de Aveiro - Teses e Comunicações", vol. I, Seara Nova, p. 360.

34. Rogério Fernandes (1977), Educação: uma Frente de Luta, Lisbon: Livros Horizonte, p. 12.
35. see the weekly newspaper O Expresso, 1974-5, where numerous references are made to this fact in a variety of articles by journalist and author Vicente Jorge Silva.
36. If only in the sense that such measures were actually taken and such innovations actually occurred. Rui Grácio eloquently summarizes the 'reformulation' in the following terms: 1) 'alteration at all levels and in all branches of schooling of the contents of learning (...)'; 2) 'a dignifying of the pedagogic, social and civic status of all teachers (...)'; 3) 'transformations of institutional relations within the educational apparatus, thus freeing it of repressive forms of authoritarianism and political, administrative and pedagogic favouritism (...)'; 4) 'modification of the proposed objectives of the school system in its relations with society as a whole, with the intention to break with deliberate isolation and subordination to minority interests (...)'; 5) 'cooperation of the school system in the democratization of the social formation, with the objective to alter its function of reproducing and legitimating social and regional inequalities (...)'. see R. Grácio (1981), Educação e Processo Democrático em Portugal, Lisbon: Livros Horizonte, pp. 106-7.
37. For, as E. Laclau points out: 'Bureaucracy contradicts the notions of equality and political participation which are implied in the idea of citizenship, in that it monopolizes political power and imposes its decisions coercively upon the rest of the community.' see E. Laclau (1978), "Democratic Antagonisms and the Capitalist State", in M. Freeman and D. Rubenstein (eds.), The Frontiers of Political Theory, Brighton: Harvester, p. 109.
38. R. Fernandes (1977), op. cit., p. 27. Ernesto Melo Antunes was a leading member of the MFA and responsible for the drafting of many of its major documents. In addition to performing

ministerial functions in the IVth Provisional Government (Foreign Affairs), he was very active behind the scenes particularly in the determination of the orientation of political strategy. The 'Melo Antunes Plan', although of fundamental importance as part of the formation of ideas and societal projects within the MFA was, as Fernandes's comment suggests, rapidly 'overtaken' by the events of the revolutionary period.

39. Programme of the Provisional Government 1975: "O Programa da Política Económica e Social", Lisbon, 1975, pp. 9-10. (Emphasis in the original).
40. *ibid.*, p. 137.
41. *ibid.* This 'new model of the school' effectively suggested a new rationale for education. This is discussed further in Chapters 4 and 5. see also note 53 below.
42. see, for example, Phil Mailer (1977), Portugal, The Impossible Revolution, London: Solidarity, p. 170; also J.A. Saraiva and V.J. Silva (1977), O 25 de Abril Visto da História, Amadora: Livraria Bertrand, p. 128.
43. Statement from leading MFA officer Vasco Gonçalves (who was Prime Minister at the time). see V. Gonçalves (1976), Discursos, Conferências de Imprensa, Entrevistas, Oporto: G.S. Bras, p. 3.
44. Quotation from Serafim Ferreira (ed.) (1975), MFA: Motor da Revolução Portuguesa, Lisbon: Diabril (extract from the Boletim Informativo do Movimento das Forças Armadas, 6-5-75).
45. Professor J.J. Teixeira Ribeiro in the "Introduction" to Vasco Gonçalves, Discursos, Conferências de Imprensa, Entrevistas, Oporto: G.S. Bras, 1976, p. 7.
46. Jorge Correia Jesuino (1979), "Acción Comunicológica en el Proceso Revolucionário Português", in J. Vidal Beneyto (ed.), Alternativas Populares - a las comunicaciones de massa, Madrid:

Centro de Investigaciones Sociologicas, p. 5.

47. A detailed analysis of the MFA cannot be contemplated here. see, however, Chapter 4 for further comments. Also see Rona M. Fields (1975), The Portuguese Revolution and the Armed Forces Movement, New York: Praeger; Ben Pimlott (1978), "Soldiers and Politics in Portugal: The Armed Forces Movement 1973-6", Journal of Iberian Studies, 7-1, Spring; Douglas Porch (1977), The Portuguese Armed Forces and the Revolution, Hoover Institute Press.
48. Quoted in M. Braga da Cruz (1978), "As Origens da Democracia Cristã e o Salazarismo(I)", Análise Social, no. 54, p. 278.
49. see R. Grácio, Preface to A. Reis Monteiro, op. cit.
50. M. Braga da Cruz, 1978, "As Origens...", op. cit.
51. Note that Williams considers that equality of opportunity '(...) requires not merely that there should be no exclusion from access on grounds other than those appropriate or rational for the good in question, but that the grounds considered appropriate for the good should themselves be sure that people from all sectors of society have an equal chance of satisfying them.' see B. Williams (1969), "The Idea of Equality", in Joel Fineberg (ed.), Moral Concepts, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 167.
52. In the following chapter the use of these two mobilizing 'slogans', or currents as we shall also refer to them, will help to differentiate two major political strategies having considerable influence within the MFA. For the moment suffice it to say that 'alfabetização' depended on a centralized directive body whereas 'poder popular' conceived its action on a local basis. see Introduction and Chapter 4 for further comments.
53. Socialist Party Programme and Statutes, Socialist Party

Congress (December, 1974), "The School", subsection 3.5.3., p. 39.

54. *ibid.*, p. 31.

55. see Programa do Partido Comunista Português, October, 1974.

56. see Decree-Law 221/74 of 27 May 1974, Appendix V.

57. The democratic management of schools in primary education has not yet been completely implemented. Initially conceived in terms of schools, districts and counties, it was reduced in the end to the election of delegates from the school zone. Nevertheless, at the level of the primary schools themselves, there have occurred some interesting experiments in democratic management (for example, Directors of primary schools are elected by colleagues from among the permanent staff). see Cadernos Sobre Gestão Democrática, Teachers' Union of Greater Lisbon, (w/d). In the teacher training sector (Escolas do Magistério Primário), the democratic management of schools has also never been fully implemented. Even during the revolutionary period, the Directors of these institutions were appointed by the Ministry. The newspaper O Expresso reported at the time that the Ministry thought the staff of the Magistérios too 'reactionary' to allow for the full installation of democratic management. In fact, there may have been another reason. The revamped Escolas do Magistério Primário were in many ways the nearest conception of the 'new model of the school' outlined in the 'Melo Antunes Plan' (see note 41 above). In addition to incorporating the 'new' disciplines of sociology, notions of linguistics, and 'contact activities' ('to promote critical spirit and creativity' - see Appendix XI), they engaged in new pedagogic methods based on group work (centred on seminars) and set as their objective the creation of the 'new teacher: cultivated, conscientious and interventionist' (from Plano de Estudos das Escolas do Magistério Primário 1975-6, Ministry of Education, Directorate-General of Basic Education). Indeed,

a major tension of the revolution showed itself most evident in this sector: to what extent could mobilization democratically 'impose' itself? (This was a crucial question considering the nature of the Portuguese revolution - i.e. the fact that it originated in a military coup d'etat.) Also, mobilization called for change, for action, at all levels: at grass-roots level and in state bodies. But in sectors where the grass-roots movement was non-existent? How was change to be brought about? The weakness of the state was also made clear in these circumstances. In the northern town of Chaves, for example, the local community fought the Ministry's choice of Director for the local Magistério tooth and nail. An hysterical campaign was started in a local newspaper against the Director who was accused of implanting 'red' pedagogy in a crucial and sensitive sector of education. The campaign mounted in fury until at one stage the Director actually felt herself to be in physical danger. Although the Ministry of Education supported the Director throughout the struggle, it was incapable of providing a situation where the Director could continue in her appointed post.

58. Manuel Leite (1980), "Em Defesa da Gestão Democrática", A Escola, p. 5.
59. *ibid.*
60. A.F. Santos, H.G. Pina and C.F. Varandas (1980), "A Gestão Democrática das Escolas de Ensino Superior", in A Universidade Portuguesa em Debate, a series of articles organized by the Trade Union of Teachers of Greater Lisbon, p. 63.
61. Title in the newspaper O Expresso, 25-5-74.
62. *ibid.*
63. Raul Gomes (1977), A Educação Democrática em Perigo, Oporto: Limiar, p. 170. Rui Grácio, on the other hand, points to the '(...) severe limits and fragility of state power before the

offensive and vitality of a civil society where diverse instances had a wide field for affirming and denying - everything, now!' see R. Grácio, 1981, Educação..., op. cit., p. 18. Those occupying positions within the Ministry were subject to frequent frustration: '(...) while now (October, 1978) a minister can speak for half an hour to a T.V. audience, we only had five minutes available to us - and immediately afterwards a student from the Technical University would say that what the minister had just said was going straight into the rubbish bin!' António Hespanha, former Director-General for Higher Education, quoted in R. Grácio, *ibid.*

64. see Encontro Nacional de Professores, Edition of the Nucleus of Lisbon teachers, M.E.S. (Movimento da Esquerda Socialista), March, 1975; also A Política na Escola (Contra a Escola Capitalista - C.E.C.), Lisbon: Armazen das Letras, 1978. More explicitly, 'poder popular' groups wished to construct the 'socialist school' within a dynamic emphasizing local initiative. Strategically, the socialist school would be an alternative power to the centralized Ministry of Education. There were also many other political groups active in the schools, including those incorporating the current 'alfabetização', who did not share this problematic. This is discussed further in Chapter 4.
65. see note 48 above.
66. Raul Gomes, op. cit., p. 175.
67. *ibid.*, p. 155.
68. *ibid.*, p. 169.
69. Decree-Law 735-A/74 applied to preparatory and secondary education. It appears in Appendix V.
70. R. Gomes, op. cit., p. 169.
71. see Appendix V. Decree-Law 806/74 applied to the University

sector.

72. Gomes put a lot of the blame for what he saw as the failure of the laws, on the teachers, who he claims were 'unprepared' for their new-found freedom due to a lack of professional and political training prior to the revolution.
73. This is described in Article 21 of DL 735-A/74, in Appendix V.
74. Raul Gomes, op. cit., p. 30.
75. *ibid.*, p. 43.
76. Expressed in an article in O Expresso, 25-1-75.
77. For example, R. Gomes himself, op. cit; also A.F. Santos, H.G. Pina and C.F. Varandas, op. cit.
78. see the preambles to DL 735-A/74 and DL 806/74 in Appendix V.
79. Which is part of the University of Lisbon. see A.F. Santos, H.G. Pina and C.F. Varandas, op. cit.
80. Quoted in the periodical Vida Mundial, no. 1893, p. 24, 24-6-76.
81. R. Gomes, op. cit., p. 96. COEGON was an MFA unit headed by Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho with the task of settling disputes and disturbances beyond the jurisdiction of the local police. It acted as a guard of the revolution.
82. see note 72 of Chapter 1.
83. Interesting in this respect is an article by Afonso Praça in O Jornal da Educação, "Porque Votam os Estudantes à Direita?", April, 1977.
84. From the Socialist Party Programme and Statutes, Socialist Party Congress (December, 1974), "The School", subsection 3.5.3,

p. 39.

85. A. Rebelo de Sousa and G. Oliveira Martins (1978), Democracia Incompleta, Viseu: Fundação Social-Democrata Oliveira Martins, p. 48. This attack was directed at (then) Major Vítor Alves, a leading member of the MFA, who later became Education Minister for the VI. Provisional Government. Alves, identified as being close to the Socialist Party, was hamstrung by the very nature of the VIth Provisional Government. This is discussed in more detail in Chapter 4. The leadership of both the Communist Party and the Socialist Party agreed that schools were in a 'chaotic state'. However, while the Communist Party saw the 'extreme-Left' as the main culprit, the Socialist Party tended to blame 'the ambiguous and autocratic politics of the Communist Party' - which corresponded in some circumstances, they claimed, to 'pure infiltration' of the state apparatuses (and takeover of the government through influence within the MFA), and in others, to 'apparent' alliance with the popular politics of the extreme-Left. see M. Lucas Esteves for a Socialist Party point of view of 'the infiltration of the education apparatus' by the PCP; in Portugal Socialista, no. 104, 15-7-76. (In this context, the soon-to-be first Minister of Education of a post-revolutionary Constitutional Government, Sottomayor Cardia, wrote: 'The Communists have acquired almost a complete monopoly in the carrying out of education policy: the socialists promise to dismantle communist terror in education and to guarantee the constitutional principle which prohibits ideological directivism within the school. The Communists struggle ruthlessly for a new obscurantism; the socialists defend Portuguese cultural tradition and assure respect for the moral values of the nation.' Quoted in Portugal Socialista, ^{p. 13} 16-6-76.) With the onset of 'normalization', what had hitherto been seen as acceptable and/or positive - particularly the ineffectiveness of the state - in a revolutionary (mobilizing) context, suddenly became totally unacceptable and/or negative - particularly the ineffectiveness of the state. With the advent of the 1st Constitutional Government, the Communists directed the main thrust of their attacks at the Socialist Party Minister

for Education, Sottomayor Cardia, who came to symbolize, perhaps more than any other minister, the whole process of normalization.

86. Programa do I Governo Constitucional, 1976, p. 54.
87. *ibid.*, p. 55.
88. *ibid.*, p. 257.
89. *ibid.*
90. The 11th of March was the date of the second 'mini-coup' that took place during the revolutionary period. On this date, right-wing forces led by former President António de Spínola were easily defeated after a coup attempt, Spínola being forced to flee the country. The event enabled Vasco Gonçalves, Prime Minister at the time, to take radical measures such as the nationalization of the banks and insurance companies.
91. M. Sottomayor Cardia, in the Programa do I Governo Constitucional, *op. cit.* Interestingly, from the rhetoric of Cardia's intervention arises the curious notion of 'totalitarian chaos'.
92. Rui Grácio observes that during the presentation of the section on education of the Programme of the 1st Constitutional Government, the Minister of Education, Sottomayor Cardia, received for a 'short intervention of only 15 minutes', the standing applause of all M.P.s of the Socialist Party, and of the parties of the Right, the PPD and the CDS. see R. Grácio (1981), Educação..., *op. cit.*, footnote 3, p. 90.
93. How far, indeed, the Socialist Party had moved from its declarations of December 1974 on the school (see note 53 above).
94. Programa do I Governo Constitucional, 1976, p. 257.
95. see Gusmão, M.P. for the Portuguese Communist Party, in

Programa do I Governo Constitucional, 1976, p. 261.

96. Afonso Praça (1979), "Apesar de Tudo, Muita Coisa Mudou", Raiz e Utopia, 9/10, Spring/Summer, p. 304. (Emphasis added.) Praça refers, on the one hand, to a list of laws all aimed at restricting, or extinguishing, educational measures initiated, or promoted, during the revolutionary period, and, on the other, to laws and other official documents which, in their preambles, referred to 'pedagogical degradation' resulting from the 'chaos' of the revolutionary period. We find examples of the former in laws such as DL 601/76 of the 23rd of July, 1976, which instituted numerus clausus in medicine, DL 843-13/76 of the 9th of December, 1976, which restructured the Faculty of Law of the University of Lisbon and 'Dispatch' 88/77 of the 12th of March, 1977, which extinguished the Faculty of Pedagogy (see Praça, *ibid*). As for references to 'pedagogical degradation', there is DL 768/76 of the 23rd of October, 1976, for the creation of committees of restructuring (*sic.*), which states: 'In some higher education establishments, there has occurred in the years just past such a degradation in the quality of schooling that one could easily justify their closing (...). It is the duty of the Constitutional Government to safeguard the principles of the Constitution of the Republic, and therefore it cannot permit that activist minorities, pseudo-revolutionaries, obstruct and annihilate the work of those who want to work for the "progress of a democratic and socialist society".' DL 769-B/76, of the 23 October, 1977, deals with the setting up of 'interuniversity scientific commissions (...) to judge courses and the competence of staff in universities'. Its preamble reads, '(...) some establishments, under the pretext of scientific and pedagogic independence, contrary to legal dispositions, substituted courses and curricula for others approved in assemblies very under-represented and very under-qualified, without the scientific and pedagogic knowledge necessary to give them authority and honesty'; '(...) to restore, urgently, to higher education its quality and competence' the aforementioned commissions are to be set up.

'Decree' 8/77, of the 13th of January, 1977, refers to 'disorganization, in both pedagogic and administrative terms' in the transformation of the Higher Institute of Social Sciences and Politics (ISCSP), which led to a '(...) politicizing (of) all activity of the school, (leading to) an attempt at creating a bulwark of independence in relation to all educational hierarchy, leaving the Ministry without any pedagogic or administrative control (...).' Finally, Decree 10/77, of the 14th of January, 1977, argues that the 'quality of education in the Faculty of Economics of the University of Oporto has evidently declined, now having gone beyond the limits which the school by itself could rectify in order to adjust to the new economic objectives of Portuguese society.' In one way or another all these measures were aimed at restoring the 'value' of university diplomas and degrees, for during the revolutionary period the bottom had literally fallen out of the credential market.

97. see Appendix V.

98. see the preamble to DL 769-A/76, Appendix V.

99. *ibid.*

100. see A.F. Santos, H.G. Pina and C.F. Varandas, *op. cit.*, p. 65.

101. *ibid.*

102. João Cunha Serra (1980), "Experiências e Perspectivas da Gestão Democrática no IST", in A Universidade Portuguesa em Debate, Trade Union of Teachers of Greater Lisbon, p. 159. Lecturers in universities ('assistentes') and students, in general, were excluded from the Scientific Council. see DL 781-A/76, Appendix V.

103. *ibid.*

104. For example, Pedro Amaro (1980), "A Gestão Democrática das Escolas e os Docentes Universitários", in A Universidade

Portuguesa em Debate, Trade Union of Teachers of Greater Lisbon.

105. M.E. Brederode Santos, op. cit., p. 400.
106. *ibid.*
107. One wonders to what extent this is a result of the influence of Jacobinism in Portuguese affairs. As authors J.A. Saraiva and V.J. Silva point out: 'The British occupied in Portuguese society that place which the Portuguese bourgeoisie never showed itself capable of occupying (...). On the other hand, France functioned as the sun for the revolutionaries of that period. From France one imported the ideology of the Revolution. From France one imported not only the mentality, the style, the political discourse, the verbal radicalism and the radical anticlericalism, but even the revolutionary organizations (such as the masonry); one imported Jacobinism - which would come to play a decisive role in the implantation of the Republic in Portugal.' see J.A. Saraiva and V.J. Silva, op. cit., p. 199. In the Jacobin tradition of democracy the government gives expression to the general will of the people (the object and subject of the government) whose object is common good. Thus, if the people's will is sovereign, the opposition, by definition, must be malignant, for how can a people's government harm its own people, being a reflection of its own will? The result is that governments, apart from becoming increasingly authoritarian over time, in spite of sincere democratic intentions, tend to approach with great suspicion what they inherit from previous regimes. Salazar's reign may have exacerbated the problem by polarizing Portuguese society over quite a long period of time. (For further comments and details of 'normalization', see Chapters 1 and 4.)
108. M.E. Brederode Santos, op. cit., p. 395.
109. For example, the return of executive power and control to the 'catedratic' elites of the university through the creation of the Scientific Council; the fact that democratic management

in schools stopped short in both primary education and in teacher training; and finally, the fact that the whole process since the onset of normalization has been consistently ignored by the Ministry of Education. If democratic management in schools is still operational today, in the 1980s, it is largely because of the struggle for its defense that has been carried out by the Trade Union for Teachers, and, even more importantly, by teachers working in schools.

110. see C.B. Macpherson (1977), The Life and Times of Liberal Democracy, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Chapter 4

Conquests of the Revolution: 'Emptying the Schools into the Streets and the Streets into the Schools'¹

'(...) the Portuguese solution was not an evolutionary, careful, skilful change of scene conducted by the most modern fraction of the ruling class and the Armed Forces, as in Spain, who learned much from the unpredictable adventures of her neighbour, but a surprising and invigorating alteration of depth and form. That which, with delight or terror, one customarily designates as revolution.' ²

Mobilization: Yes, but...

The sort of spontaneous mobilization that we looked at above that took place in schools and universities throughout Portugal immediately after the April coup d'etat differs considerably from the more centrally-planned, controlled mobilization processes that we shall examine in this chapter. The democratic management of the schools sprang forth from the schools and universities themselves. It originated there. However, the processes we shall be looking at here, apart from perhaps some mention of the urban housing movement, originated either in state ministries or in the Armed Forces Movement (the MFA).

In an earlier chapter we argued that the Veiga Simão Reform marked the beginning of a period of educational mobilization - initially a form of mobilization resulting in, what we called in so many words, arming the opposition, where space and a platform

were provided for new forms and topics of educational discussion and practice. We also argued above that with the 25th of April the notions of educational (and societal) change contained within the Veiga Simão Reform finally made contact with 'society'. The occupation of schools and universities was the first (euphoric) sign of this contact. Exploring this contact and developing it further was the democratic management of the schools, which may be interpreted as the first concrete element of a much wider, uncoordinated, but revolutionary self-conscious movement which aimed at creating, at developing, a new rationale for education. This new rationale rested on three basic premises, namely 1) that the local community (both urban and agrarian) needed very much to 're-identify', to re-establish, itself in the light of new national realities,³ 2) that a great effort should be made to overcome the more blatant differences between urban and rural schooling, and 3) that a similar effort should be made to attenuate, if not abolish completely, the consequences of the mental-manual division resulting from different forms and contents of schooling.

The second element of the wider, uncoordinated, but revolutionarily self-conscious movement which aimed at creating and developing a new rationale for education differed considerably from the first. Although it shared the same material interests as the first element, and thus was able to support the same premises as the first for a new rationale for education, its conception of politics was more directive and organizational. It conceived the implementation of political change as a more centralized, organized process. In accordance with the terminology we have adopted in previous chapters,⁴ this second element

was more in tune with what we have termed the current of 'alfabetização'. 'Alfabetização' was committed to a form of organization-building, and to what Breines's has termed 'strategic-thinking'.⁵ These were forms that were, if not wholly alien to, at least not the major preoccupation of 'poder popular' (whose focal point was direct action in local struggle).⁶ While 'poder popular' tended to consider the pedagogy of the revolution, that is 'the process, the means, the participation and the dialogue',⁷ as important as the actual goal of the revolution (the transfer of political and economic power; the consolidation of new categories of power), 'alfabetização' prioritized calculated organized struggle in order to achieve and consolidate power so that structural changes in the political, economic and social order might be wholly concretised.

However, just as we have argued that 'poder popular' and 'alfabetização' did not correspond unambiguously to distinct social supports,⁸ so too is it wrong to identify the spontaneous movement within the schools that led to democratic management in the schools as being wholly the terrain of 'poder popular', or the more centrally-planned, controlled mobilization processes of this chapter as being wholly the terrain of 'alfabetização'. Rather, both elements were characterized by a constant struggle between two conflicting strategies for the implementation of a new rationale in education. It would, however, be fair to say, in general terms, that the logically dominant category of the spontaneous movement in the schools was 'poder popular', while for the centralized mobilization processes it was 'alfabetização'.

The more centrally-planned, controlled mobilization processes were tentatively operationalized through the 'new model

of the school' described in the Melo Antunes Plan,⁹ but the major thrusts towards their implementation came in the form of (at least)¹⁰ three major mobilization projects, namely, the Campaign for Cultural 'Dynamization' ('A Campanha da Dinamização Cultural'), organized by the MFA, and the ministerial projects of the Student Civic Service ('Serviço Cívico Estudantil') and Civic Polytechnic Education ('Educação Cívica Politécnica'). A central objective implicit in all three projects was the expansion of the education process to its very limits by not only enabling entry to those neglected previously by the education system, but by bringing back in those banned entry to it by the previous regime.¹¹ Nowhere is this 'inclusiveness' more clearly expressed than in the MFA Programme which appeared in May, 1974, and which is referred to in the following terms by Portuguese Professor Eduardo Lourenço:

'(...) the internal and most profound logic of the MFA document pointed in the direction of democratic restoration, which meant, in principle, giving the Portuguese people the political right to speak.'¹²

Even the purges and exclusions which occurred¹³ were inclusive in the sense that they excluded those who previously had been the 'excluders'.¹⁴ V.M. Godinho, Minister for Education and Culture during the second, and part of the third, Provisional Governments, defended the need to purge in order to provide justice for those who had been unfairly treated by former colleagues or by administrative officers who had given information to the DGS/PIDE (the secret police), or who had achieved positions through favouritism. In addition, the new rationale called for selection of staff and students not on the basis of a largely discredited credential market (economic), but on the basis of the criterion of 'democraticity' (political). Godinho stated:

'A new policy cannot advance, or even be launched, after a revolution (or a revolutionary process) without the installation of new teams and an implacable assessment of education's heritage (...), thus, during the early days we removed former directors and general inspectors.' 15

The Armed Forces Movement Programme contained a chapter on education entitled 'Education, Culture and Research Policy' which acted as a kind of future guide for educational and cultural mobilization. Its principal points were the following: a) mobilization of efforts for the eradication of illiteracy and the promotion of culture, (namely) in rural areas, b) development of educational reforms, taking into consideration the role of education in the creation of a genuinely democratic national conscience and the necessity of 'inserting the school into the general problematic' of Portuguese society, c) creation of a national system of life-long education, d) revision of the professional status of teachers at all levels of education and reinforcement of means of contributing to their training, e) amplification of schemes of school social action and of pre-school education, obliging the involvement of the private sector, with the aim of accelerating the process of implementation of the principle of equality of opportunity in education, f) creation of schemes of participation of teachers, students, families and other sectors interested in educational reform, aiming for, especially, liberty of expression and efficiency at work, g) definitions of a national policy of research, h) promotion of cultural and artistic activities, namely literature, theatre, cinema, music and the plastic arts, and also of the means of mass communication, as indispensable vehicle for

the development of the culture of the people,¹⁶ and i) diffusion of Portuguese language and culture throughout the world.¹⁷

Immediately striking are the first three points of the programme, for they set out in no uncertain terms priorities that radically differed from the pattern of educational development up to the revolution (including the Veiga Simão Reform era - note, in this context, that equality of educational opportunity appears further down the list and in direct link with schemes of school social action and nursery education). In what follows we shall attempt to elaborate the interpretations made of these priorities by the MFA, and by state ministries, and the means used in their attempted implementation. To get a full understanding of this process, we shall need to analyse the limits placed on the mobilization process by the nature of the revolution itself. Also revealing should be the contrast between the centralized processes adopted and the critique made of them by the current 'poder popular'. We shall, in fact, discover that the MFA Cultural 'Dynamization' Campaign appeared in many of its central aspects to be shaped by, in theory, and modelled on, in practice, the experience of the Cuban-style literacy campaign.¹⁸

The Economic Transition Plan

To begin with, a programme for centralized educational and cultural mobilization requires a plan of economic mobilization to make it work, to give it structural support. In Portugal, such a plan was not readily available at the time of the publication of the MFA Programme (due primarily to the fact that the mobilization process began as a coup d'etat, only expanding afterwards

and through successive stages into a revolution). When 'recipes' for economic mobilization did appear - for example in the previously discussed 'Melo Antunes Plan', and in the Economic Transition Plan ('Plano Económico de Transição': P.E.T.), prepared by the Planning Ministry of the IVth and Vth Provisional Governments - there was already more than a hint of defeat about them:

'(...) two attempts (1975) were made to elaborate a medium-term economic plan, but both failed, due to the absence of a necessary minimum of political consensus.' 19

Drawing out the implications of this lack of political consensus, effectively the 'political crisis' of 1975, will occupy us for most of this chapter. From it resulted the necessarily confusing definition of the state of the Portuguese economic system as in 'transition from capitalism to socialism', or, in the words of Mário Murteira, 'in transition between capitalism and socialism', without effective direction and thus in danger of 'recovery by the peripheral capitalist mode of production'.²⁰

The underlying philosophy of the Economic Transition Plan, drawn up under the leadership of Murteira, Minister of Planning and Economic Coordination for the IVth and Vth Provisional Governments, expressed this 'movement towards socialism', which meant essentially giving priority

'(...) to the long-term objectives of full-employment production in the rapid creation of an internal supply structure that reduces dependence - commercial, financial, monetary and technological - in the drastic limitation of non-essential consumption and in the adoption of a strategy of external cooperation compatible with the model of development adopted, privileging schemes of cooperation with the socialist countries, progressive countries of the so-called Third World and new nations of the Portuguese language.' 21

Further, the plan stated that in terms of the configuration of the economic system

'(...) there would have to be a strong and efficient central coordination of macro-decisions with a progressively decentralized and deconcentrated structuring of the socio-economic systems, aided by the diverse bodies of "poder popular" (...).' 22

The full implications of the Economic Transition Plan can be seen in what Murteira calls two 'strategies of transition'. These 'transition alternatives', with opposing strategies of development, are set out below in Figure 1. At the time of writing, 1975, Murteira recognized that Strategy A would be effectively defeated before it could be applied, due to 'fear of aggressive forms of political economy by international capitalism and its institutions (IMF, World Bank, EEC, etc.)',²³ and in spite of crucially important qualitative transformations in the Portuguese economic system, which Murteira was to argue in a later work, were the result of the

'(...) movement of the masses against the big centres of private economic power, monopolies and latifundia, a movement that emerged from the destruction of the old politically and socially repressive regime.' 24

Strategy C, thus, was the response vital for continuing peace with the international capitalist community. This meant after a period of adaptation via the inflationary cycle (where salaries cannot accompany prices) - 'to stabilize the economy' - a return to the developmental dynamic of the sixties and early seventies, which as we pointed out earlier on, was exogenous in nature. Events since 1975 seem to have proved Murteira's analysis accurate.²⁵ In the final chapter we shall take a closer look at the influence of the international capitalist community.

(FIGURE 1)

STRATEGIES OF TRANSITION		STRATEGY OF DEVELOPMENT				CONFIGURATION OF ECONOMIC SYSTEM
<p>STRATEGY A (INTERNAL-ORIENTED)</p>	<p>EMPLOYMENT</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - ABSOLUTE PRIORITY, MEDIUM AND LONG-TERM, ON <u>PRODUCTION EMPLOYMENT</u>; - EDUCATION AND HEALTH POLICIES CONSIDERED PRIORITIES TO INCREASE VALUE OF HUMAN RESOURCES. 	<p>SUPPLY 'MINIMUM'</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - PRIORITY AGRICULTURE AND TAKING ADVANTAGE OF NATURAL RESOURCES; - CONSOLIDATION OF A BASIC INDUSTRIAL STRUCTURE CONTROLLED NATIONALLY. 	<p>EXTERNAL BALANCE</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - DRASTIC LIMITATION OF SUPERFLUOUS CONSUMPTION; - SUBSTITUTION OF IMPORTATION OF ESSENTIAL AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS; - STUDY OF COOPERATION WITH PRIORITY FOR SOCIALIST AND THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES. 	<p>PLANNING SYSTEM</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - STRONG CENTRAL COORDINATION OF KEY DECISIONS; - PROGRESSIVE SECTIONAL AND REGIONAL DECENTRALIZATION. 	<p>NATURE OF ECONOMIC AGENTS</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - GROWING INTERVENTION OF WORKERS' COMMISSIONS, COOPERATIVES, SMALL AND MEDIUM ENTERPRISE ASSOCIATIONS, TRADE UNIONS, IN MANAGEMENT OF PRODUCTIVE APPARATUS; - APPEAL TO STRUCTURES OF <u>PODER POPULAR</u>. 	
	<p>STRATEGY B (OPEN)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - SHORT-TERM PRIORITY; - IN MEDIUM AND LONG-TERM SUBORDINATION TO ECONOMIC STABILIZATION AND EXTERNAL BALANCE. 	<p>'SPECIALIZATION' OF PRODUCTIVE APPARATUS ON PERIPHERY OF EUROPEAN CAPITALISM, FOLLOWING TENDENCIES OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE AND LOGIC OF MULTINATIONALS.</p>	<p>MASSIVE ENTRY OF FOREIGN CAPITAL (PUBLIC AND PRIVATE INVESTMENT AND DIRECT PRIVATE INVESTMENT);</p> <p>REINFORCEMENT OF ECONOMIC-POLITICAL LINKS WITH EUROPE OF ETC.</p>	<p>WEAK COORDINATION OF CENTRAL DECISIONS;</p> <p>NATIONALIZED SECTOR ACTING ACCORDING TO THE LOGIC OF THE MARKET;</p> <p>DENATIONALIZATION AND/OR REOPENING OF BASIC SECTORS TO PRIVATE INITIATIVE.</p>	<p>STIMULATION OF DIRECT FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN LIBERAL TERMS;</p> <p>REVITALIZATION OF PRIVATE NATIONAL GROUPS;</p> <p>MARGINAL FUNCTIONS FOR <u>PODER POPULAR</u> BODIES IN MANAGEMENT OF SOCIAL SYSTEM.</p>	

(TRANSITION ALTERNATIVES)

(SOURCE: M. MURTEIRA, 1975)

For the moment, though, the precise nature of the 'political crisis' of 1975, whose eventual resolution led to the rejection of Strategy A above (Murteira suggests that just the thought of upsetting external bodies always made Strategy A a very unlikely option), needs to be examined in more detail. For in 1975 there arose a situation of mobilization which, particularly outside the major urban areas,²⁶ was always something considerably less than the triumphant march of the masses to victory. Yet there existed within the MFA Programme a strategy for educational and cultural mobilization and, eventually, plans for economic mobilization also came into being capable of providing a framework for that Programme. Further, a whole series of measures promoting educational and cultural mobilization were designed (mainly within the Education Ministry) to aid the implementation of a new rationale for education based on participatory forms of education.²⁷ Why, then, in spite of its central place in the revolution, did such mobilization appear so diversified and uncoordinated? What we are, in fact, asking for here is a clearer definition of the April revolution in order to test its centralized mobilizing capacity.

'A Pre-Revolutionary Situation'

João Martins Pereira, a well-known Portuguese political analyst, defines 'the Portuguese case' of 1974-6, as a 'pre-revolutionary situation'.²⁸ In a pre-revolutionary situation, according to Pereira, 'the bourgeoisie loses its capacity of repression - not only physical but also ideological'. Without repression to hold the masses back, there occurs 'a popular explosion'.²⁹ To

specify more precisely the Portuguese case, Pereira argues that in Portugal a crucial, perhaps determining, factor was the fact that

'(...) the political party potentially revolutionary located itself in the area of state power (and not therefore in the midst of the grass-roots movement) and created a diversion of the question of power in society to a question of power within the Armed Forces (more concretely, within the military apparatus). 30

This act of 'privileging state power over social power' made it possible for the 'potentially revolutionary party' (Pereira is referring, of course, to the Portuguese Communist Party) not only to control the trade unions, but also to gradually penetrate the administrative and ideological 'apparatuses'. Meanwhile, outside the state apparatuses, there occurred after 25 April, 1974, precisely that 'popular explosion' typical of the pre-revolutionary situation. In addition to the spontaneous movement in the schools and universities (described in the last chapter), this explosion was exemplified, according to Pereira, not only by the occupation of work-places and the takeover of factories by workers, but also by the urban housing movement:

'The occupation of 23 residential blocks in Chelas, still in the construction phase, by more than a thousand persons living in slum conditions on the periphery of Lisbon, constituted one of the most curious operations of popular initiative registered lately.' 31

A day later, in Parede, a town on the outskirts of Lisbon, a further 84 incomplete dwellings were occupied.

There are, in fact, several works which document the details of the 'popular explosion' in its various aspects, including studies of the urban housing movement.³² However, the point we wish to note here is that 'the popular movement' growing out of the

'popular explosion' that followed the military coup d'etat often appeared, as we witnessed in the previous chapter, in opposition to the state (although exactly what the state was in these circumstances, with a very ineffective repressive apparatus, is a matter for debate³³). Pereira tends to see the Portuguese state during this period as a bureaucratic device with the capacity to regulate or block solutions called for by the 'popular movement', the two mechanisms of social control being unemployment and party apparatus.³⁴ With the 11th of March and the disarticulation of major capitalist economic mechanisms, the 'popular movement' enjoyed renewed vigor, gaining increased legitimacy from, and within, the MFA. Pereira argues, however, that the lack of a coherent revolutionary strategy on the part of the Government after the events of 11 March had the effect of creating a dual-power-like situation:

'While the Government called for the launching of tasks and workers' mobilization, to consolidate revolutionary power, 'poder popular' forces claimed the situation only pre-revolutionary.' 35

For the workers, thus, according to Pereira, the state was not a 'state at the service of the working class', but rather

'(...) a state trying to conquer the confidence of the workers by conceding to them "case by case" and thus contributing to their division.' 36

Consequently, the state was unable to galvanize the 'grand mobilization of revolutionary energies' typical of a truly revolutionary situation. For Pereira this meant simply that the revolution had not yet occurred for

'(...) in an unequivocally revolutionary situation (...) the problem of national independence would appear in all its

clarity, stripped of all "manoeuvres" by the state apparatuses (...). It would be the fundamental lever for "collective mobilization", for introducing situations unthinkable in other circumstances, of a spirit of resistance at all levels.' 37

In contrast to Pereira, Vital Moreira, intellectual of the Portuguese Communist Party,³⁸ put forward the classic Leninist position on the conquest of state power. Moreira wrote in 1975:

'Every political revolution is, before all else, the substitution of one "ruling class" by another at the level of the state apparatus (...). The final task of a political revolution is to conquer the state apparatus and restructure it according to revolutionary interests.' 39

To consolidate the political power of the new 'ruling class', both a revolutionary dictatorship and revolutionary mobilization were essential, argued Moreira. The former would allow the liquidation of the political power of the old ruling class, while the latter would reinforce the political power of the new ruling class. Furthermore, 'each is necessary to the other (...), without one or the other, the revolution, as revolution, does not exist.'⁴⁰

After the devastating setback suffered by monopoly capital - following the events of the 11th of March -, and with the ensuing occupation of the latifundia within the Alentejo region, conditions appeared to be approaching those necessary for a 'revolutionary dictatorship'.⁴¹ Indeed, even further, Moreira argued that once the 'revolutionary dialectic was put in movement' there could occur

'(...) a transformation in the nature of the revolution, in the sense that the working class could achieve hegemony and sufficient power to transform a democratic revolution into a socialist revolution.' 42

The nature and extension of the 'revolutionary dictatorship' would depend on the nature of the revolution:

'If the revolutionary movement occurred under the direction of a single party - as with most socialist revolutions and most wars of national liberation - then the revolutionary regime would tend to remain under the direction of a single party. If the revolution occurred under the banner of various political forces - as with most bourgeois-democratic revolutions - then the revolutionary regime would base itself on the co-operation of various political parties.' 43

However, for Moreira, the existence of various political parties should not imply necessarily a regime based on party competition in the traditional pluralist manner (since it tends to weaken the revolution, putting at risk the political mobilization of the masses). Rather, there could occur party co-operation based on objectives clearly stated and followed which would allow for the essential revolutionary mobilization of the unpoliticized masses.

There is an obvious ambiguity in Moreira's thesis, in all probability provoked by the very ambiguity of the political situation at the time of writing: it was still unclear whether the MFA would surge forth as the guiding force of the revolution (in fact, at a later stage the MFA was 'officially' designated a 'national liberation movement'⁴⁴), or whether the political parties, of a pluralist persuasion, would in the end reestablish the power of the state on parliamentary democratic terms. Of course, the sort of party co-operation referred to above by Moreira could only have been conceivable under the leadership of a vanguard organization such as the MFA. The Portuguese Communist Party, therefore, was caught between two logics: on the one hand, it obviously supported the dynamic of the revolution which pointed towards the

transformation of a democratic revolution into a socialist one, and, on the other, it clearly wanted to be, and was, a part of the reestablishment of the state on pluralist parliamentary terms (in addition to parliamentary democracy being a huge advance over the previous authoritarian regime, there always existed the danger of Portugal becoming another 'Chile'⁴⁵). Below we shall see that what was a dilemma for the Communist Party was similarly a dilemma for the MFA.

The positions of Martins and Moreira that we have outlined very schematically here,⁴⁶ help us to understand the complexities of the 'political crisis' of 1975. They point to the existence of two 'revolutionary' strategies of social transformation, with conflicting projects for social and cultural mobilization. Both of these strategies were manifested, with varying degrees of support, within the MFA. One was based on taking over, or dominating, the state apparatus, on providing a centralized direction of the revolution with the MFA acting as the vanguard force linking the state apparatuses and the Government to the people. The main task of central power would be to interpret and to put into action (to organize) the demands of civil society on the basis of two main criteria: bringing previously excluded groups into the political system and changing the political culture of the country. We shall analyze the problems complicating this task in the following pages. The other strategy was based on the notion of a social movement autonomous from the state, on notions of dual power, of setting up a revolutionary alternative through the locally-based organs of 'poder popular'. Thus the situation was defined as 'pre-revolutionary', it being considered that the MFA, another 'important

site of class struggle', could be important to the social movement only to the extent that it could manage to protect and promote the occupation and local control of schools, factories, houses and land by the elements of the social movement themselves.

Opposing both these strategies, eventually,⁴⁷ were the 'bourgeois' political parties (particularly the Socialist Party and the PPD, which later became the PSD, that is, the Social-Democratic Party). These parties countered the more radical demands of 'alfabetização' and 'poder popular' with a demand for the institutionalization of pluralist representative democracy, on Western lines, particularly after the massive legitimization boost they received from the Constituent Assembly Elections of April 15, 1975. Effectively, they called for the end of the MFA, for the return of the soldiers and their officers to the barracks.

'Revolutionary Mobilization'

Moreira, above, points to the absolute necessity of 'revolutionary mobilization' to consolidate revolutionary transformation. This in fact was the precise message of the mobilizing current that we have termed 'alfabetização'. It first became visible after the 25th of April coup in the summer of 1974 through the literacy campaign run by students in the Northeastern regions of the country.⁴⁸ These regions were deliberately chosen because of their high rate of illiteracy and because of their 'distance' from the centre of the revolution. It later became visible through the interpretation made of the positions, and priorities, set out in the education section of the MFA Programme of 1974 and in the programme of the

Portuguese Communist Party drawn up in Congress in October, 1974.⁴⁹
(Thus, 'revolutionary mobilization' was to become the Cultural
'Dynamization' Campaign, organized by the MFA, and was to appear
in a variety of projects sponsored by the Education Ministry.)
Finally, the message itself was succinctly put in the Draft Project
for a Bill to Officially Establish a National Campaign of Mass
Literacy⁵⁰ - which was discussed by the Vth Provisional Government
in July, 1975, but which never received official approval (the Vth
Provisional Government only lasted one month):

'The process of revolutionary transformation of Portuguese society will only make real sense if aided by the conscious will of the working masses. It therefore becomes necessary that it finds a base not in some emotional motivation, which is manipulable and of short duration, but that on the contrary is rooted in the comprehension of the social dynamics of the struggle against exploitation and injustice (...). It is within these parameters that a programme of literacy should be considered in Portugal. Official numbers suggest an illiteracy rate of 30% of persons older than 15 (...). A literacy campaign in Portugal should be: 1) a fundamental part of the process of popular mobilization and of the project of liberation of all fears, passivity, individualism and naive and fatalistic consciousness (...) and 2) the beginning of a system of life-long education (...).' 51

A central component, then, of 'revolutionary mobilization' -
and here it was not the mobilization process in itself that counted
most, but rather the consolidation of revolutionary transformation
(i.e. it was not the pedagogy of the revolution that was deemed
to have most value, but rather the new categories created by it) -
was the concretization of the spread of education and culture to
all sectors of the population. For, logically, only this way
could the MFA (in the name of the revolution) introduce to the
citizenry of the country participation in political decision-making

processes (particularly relevant for two reasons: 1) because of the attempted counter-revolutionary coup of 28 September, 1974,⁵² and 2) because of the promised elections due to take place in the Spring of 1975). Hence, the purpose and power of the model of the literacy campaign made itself evident:

'As long as the masses of the population are deprived of elementary education, access to educational facilities appears as a pre-condition without which all other rights under the law remain of no avail to the uneducated.' 53

Further, in addition to their role of conferring citizenship rights, mobilizing campaigns could serve to build a sense of solidarity between urban and rural sectors. This had been a major objective of the mass literacy campaign carried out in Cuba:

'The goal of the campaign was always greater than to teach poor people how to read. The dream was to enable those two portions of the population that had been most instrumental in the process of revolution from the first, to find a common bond, a common spirit, and a common goal. The peasants discovered the word. The students discovered the poor. Together, they all discovered their own Pátria.' 54

Finally, 'revolutionary mobilization', to be successful in light of the socialist ideals of the revolution, would have to aid the transformation of the political culture of the country. This it could do by promoting a new set of social values (based on the principles of workers' democracy, egalitarian social relations, social solidarity and international class struggle⁵⁵). Only then would education and culture be located within socialism. Here one can argue that the latent effects of the literacy campaign model, in a revolutionary context, are more, or at least equally as, important in the consolidation of the revolutionary process as the manifest one of bringing people into the revolution itself. We

are referring to the effects of the campaign on the 'brigadistas' themselves. In Cuba, for example, the effects of the campaign on the 'brigadistas' were considered crucial:

'It was the campaign itself which turned 100,000 liberal, altruistic and utopian kids into a rebel vanguard of committed or, at the very least, incipient socialists.' 56

Portugal in this respect was no exception to the rule. In fact, on the contrary, for the MFA, being basically a military organization, needed to 'civilianize' and to 'revolutionize' its personnel constantly:

'The military man is before anything else an education, but educators have to learn with those they are teaching, with other educators, and with those that aid the process of teaching (...). The military man after the cultural "dynamization" sessions returns to the barracks more politicized, more aware of his tasks, more democratic; we also democratize the Armed Forces with the sessions of civic explanation; and we strengthen the unity between the people and the Armed Forces, which is a fundamental condition of our progress, of progress in peace without bullets.' 57

The MFA Cultural 'Dynamization' Campaign⁵⁸

As we have seen above, in the first few months after the 25th of April, there occurred a series of mobilizing events - occupation of schools and universities, urban housing movement, the beginnings of the workers' movement in the factories and on the latifundia of the Alentejo - some of which we have discussed. However, as we have also seen,⁵⁹ there did not occur,

'(...) a bit surprisingly, (...) that cultural explosion that one might have expected.' 60

The MFA, therefore, had to create its own means of penetration to make up for the lack of cultural transmitting agencies. Also, the MFA -

'(...) thrust into a vanguard position, due to 1) its being the only organization directly responsible for the fall of fascism; 2) the political and ideological weakness of the workers' movement; and 3) the fact that the MFA was the source of arms' - 61

was the only organization capable of projecting an image of one culture, one people, one revolution. Therefore, it was effectively obliged to set itself the task of being the 'catalyst for the political socialization of the masses'.⁶²

As we mentioned earlier on, the Campaign of Cultural 'Dynamization' only got under way after the first attempted 'coup-within-the-coup' of 28 September, 1974, when, according to Pereira, 'class struggle moved into the domain of the Armed Forces'.⁶³ In fact, the failed putsch of 28 September provided the impulse and the clarification of political forces which enabled the campaign to take place. The campaign arose, argued its organizers,

'(...) as a need to mobilize the most inert and constrained sectors of the population, in order to transform a coup d'etat into a revolution.' 64

Taking place midway between the university students' literacy campaign effort of the Summer of 1974 and the actual discussion by the Vth Provisional Government (in July 1975) of a National Literacy Plan (PNA),⁶⁵ the Cultural 'Dynamization' Campaign shared great affinities with both. Thus, modelled on a literacy campaign, without actually being one, its objectives were claimed to be: 1) coordinate and support all cultural associations of the country so that the establishment of a cultural network might become possible, and 2) to act politically via an effective

presence of military personnel among the general population.⁶⁶

Between October 1974 and March 1975, the MFA organized over 2,000 cultural sessions in the North and Centre of the country.⁶⁷ The sessions were organized primarily with the peasants in mind. The MFA Boletim, published bi-monthly, acted as a support for the whole campaign in addition to providing ideological guidelines for those engaged in public intervention. The combined unity of the actual sessions and the very highly circulated Boletim⁶⁸ were part of what Correia Jesuino, Minister of Mass Media for the IVth and Vth Provisional Governments, termed

'(...) a new information praxis rooted in facts originating at grass-roots level, a bilateral relationship rather than a unilateral one.' 69

In this sense, Cultural 'Dynamization' was about 'alternative communication, if by such a concept is meant the effective possibility of bilateral communication.'⁷⁰ In a similar vein, leading members of the Campaign explained in an interview to the periodical Flama:

'In the end, cultural "dynamization" is a matter of communication, an attempt to put together what is separated, everything that exists on different planes. Only when the people all speak the same language - the same language which aims for the precise objectives which constitute the happiness of the Portuguese people: greater justice, more rapid social evolution, greater economic equality - only when this has been accomplished, will our work be complete.' 71

The projection of 'one culture', 'springing forth from the people',⁷² was central to the Cultural 'Dynamization' Campaign:

'It is worth emphasizing that there is only one culture: that which is the authentic expression of a people, of its customs, work, suffering, needs, anxieties, qualities, moments of joy.' 73

It was central because it was instrumental in securing the transformation of the political culture of the country. Through it revolution and culture would become inseparable. Correia Jesuino put it in the following manner:

'The internal logic of the process pointed, to some extent, to a de-differentiation of the state and civil society through the building of a new "gemeinschaft" based on a direct form of communication, without media and without masses.' 74

Nevertheless, as Correia Jesuino himself points out, the MFA, in spite of its talk of 'one culture', was very divided over the issue:

'Cultural "Dynamization", which to a great extent was the very symbol of the MFA, practised a kind of direct democracy at the level of processes, but at the level of content conveyed an ambiguous pedagogy about the rules of the democratic game.' 75

In practice, this meant that the MFA gave explanations about the electoral process, about the rules of pluralist democracy, 'thus contributing to the organization of the collective will in terms of political parties and associations',⁷⁶ while at the same time it pursued a persistent policy of anti-electoralism, ostensibly as a means of circumventing the passivity and hierarchy of the electoral process. The MFA Boletim is riddled, from January 1975 to its demise in August 1975, with examples of this anti-electoralism. For example, in Boletim no. 8 of 14 January 1975, it is stated:

'The elections (for the Constituent Assembly) will not find solutions to the big problems confronting the country; these solutions will be found through the true insertion of progressive political forces in the revolutionary process and by their frank and open collaboration with the MFA in all measures of a

revolutionary character that it is necessary to take.' 77

Again, in issue no. 12, of 11 March 1975, one finds direct criticism of the political parties:

'How are the Portuguese people to tread the path which leads to a life of human dignity if the political parties don't visit them, or teach them, and simply manipulate their vote?' 78

A month later, towards the middle of April 1975, just before the Constituent Assembly elections, the MFA, which had from the beginning of the revolutionary process guaranteed elections to the country, arrived at the seemingly logical conclusion that the elections should (and could) be denied through the call for a blank vote. According to the Boletim, the logic of the blank vote was as follows: 'To vote is a civic duty, an arm of the people', however, the importance of the act of voting requires that a citizen vote conscientiously. Those, therefore, unable to choose a party should hand in a blank vote.⁷⁹ Additionally, the electoralist practices of the 'bourgeois parties', it was argued, tend to hide the truth, mask reality, create false consciousness. Political parties often are, therefore, a prime source of alienation. To choose freely, people must be conscious, unaffected by fears which others may try to impose upon them. Therefore, to ensure that one is choosing freely, that one is not being manipulated by electoralist or sectarian strategies, the best solution is to cast a blank vote:

'To cast a blank vote is not a crime nor treason. On casting it we are choosing; we are saying freely what we think and what we feel, fulfilling our duty as patriots without violating our own consciences, without turning our arms against ourselves.' 80

Thus, finally, to cast a blank vote was to cast a vote for the MFA.

The results of the Constituent Assembly elections confirmed the defeat of the blank-vote strategy, and much more:

'The blank vote obtained only 7% of the vote, indicating not only the victory of the Socialist Party, but still more importantly, the victory of the political parties, now recognized as the sole legitimate force for organizing the collective life of the Portuguese people. From that date onwards, the MFA, as an alternative project, as a liberation movement, as a builder of "poder popular", was condemned.' 81

Suddenly, overnight, the MFA had lost much of its raison d'être. Even more importantly, suddenly it had become an 'oppositional' force. And the problems confronting the Cultural 'Dynamization' Campaign became increasingly evident: '(...) the MFA was accused of "brainwashing" methods, of confusing the issues rather than clarifying them';⁸² some, later, went even so far as to proclaim the Campanha de Dinamização Cultural 'the first great failure of the MFA':

'It was a campaign which used helicopters and armoured cars to "teach" democracy to the people - it only succeeded in creating popular resistance and distrust of the MFA (...). Democracy being a daily practice, could not be "taught" through the simple visit of a military detachment.' 83

Indeed, changing political culture through the promotion of a new set of values is not an easy task. The implantation of 'one culture' in Portugal was not, in the end, successful. Thus, the attempt to deny 'bourgeois culture' and 'bourgeois institutions', by counterposing and promoting a new set of values centred on the principles of workers' democracy, egalitarian social relations,

social solidarity and international class struggle, failed. Indeed, such 'new values' came to be savagely attacked as anti-

Nation:

'Among the various depredations that, abusively and in the name of the revolution, weakened the country, stands out the attempt to separate from the Portuguese character those values forming part of its very spirit. Where the revolution should have venerated the proponents of Portuguese culture, these were trodden upon and in their place erected statues of idols exotic to our sensibility. An attempt was made thus, to inculcate a cultural and ideological orientation of a foreign extraction and a totalitarian character, imposed as the only creed. Wicked work! To deprive a people of its national spirit is to mortgage its capacity to reply to the aggressions that aim at national sentiment.' 84

In the aftermath of the election campaign, the MFA Boletim continued to defend the rationale behind the blank vote strategy:

'(...) while the political parties combat each other over the results of a restricted electoral campaign, the MFA proceeds with its campaign of cultural "dynamization" and civic action in conjunction with the people.' 85

But there was little doubt that the situation had changed radically. The political parties had a new-found legitimacy, and as defenders of the institutionalization of a new legality based on a regime of parliamentary democracy and a strong state, there could be little immediate room for the processes of direct democracy. In fact, the reconstitution of the state under the leadership of the political parties was the very negation of the processes of direct democracy, for

'(...) up to the elections the ineffectiveness of the state could be interpreted in positive terms as a pattern of political

power embodied by the MFA; after the elections the ineffectiveness of the state became a weakness that was unacceptable, powers were thus needed by the new political class.' 86

Had the MFA Campaign of Cultural 'Dynamization' been completely successful, it should have resulted in a fusion of mobilizing currents, bringing together 'alfabetização' and 'poder popular'. This in a sense, was its underlying thrust; this was the basis of the idea of the MFA as 'a liberation movement' which grew out of the Campaign.⁸⁷ The question that arises, however, is to what extent could a 'new "gemeinschaft"' have been constructed on the basis of the model of the Cultural 'Dynamization' Campaign? Apart from the question of the strong opposition of the pluralist political parties to such a project, certainly the centralized, controlled methods of the Campaign would not have found a compatible partner in 'poder popular' (particularly in the light of the undefined nature of the revolution). Thus, the deficiencies of the Campaign appear to have been twofold: first, the model itself, the 'campaign', in structure and in ideology very similar to the literacy campaign which followed the Cuban revolution, was not particularly well-suited to Portuguese conditions, and second, the Campaign suffered, from the beginning, a tension within itself, probably not determining but certainly important, resulting from the presence of the two conflicting mobilizing currents of 'alfabetização' and 'poder popular'.

With respect to the model of the Campaign, the notion of the 'enlightened pedagogue', who, through identification with the people, in their prolonged condition of exploitation and suffering, provides the support that may enable the people to overcome

their oppression, requires a minimum base on which such identification can occur. If that base is not available, 'promotion' of a new set of values is likely to become very rapidly the 'inculcation' of a new set of values, as the quotation above suggests. Kozol, in his study of the Cuban literacy campaign, lists several reasons for the success of the Cuban campaign.⁸⁸ They can be resumed as follows: the campaign was successful a) because of the context of an ongoing military revolution and the fresh memories of the victorious culmination of the revolution (establishment of central revolutionary power); b) because of the nature of the previous regime - 'energy exploded like hot anger that had been compressed within a tank for thirty or three hundred years';⁸⁹ c) because the campaign was a continuation of the 'work-and-struggle-in-the-mountains' symbolized by Che Guevara and Fidel Castro and by guerilla warfare in general; d) because of the charisma of Fidel and Che; and finally, e) because of the massive organizing effort by a close-knit vanguard of Marxists within the education ministry. Underlying all these reasons were, of course, the expectations created by the revolution:

'None of it works, in any case, unless it is allied with something else. That "something else" is what they did in Cuba. It is the promise of a better life for every man and woman in the land - and parallel actions which confirm to the participants that this indeed will be the case.' 90

A comparison of the context of revolutionary mobilization in Cuba with the situation of Portugal during the period 1974-5 lays bare the glaring fact that the revolution in Portugal did not originate in the Portuguese countryside.⁹¹ Additionally, there was no protracted armed struggle within continental Portugal.⁹²

The revolution itself was initiated by a military coup carried out by a group of low and middle ranking officers who, although seeking the support and approval of civil society, were to a considerable extent separated from it (the demands of the officers were mainly of a professional nature). Most of the activity which took place during the two-year revolutionary period was urban based, with the exception of the occupation of the latifúndia in the Alentejo region, but even there the farm workers constituted much more a rural proletariat than a peasant population.⁹³ Indeed, almost all the cultural mobilization activity of the revolutionary period was aimed at taking the revolution to the countryside.⁹⁴

Secondly, Portuguese culture has never been dominated by foreign culture - or by a foreign culture - to the extent that this was true in Cuba. Thirdly, and this crucial point has been referred to both above and in the previous chapter:

'There was no directly political force with hegemony over the (revolutionary) process. There was no centralized revolutionary power. Except for a time at the beginning of the process - at the time of the MFA Programme - there never occurred a definition of a line of advance in the revolution, by higher authorities - the MFA or the Government - that was concretized in practice.' 95

These three 'problems' alone made what Murteira has called the 'Cuban solution'⁹⁶ (i.e. in economic terms, central planning and comprehensive controls, including extensive nationalization, higher taxation, wage mobilization, mobilization of youth for work in the countryside, breaking away politically from the U.S.A.) a remote possibility for Portugal over both the medium and the long term. All this is well summed up by Dudley Seers, who, in addition, highlights the distinctions made above:

'It is hard to imagine a Cuban system without a political organization permeating the bureaucracy, to ensure that controls are operated without corruption and to induce the public to accept the sacrifice required. An organization of this type and on this scale emerges gradually during an armed struggle with both nationalist and social objectives, involving a large section of the population, judging from historical experience (e.g. the Soviet Union and China, as well as Cuba) and only during such a struggle.' 97

The fact that mobilization in Portugal was something other than the 'grand mobilization of revolutionary energies' now appears more understandable. United revolutionary mobilization could only have occurred if the question of power had been decided (favourably for mobilization) at an early stage. That it wasn't decided at an early stage probably made possible the 'uniqueness' of the Portuguese situation, which included the different contributions of 'alfabetização' and 'poder popular'. Once the question of power had been finally decided, the political parties rather than the currents of 'alfabetização' or 'poder popular' found themselves in control of the situation. This fact in itself signalled the end of revolutionary mobilization. Intellectuals of the 'alfabetização' and 'poder popular' currents recognized this defeat. With respect to the Cultural 'Dynamization' Campaign, Álvaro Cunhal, in his book on the revolution, argued that the Campaign had, from the beginning, been marked by a heavy dose of idealism. He did recognize some positive results, but on the whole,

'(...) not only were the ideas brought to the people gravely damaged by verbalistic propaganda, by the lack of presentation of a real perspective, and at times by a destructive ultra-left influence, but also very few measures were taken to defend the interests of the local populations against fascist local power. The local reactionary

"caciques" (bosses) continued without restraint to deceive and coerce local populations.' 98

In addition to his virulent denunciation of the 'pseudo-revolutionary politics of 'petty-bourgeois radicalism', Cunhal laid the blame for the defeat of revolutionary mobilization largely at the feet of the military Left, who he claimed,

'(...) as a whole, committed after the coups of 28 September and 11 March an error of huge proportions; they did not take the offensive with sufficient audacity, they did not know how to take advantage of the imbalance of forces in their favour, and the demoralizing and demobilizing surprise and effect of the defeat of the reactionary forces, to dislocate them definitively from their local and regional fiefdoms and from their positions within the state apparatus.' 99

João Martins Pereira, on the other hand, accused the MFA of having handed the task of mobilizing the masses to the political parties on a plate, thus ruining the dynamic of national liberation and undercutting all notions of 'revolutionary authority'.¹⁰⁰ Later, he was to write: 'The electoral-vertical logic and the social classes-horizontal logic are incompatible.'¹⁰¹ For Pereira, the blame for the defeat, not so much of revolutionary mobilization, but more for the failure to turn a 'pre-revolutionary situation' into a revolutionary one, lay in the 'occupation-of-the-state' strategy of the Portuguese Communist Party, in a situation where a) there was an initially premature and 'incorrect' definition of the revolution as 'national democratic', and where b) there occurred a 'privileging of state power over social power'¹⁰² (i.e. of 'alfabetização' over 'poder popular').

Ministerial Initiatives: The Student Civic Service and Civic

Polytechnic Education

With the reconstitution of the state under the leadership of the political parties all mobilizing activities were to suffer; some like the MFA 'Dynamization' Campaign were hit right away, others such as the Student Civic Service and Civic Polytechnic Education were doomed to disappear within the near future. 'Alfabetização' and 'poder popular' could not resist the onslaught of 'normalization' for long.

The Student Civic Service was conceived originally, according to the Minister of Education at the time, Vitor Magalhães Godinho, as an answer to the problem of 14,000 students with no place available for them within the university system:

'The number of new candidates seeking entrance into the university is 40% higher than the total number of students of this present academic year. With this "flood" coincides a necessary and profound cleansing of the teaching force; therefore we find ourselves confronting an impossible situation. We need qualified teachers and university installations are not elastic. To resolve this problem it is necessary to create, simultaneously, a short higher education ("ensino superior curto" - today called Higher Polytechnic Education) as preparation for certain professions linked to industry and administration, and also a "civic service" that will absorb the surplus, allowing some students to carry out practices in factories, in hospitals and to participate in literacy campaigns and life-long education.' 103

Further, the Student Civic Service was set up with the objective in mind to accomplish that task which naturally forms a part of most revolutions (and which in most cases, Godinho pointed out, involves the shutting down of higher education for at least a year): namely, the reorganization of the education

system, which includes the preparation of installations and teaching staff and the opportunity to 'give youth a bath of realism and a notion of practical work.'¹⁰⁴ In terms of 'alfabetização', such a reorganization was crucial. Godinho specified further what he meant by it:

'Civic Service is useful beyond the problem of a lack of a place within the University for two reasons: to bring students near the working classes and the world of work and to put students in contact with "authentic national realities" - to get them outside the two or three cities and the world of cafes, to the Portugal where television is unknown, where plows are wooden and drawn by oxen, where carts still roll on wooden wheels and where women ride on the backs of donkeys.' 105

The Student Civic Service was officially created by DL 270/75 of the 22nd of May, 1975; quite some time after Godinho had left the Education Ministry. Godinho, looking back on the event, explains in part the delay:

'(...) the novelty of the initiative, and the fact that we had little time to put it into operation, did not make it easy for us to set it up with the speed required; the concentrated action of several ministries came up against obstacles due to the lack of preparation for such an event; and the divided nature of institutionalized power in our country at that moment constituted a supplementary obstacle.' 106

Another important obstacle was student opposition to the whole project:

'Right-wing students objected to the scheme because it jeopardized the social privileges of the middle and upper class youth: the only way round the Student Civic Service was to give up going to university altogether. Left-wing students objected not to the principle,

but to its organization and planning by a capitalist government.' 107

It is true that in the beginning the scheme was considered to be workable on a voluntary basis, with (male) students perhaps being given some time off from compulsory military service. Later, however, with DL 363/75 of 11 July 1975, the Service was made obligatory for entrance into the University. In fact, not all Left-wing students objected to the scheme. The UEC (Communist Party student organization) supported it whole-heartedly (it had their 'unconditional support'). However, the student organizations centred on 'poder popular' argued that in addition to being a solution for the crisis of the 'bourgeois university', imposed from above, the Student Civic Service would 1) demobilize youth, pushing them out of the schools and universities (thus allowing the state to reclaim them?),¹⁰⁸ 2) would be merely a camouflaged means of obtaining cheap labour, and 3) would aggravate unemployment:

'In the opinion of F.R.E.P. (Revolutionary Federation of Portuguese Students), the Civic Service in a country with more than 100,000 unemployed is a means to secure the revolt of the workers against the students and is part of the tactic that consists in dividing the masses.' 109

Here, as earlier with the Cultural 'Dynamization' Campaign, we find a dichotomy of, on the one hand, a 'consolidation of the revolution' concern, and, on the other, a situation defined as 'pre-revolutionary'. The adherents of the latter position rejected any initiative coming from the state as 'bourgeois', or as an 'excuse for incompetence'. The alternative to the state was 'struggle with the workers', based on the call for the immediate entrance of all students into the University, and on the building of a school and culture at the service of the popular masses.

The role of the Communist Party, on the other hand, as supporter of the Civic Service, was recognized, in almost glowing terms, by Godinho:

'Even he who is not, nor ever was, Communist (...) cannot hesitate to recognize that the Communist movement constantly considered work, toil, the only way to construct a new society and thus opposed any easy option; thus the support given by UEC to the Ministry of Education and Culture on various occasions, thus sustaining a policy of firmness against the paralyzation of school work (...), which earned this tendency the right to be attacked as "collaborationist" (...).' 110

However, in September 1975, when it was decided that the Student Civic Service would be renewed for a second year, UEC radically changed its position on the Service (promptly earning the label 'opportunist'). For, according to UEC,

'(...) the revolutionary Civic Service that UEC had wished to support had turned out to be nothing more than a way of using students to give vaccinations (competing thus with nurses) or to carry out questionnaires (competing thus with civil servants).' 111

There is little doubt that UEC's change of heart reflected an awareness by the organization of the battle already lost at the level of ministries of the state. In fact, in September, 1975, the VIth Provisional Government took office. This was a Government dominated by members of the Socialist Party and the Social-Democratic Party. Thus, a Student Civic Service which had previously been seen by the UEC as a means to consolidate the revolution, suddenly became, as the 'poder popular' forces had been claiming from the beginning, pointless, merely 'an excuse for the incompetence of the Education Ministry'.¹¹²

On the whole, the Left couldn't complain about the objectives

set for the Student Civic Service, which, as we have seen, included guaranteeing students a more adequate integration into Portuguese society, by contributing to the reconversion of the education system, by fomenting the spirit of collective work, by motivating cooperation between workers and students and by helping the needy. But the context of the scheme, how, and by whom, it was going to be put into practice, were matters of crucial importance. Failure to comprehend this fact has resulted in statements such as the following:

'The curious thing about the Student Civic Service is that from Illich to Freinet, by way of Neill and the free school and the German pedagogues of the beginning of this century, all pedagogy has called for the school without walls, linked to the community. However, in our country when one attempts to tear the walls down, everyone becomes distressed. It is evident that our students are not prepared for such a change. We must remember that they come from the "liceu", which is a closed school. And that, unfortunately, they will go to a university that has made mistakes. But analysing the Student Civic Service coolly, without passion, let it be said that it is worth analysing in all its aspects, in order to understand the role that it could play in the training of youth.' 113

In spite of the factual truth of the individual elements of this statement, taken as a whole it totally ignores the struggles for power, the opposing strategies, that characterized the revolutionary period.¹¹⁴ The Student Civic Service was not as successful as it might have been for many of the same reasons that caused the MFA Campaign of Cultural 'Dynamization' to ultimately fail. We shall return to those reasons in our conclusion to this chapter.

One of the major feats of the revolution was the rapid progress

made towards the comprehensivisation of Portuguese secondary education. The first year of 'ensino unificado' was put into gear at the beginning of the school year 1975-6.¹¹⁵ An essential companion of 'unificado' was the new educational discipline Educação Cívica Politécnica.¹¹⁶ This new discipline made up part of the 7th and 8th years of schooling. It was termed an interdisciplinary area, with no programme, but with suggestions for possible activities, organized around the regional and community integration of the school, and around the union between study and productive work (it was to occupy one morning or afternoon of the school timetable per week). Civic Polytechnic Education had two major preoccupations according to its designer and instigator, Rui Grácio (Secretary of State for Pedagogic Orientation from July 1974 to July 1975):

- 1) To contribute to the education of school-aged youth through intervention aimed at transforming the immediate community, mobilizing its creative energies in a generous and open social practice (civic dimension);
- 2) To contribute to overcoming the anti-mony between an alienated knowledge of practical investment (dominant in the liceus) and an alienated practice of theoretical support (dominant in the technical schools), to contribute to the articulation of school study and social work, namely productive work (polytechnic dimension).¹¹⁷

The suggestions for practical activities made by Civic Polytechnic Education included study visits, data gathering, useful community work, the learning of technical skills, and cultural and sports activities. Each school had the freedom to define the methodology it wished to employ. Planning the activities chosen was left to the school also. No single teacher was in

charge of the discipline but rather responsibility was allotted to a group of teachers from a variety of disciplines.¹¹⁸

The relevance and importance of the discipline Civic Polytechnic Education can only be judged in terms of the contribution it made to the new and increased significance of education in Portugal after the April revolution. During the Veiga Simão epoch Portuguese national identity was still very much linked to the idea of 'greater Portugal', with its overseas possessions (if not empire). This fact, paradoxically, contributed greatly to the dearth of knowledge about, and lack of activity in, the local community. Thus, national cultural identity was restricted to a minority of the population. With the April revolution and the reawakening of local culture, which meant, paraphrasing the words of Eduardo Lourenço,¹¹⁹ that in the hustle-bustle of constructing democracy the Portuguese people were absent from their own decolonization process, comprehension and celebration of national cultural identity topped the list of priorities. Civic Polytechnic Education which aimed at

'(...) channelling the action of youth towards the knowledge of the problems of their community, in search of solutions and the execution of tasks of a social character', 120

acted as a platform, and as a reminder, of the social and egalitarian meaning of the comprehensivisation process. For, 'knowing the community' and 'actively intervening in the community' were ideas that together brought

'(...) the liberation of initiative and of speech, incentive for the concerted action of people and groups, a will to assume individual and community responsibility, and increased esteem for the socialist ethic of work.' 121

As such, Civic Polytechnic Education was a central discipline to a possible new project for the school, conceivably built around the theme 'Celebrate and Build the Homeland',¹²² which insisted on integrating local culture within the school in order to 'fazer Portugal' (literally 'make Portugal'), in order to construct a kind of 'everyday patriotism'.¹²³

In Chapter 5 we shall discuss further the ingredients making up a possible project for the school in Portugal. But, unfortunately, we shall find that in a period of 'normalization' Civic Polytechnic Education has disappeared from view. Like the Campaign of Cultural 'Dynamization' and the Student Civic Service, it, too, suffered the consequences during normalization of being a mobilization activity conceived to consolidate the revolution. As a result, and in spite of many qualities, or potential qualities, that it may have displayed, it came to an abrupt end in September 1976 by way of Ministerial dispatch. But Civic Polytechnic Education, unlike both the 'Dynamization' Campaign and the Student Civic Service, continues, arguably, to haunt the education system, for it gave the system an element of 'Portugalization' that the normalization process has so far been unable to replace. Hopefully, this will become clearer through our discussion of the problem of education and national independence in Part 3.

Summary and Conclusion

'Yet, paradoxically, and this is its true originality, rarely has a military revolution by soldiers and sailors, been so civilian.' 124

If during most of 1975 Portugal was 'moving towards socialism', certainly after the events of November 25th, 1975, Portugal began to move gradually away from it. The political crisis of 1975 was thus finally resolved, and typically it was resolved through a military intervention. But although the final resolution had military overtones, the events leading up to it were, as we have argued, much broader in nature. Some commentators have stressed, however, that mobilization in general was never a success during the revolution precisely because of the dependence of the whole process on the Armed Forces; thus the revolution was

'(...) marked by juridical and ideological affirmations and proclamations without effective relation to social reality', hence the '(...) need of the MFA to legitimate this or that political intervention by way of the invocation of a document, which immediately became a new Gospel.' 125

Mobilization was, therefore, according to this argument, out of phase with social reality. It was out of phase with social reality, and thus condemned to failure, because of the basic weakness of the Portuguese class structure,¹²⁶ because of the inorganic nature of the Portuguese social movement, because of the heavy influence of the petty bourgeoisie in Portuguese society. The MFA arrived as the 'saviour of the people', as the 'petty-bourgeois messiah', to resolve problems that the groups, associations and parties of civil society were unable to resolve by themselves. Consequently, those mass phenomena that appeared during the two-year revolutionary period were bound to be 'conjunctural, episodic and inorganic'.¹²⁷

In effect, this critique bears some resemblance to the one

we made above. There, we argued that the fact that the revolution had to be taken to the countryside - rather than originating there, or being grounded there - created a grave identification problem for the MFA. However, that being said, the analysis of Saraiva and Silva tends to separate the MFA and civil society, particularly after the 25th of April coup d'etat, in a way that is totally unacceptable. Although it is true, as recognized above, that such a separation was indeed a fact before the April coup, when the MFA was preparing its entrance onto the scene, it is certainly difficult to see how one can argue that it existed during the months of the revolution when increasingly the MFA identified itself with, and responded to, civil society. Indeed, it was the very fact that the divisions and contradictions of civil society were likewise manifested within the MFA that helped defeat the MFA as a vanguard organization. Perhaps, in fact, precisely contrary to the conclusions of Saraiva and Silva, the offending characteristic of the political forces supporting both 'alfabetização' and 'poder popular' was their neglect of, their tendency to underrate, the strength, the vitality and the resistance of both the state and civil society in Portugal. This would help to explain, as we saw in the last chapter, their relatively underdeveloped notions of what constituted socialism and also their deficient theoretical analyses of the impact that a maverick Portugal would have on the international community. It would also help to explain the existence of two conflicting strategies, one based on occupying and/or manipulating the state to achieve its own ends, and the other based on total opposition to the state.

We began this chapter referring to two concrete elements of

the uncoordinated, but revolutionarily self-conscious movement aimed at creating, at developing, a new rationale for education based on the need of the local community to 're-identify', to 're-discover', itself, on the effort to overcome urban/rural differences in schooling and on the struggle against the mental/manual division of labour resulting in part from different forms and contents of schooling. The first of these elements was the democratic management of schools and the second the centrally-planned and controlled mobilizing activities of the revolutionary period which included the MFA Cultural 'Dynamization' Campaign, the Student Civic Service and Civic Polytechnic Education. We then set out to specify the nature of these latter activities through an understanding of the limits placed on them by the nature of the revolution itself. We concluded that their main dynamic was one of 'alfabetização', that is, a process of 'revolutionary mobilization' consisting of the social and cultural consolidation of political and economic changes having taken place within the administration of the state. Further, we argued that this process involved bringing into the revolution those outside it, by taking (transporting) the revolution (and education and culture) to them.¹²⁸ 'Poder popular's' critique of this process was essentially the argument that 'real' social change could only come about through autonomous popular initiative in the self-organization of educational and cultural action.¹²⁹

The undefined nature of the revolution and the political divisions within the MFA, plus the general weakness of the state (referred to also in Chapter 3), made revolutionary mobilization something less than the 'grand mobilization of revolutionary energies'. Consequently, the impact of the MFA Cultural

'Dynamization' Campaign, and of both the Student Civic Service and Civic Polytechnic Education (not to mention other such activities mentioned in note 10 above), was insufficient to guarantee the creation of a new rationale for Portuguese education. However, that being said, it is by no means certain that the overall long-term impact of these mobilization activities will be insignificant.¹³⁰ The very violence of the regime of 'normalization' that came into effect with the taking of power by the 1st Constitutional Government emphasizes this fact.

After a tremendous period of inclusion, starting with the Weiga Simão Reform period in 1970 and stretching through the concrete realizations of the revolutionary period - including the setting up of the democratic management of schools, the MFA Campaign of Cultural 'Dynamization', the Student Civic Service, the progress made towards 'ensino unificado' (comprehensivisation of secondary schools) and Civic Polytechnic Education, the 'contact activities' of the Escolas do Magistério Primário, the explosion of nursery-school education (popular and official), the setting-up of cooperatives in the field of special education (the 'CERCIS'), the founding and expansion of trade unions for teachers (autonomous from the state) and a career structure for teachers (the impetus for which was strengthened by the revolutionary period), etc. - the regime of normalization must find itself, in the end, largely determined by the summary of the mobilizing events of the first half of the decade of the seventies. The most it can do is try to limit the effects of those events.¹³¹ The revolutionary period in Portugal, precisely like that 'something else' in Cuba, made people not only aware of the desperately inadequate state of the education system and how much

they nevertheless wanted entry to it, but also made them aware of its potential (and of the potential of education in its widest sense). In this sense, if the 1950s and the 1960s brought out into the open and extended the link between education and industrial development, in terms of the industrial modernization of Portugal, the 1970s made clear the link between democracy and education in Portugal, in terms of a form of schooling that is community based, meaning 1) that education, and culture more generally, play a vital role in constructing and maintaining a democratic society, and 2) that for education in Portugal to be democratic, it must be participatory and egalitarian (striving for equality).

Footnotes to Chapter 4

1. The full quotation from which this title is derived was published in the Boletim Informativo do MFA on the 12th of November, 1974 (having first appeared at a press conference given by members of the MFA on 25 October 1974). In full, it reads: 'Once more, in perfect unity with the Armed Forces, we shall win the cultural battle which is more than simply that which books may teach us. Schools will empty into the streets and the streets into the schools, through the playing of musical bands, folklore, orchestras, songs, dances, poetry, theatre, circus, cinema, handicraft activities, the plastic arts.' (Emphasis in the original.)
2. Eduardo Lourenço (1977), in Prefácio: um Homem do (nosso) Destino, pages 9-10; in Otelio Saraiva de Carvalho, Alvorada em Abril, Amadora: Bertrand.
3. Alberto Melo, head of the Directorate-General for Life-Long Education within the Ministry of Education from October 1975 to July 1976, termed it a 'process of discovery': 'A new system of adult education had to be able to develop itself, taking as a point of departure the strongly motivated adult engaged in a profound process of discovery of himself, of his society and his world.' see Alberto Melo (1978), "Portugal's Experiences of Reform Through Popular Initiative", in Convergence, Toronto, (1), p. 30.
4. see, for example, note 67, Chapter 1; note 48, Chapter 3.
5. see Wini Breines (1980), "Community and Organization: The New Left and Michels' 'Iron Law'", in Social Problems, Vol. 27, no. 4, April. Breines's distinction between 'strategic' and 'pre-figurative' politics, although not wholly appropriate to the Portuguese situation, does help clarify the currents we have identified as 'alfabetização' and 'poder popular'. It is a distinction not wholly applicable because of the partisan nature of many of the activities and struggles of the revolutionary

period (as opposed to the oppositional, protest-oriented social movement of America's student Left described by Breines). It is helpful because it does put the accent on a dichotomy (similar, in fact, to the one the authors of Unpopular Education have identified in the English context as 'substitutionism'/'statism' - see the Introduction, note 44) very evident in the Portuguese situation: that is, either struggle was seen in terms of an alternative to state organization and direction (considered both 'capitalist' and ineffective), or it was seen as an extension and, at the same time, as a possible new form of state organization and direction. The problem, as we shall see below, for the strategists of the latter form of struggle was the unclear nature of the Portuguese revolution. Hence, they could never be sure whether they were aiding the creation of something new, or whether, ultimately, they were protecting and prolonging something with which they basically disagreed. This in part, explained their susceptibility to the arguments and practices of those openly opposed to forms of struggle relying on the state. Such susceptibility, and sympathy, was eventually concretised in the attempt to turn the MFA into a liberation movement, and in the short-lived FUR (Frente Unitária Revolucionária) which appeared in August 1975.

6. The phrase 'poder popular' was coined by the organization M.E.S. (Movimento da Esquerda Socialista - Movement of the Socialist Left) which, although a small group, achieved considerable influence during the revolutionary period both within the MFA and among secondary and university teachers.
7. Wini Breines, op. cit., p. 422.
8. see the Introduction to this thesis.
9. see Chapter 3, p. 114.
10. Allied to these projects were the measures carried out in the Teachers Training Colleges (Escolas do Magistério Primário), mentioned in note 53 of Chapter 3, the move towards the

comprehensivisation of Portuguese secondary education (known as 'unificado'), and projects such as 'Productive Work in Basic Education and the Opening of the School to the Surrounding Environment' (Trabalho Produtivo no Ensino Básico e Abertura da Escola ao Meio Social), which was initiated by the Directorate-General of Basic Education (see Lisete Castro (1982), "'Trabalhos Manuais' e Política da Educação. Evolução da Terminologia no Ensino Preparatório e Unificado", in Análise Psicológica, 4 (11): pp. 497-526).

11. As we pointed out in Chapter 2, this process had already begun under Veiga Simão.
12. Eduardo Lourenço, op. cit., p. 13. In an important sense, as we shall discover below, the difference between 'alfabetização' and 'poder popular' was precisely the different ways in which they conceived carrying out this 'democratic restoration'. In essence, for 'alfabetização', 'giving the Portuguese people the political right to speak' meant acting as a vehicle for the transportation of the content of such speech (i.e. 'culture', 'education') to the people. This would enable the consolidation of the new power structures. For 'poder popular', it meant essentially 'letting the people speak their minds', by starting with 'their givens: songs, poetry, proverbs, local history (etc.)'. Effectively, 'poder popular' considered the methods of 'alfabetização' an 'emasculatation of a rich and dynamic social reality' by 'shutting it up in a box of preconceived pedagogical ideas'. see Alberto Melo, op. cit., pp. 36-7.
13. see, for example, the eligibility lists for posts within the regime of the democratic management of schools. In Appendix V; DL 735-A/74, Article 5.
14. Excesses may have occurred. This is obviously not meant to be an apology for those excesses.
15. V.M. Godinho, in Opção, no. 21, 16 September 1976, p. 25;

see also, V.M. Godinho (1975), A Educação num Portugal em Mudança, Lisbon: Edições Cosmos. The question arises, considering what was said in Chapter 3 about the spontaneous purging process that developed within the schools and universities, to what extent Godinho, as Minister of Education, was simply recognizing a fait accompli.

16. Indeed, the means of mass communication took on great importance during the revolutionary period, at least so it was thought: 'In all the complex process that would continue until 25 November 1975, control of the "mass media" was to become an irritating obsession for all forces present; on the 28th of September, the 11th of March and on the 25th of November, the principal theatre of operations would involve the means of communication.' see José Medeiros Ferreira (1983), Ensaio Histórico Sobre a Revolução do 25 de Abril, Lisbon: Imprensa Nacional (Casa da Moeda), p. 23.
17. see DL 203/74 of 15 May, 1974.
18. Another important influence was the work of Paulo Freire in Brazil. In practically all 'alfabetização' activities, Freire's methods were either used or referred to. This fact presents us with an interesting, apparent, contradiction, in the sense that centrally-planned and controlled activities were 'credentialized', and put into practice, with, and on the basis of, the work of a man normally associated with a local, 'popular' dynamic. Alberto Melo and Ana Benavente refer, in fact, to this 'apparent' contradiction in their comments on the 'National Literacy Plan' of 1975 (Plano Nacional de Alfabetização). Here they argue that 'qualitative' and 'quantitative' aspects tended to get mixed up, the latter eventually dominating the former. A detailed study of the way Freire's methods were employed during the revolutionary period, and the rationale supporting the use of his methods, would certainly provide a useful contribution to the debate on 'conscientização'. For Melo and Benavente's comments on the PNA, see A. Melo and A. Benavente (1978), Experiments in Popular Education in Portugal,

1974-76, UNESCO, Education and Studies and Documents, no. 29.

19. see Mário Murteira (1979), "The Present Economic Situation: Its Origins and Prospects", in Contemporary Portugal, L.S. Graham and H.M. Makler (eds.), Austin: University of Texas Press, p. 337.
20. see Mário Murteira (1975), "Sobre o Conceito da Independência Económica", in Análise Social, no. 44, especially pp. 527-8; p. 532. The complexity of the situation in revolutionary Portugal - including in addition to the lack of political consensus, the 'original' role of the military and the particular characteristics of a small, dependent economy (making it particularly vulnerable to external pressure) (see Clive Thomas (1974), Dependence and Transformation, New York: Monthly Review Press) - and the rapidity with which it changed, made any definition of the economic system 'necessarily confusing', a situation exacerbated by the lack of study on transition situations. Murteira points out that Marxists, in particular, have spent much more time on a critique of capitalism than on 'an analysis of a policy of transition after or beyond capitalism and imperialism.' see M. Murteira (1982), "Estratégias de Desenvolvimento e Escolhas Tecnológicas", in Economia e Socialismo, no. 56, Winter. Another attempt, by a Marxist, at defining the economic situation was produced later by Álvaro Cunhal (in 1976) who claimed that, in Portugal, 'capitalist relations of production are still predominant but not determinant.' see A. Cunhal (1976), A Revolução Portuguesa: o passado e o futuro, Lisbon: Edições Avante.
21. M. Murteira, 1975, op. cit., p. 533.
22. *ibid.*
23. Thus he suggested the need for a Strategy B, never to be elaborated, which would take into consideration means of combat ing such 'aggressive forms'. see Murteira, *ibid.*

24. M. Murteira (1976), "As Integrações Económicas na Europa: alguns dados e perspectivas actuais", in Análise Social, no. 45, p. 283. (Emphasis in the original.)
25. see the discussion in the following chapter of IMF intervention in the Portuguese economy. see also the discussion of the feasibility of strategies A and C from a planner's point of view; in Manfred Bienefeld and Dudley Seers (1976), "Industrial Planning and the Use of External Assistance in Portugal", a report to the Ministry of Industry and Technology under the OECD technical assistance programme.
26. The exception of course being the Alentejo region.
27. There may be tension here: how effectively can centralized organization implement 'participatory forms of education'? This is discussed again further below.
28. João Martins Pereira was Secretary of State for Industry and Technology in the IVth Provisional Government (March-July, 1975). Politically he was, and is, identified with the 'revolutionary Left'. see João Martins Pereira (1976), O Socialismo, a Transição e o Caso Português, Amadora: Bertrand.
29. *ibid.*, p. 185.
30. *ibid.*, pp. 197-8 (emphasis in the original).
31. From the Daily evening newspaper A Capital, 10 May 1974, cited in Pereira, *ibid.*, p. 208.
32. see, for example, Charles Downs (1980), "Community Organization, Political Change and Urban Policy: Portugal 1974-6", Ph.D. Dissertation, Sociology, University of California, Berkeley; also Nancy Bermeo (1982), "The Revolution within the Revolution: Workers Control in Rural Portugal", Ph.D. Dissertation, The Department of Political Science, Yale University, New Haven.
33. For it is the unity of the state which distinguishes it

from civil society, and if 'this unity lies in its monopoly of physical coercion, both internally and externally vis-a-vis other nation states', then a sudden disappearance of such 'monopoly of physical coercion' puts the boundaries of the state in question. see John Urry (1981), The Anatomy of Capitalist Societies, London and Basing stoke: Macmillan Press, p. 103. Of course, after the coup of 25 April 1974, it was the Armed Forces Movement, the 'MFA', which, at least initially, generated the consent (and, however unprepared and divided, held the threat of coercion) which in turn enabled Portuguese society to function (in terms of Government and state administration).

34. Charles Downs refers in his work to the 'old state': the urban housing movement 'developed a practice and a consciousness of itself as an alternative to the old state' (in C. Downs (1979), "Comissões de Moradores and Urban Struggles in Revolutionary Portugal", p. 35 of a paper presented in Durham, N.H., June). This tells us little, however, about the complexity of the state in the revolutionary period, a complexity which drove writers Vieira and Oliveira to conclude: 'It is difficult to define exactly how the phenomenon of "poder popular" manifested itself in Portugal. But its existence was proven daily through the functioning of its organs by the people. There finally arrived a moment when there was no sector of society that was not influenced by the expression of popular will, including the domain of justice where popular judgements were carried out.' see M. Vieira and D. Oliveira (1976), O Poder Popular em Portugal, Coimbra: Centelha. For a look at the relationship between justice and popular judgements see Boaventura Sousa Santos (1979), "Popular Justice, Dual Power and Socialist Strategy", in B. Fine, R. Kinsey, J. Lea and S. Piccotto (eds.), Capitalism and the Rule of the Law, London: Hutchinson.
35. Pereira, op. cit., p. 248.
36. *ibid.*, p. 254.

37. *ibid.*, p. 259.
38. Vital Moreira, unlike most of the leaders of the PCP, did not come into the revolution from a long period in clandestinity or after having spent many years in jail. Moreira later became known as an expert in Constitutional law, playing an important role for the Communist Party in both the formulation of the Constitution of 1976 and in its revision in 1982.
39. V. Moreira (1975), Prefácio (Preface) to As Ditaduras: O Regime Revolucionário, by Fernando Catroga, Coimbra: Atlântida, especially pp. VII-VIII.
40. *ibid.*
41. One should point out here, however, that the Portuguese Communist Party had removed from its programme the phrase 'dictatorship of the proletariat' in October, 1974 (during the 7th Extraordinary Congress).
42. Moreira, *op. cit.*, p. XI.
43. *ibid.*, pp. XI, XII.
44. see Documento-Guia Povo-MFA of July 1975.
45. Indeed, the assassination of Allende, and the crushing of Unidade Popular only seven months previously, were events weighing heavily on the Portuguese during the revolutionary period.
46. Moreira's account is, in fact, necessarily brief (it being only a preface). It is, nevertheless, very useful, for the explosive pace of the revolution left little time for reflection. Hence, it is one of the few works written by a Communist Party member that tries to justify, or even outline, a particular strategy vis-a-vis the revolution. Cunhal's account of the

revolution appeared in 1976, but it offered very little on the strategy employed by the PCP during the revolutionary period.

47. 'Eventually', for as we have seen, during the first year of the revolution, there was considerable support, particularly among sectors of the Socialist Party, for more radical solutions.
48. One should say mainly the Northeastern regions of the country, for the campaign also reached the Azores. The organization of Portuguese students was called 'Pro-Unep' (Pro-União dos Estudantes Portugueses). The students came from a variety of Leftist movements, including the Portuguese Communist Party. Although the 'campaign' was not organized at official level, the students did receive some travel money and a subsistence allowance. Methods were based mainly on Paulo Freire's work (see note 18 above) which were taught in short 'crash' courses. In actual fact, the students' effort met with considerable resistance from the local population. see Lisete de Matos, Alfabetização e Educação de Adultos no Período Compreendido Entre Abril de 1974 e a Actualidade, Study for PNAEBA, Ministry of Education and Scientific Investigation, Lisbon, June 1979.
49. Both are referred to above, the MFA Programme in this chapter, the Portuguese Communist Party Programme in Chapter 3.
50. in Portuguese: "Projecto de Decreto-Lei Estatuindo o Plano Nacional de Alfabetização", 1975, Directorate-General for Life Long Education, Ministry of Education and Culture.
51. ibid.
52. The first of two coup attempts by former Portuguese President and General, António de Spínola. The second attempt took place on March 11, 1975 (see note 84, Chapter 3).
53. see Reinhard Bendix (1964), Nation-Building and Citizenship:

Studies of Our Changing Order, New York: John Wiley and Sons, p. 87.

54. Jonathon Kozol quoting Dr. Mier Febles, Cuban educator, (1978), "A New Look at the Literacy Campaign in Cuba", Harvard Educational Review, August, p. 144.
55. This set of principles is referred to by R.F. Arnove in his study of the Nicaraguan Literacy Crusade of 1980. They also sum up perfectly the new set of social values constituting 'socialism' in Portugal. see R.F. Arnove (1981), "The Nicaraguan National Literacy Crusade of 1980", in Comparative Education Review, vol. 25, no. 2, June.
56. J. Kozol, op. cit., p. 145.
57. Vasco Gonçalves, Prime Minister at the time, in speech to a crowd in Sabugo, Portugal. see p. 140, Vasco Gonçalves (1976), Discursos, Conferências de Imprensa, Entrevistas, Oporto: G.S. Bras.
58. The unit of the MFA responsible for the Campaign was the 5th Division of the E.M.G.F.A.
59. We have made several references to resistance to the revolution, particularly in the northern rural regions of the country, in Chapters 1 and 3 and also in this present one.
60. Ramiro Correia, Pedro Soldado and João Marujo (1976), MFA: Dinamização Cultural; Acção Cívica, Biblioteca Ulmeiro, p. 32. The organizers of the Campanha da Dinamização Cultural explained this fact in the following way: '(...) perhaps the principal (reason) resided in the fact that existing cultural life was negative rather than positive; also because the most valid elements, those most interested in reviving culture, were occupied with more defined political ends, at a trade union or at a political party level, thus being little involved in associative organizations.' see Correia, et.al., p.32.

61. M. Vieira and D. Oliveira, op. cit., p. 40. N. Poulantzas elaborates considerably on two of these points arguing that two decisive weaknesses of the revolutionary process were 1) the absence of class organizations, implanted and powerful, capable of providing for the hegemony of the popular masses in the democratic process; and 2) the absence of an alliance between the organizations of the Left with a base in a programme and in objectives clearly defined by the process of democratization. see N. Poulantzas (1976), Crisis of the Dictatorships, London: New Left Books.
62. The phrase belongs to Rona M. Fields (1975), The Portuguese Revolution and the Armed Forces Movement, New York: Praeger, p. 97.
63. J.M. Pereira, op. cit., p. 195; also p. 207 (meaning, 'From then on the officers of the MFA began to define themselves (...); the relative homogeneity of (officer) class began to dissolve' - p. 195).
64. R. Correia, et.al., op. cit., p. 9. Cláudio Teixeira and Anselmo Anibel argue the Campaign was in many ways a response to the so-called 'Spinolist silent majority' (associated with the 'mini-coup' of 28 September 1974 - see note 51 above). Further, it aimed at digging deep into social relations in order to uproot clientelist networks (Cunhal also makes reference to this fact below). see Cláudio Teixeira and Anselmo Anibel (1976), "As Alterações Políticas em Portugal em 1974 e 1975 e as Organizações Populares de Base", Seara Nova, no. 1564, February.
65. The PNA, National Literacy Plan, appeared in May 1975. It is expressed in the Esquema de Ante-Projecto de Plano Nacional de Alfabetização a Nível Nacional which became the "Projecto de Decreto-Lei Estatuindo o Plano Nacional de Alfabetização" of July 1975 (Directorate-General for Life-Long Education, Ministry of Education and Culture). With regard to the literacy campaign as model for the Cultural 'Dynamization' Campaign, Rona Fields states: 'The MFA's Programme for Cultural 'Dynamization'

sprang from idealistic roots close to the source of the students' project' (of the summer of 1974 - see note 47 above), and Lisete de Matos argues in her compilation of 'alfabetização' activities during the revolutionary period, that the MFA Campaign 'had great affinities with the National Literacy Plan (PNA)'. see Rona M. Fields, op. cit., p. 98, and Lisete de Matos, op. cit., p. 2.

66. For the sorts of cultural associations referred to in the objectives of the MFA Campaign, see Alberto Melo and Ana Benavente (1978), Experiments in Popular Education in Portugal, 1974-76, UNESCO, Education studies and documents, no. 29, especially Chapter II, entitled, "Let Everything Spring Up from the Root, Like Plants", p. 15.
67. Sessions were also organized for immigrants. Interestingly, the only country which refused entry to the MFA campaigners was the U.S.A.. see Jorge Correia Jesuino (1979), "Accion Comunicologica en el Proceso Revolucionario Portugues", in Jose Vida Beneyto (ed.), Alternativos Populares: a las Comunicaciones de Massa, Centro de Investigaciones Sociologicas, Madrid.
68. At one point it was the newspaper with the highest number of copies sold per issue (of course, it was only published twice a month).
69. J. Correia Jesuino, op. cit., p. 2. Thus the campaign showed itself sensitive to the dynamics of 'poder popular'.
70. *ibid.*, p. 6.
71. R. Correia, et.al., op. cit., p. 76.
72. From the MFA Boletim, extracted from a press conference given on 25 October 1974.
73. *ibid.* (Emphasis in the original.)

74. Correia Jesuino, op. cit., p. 7.
75. Correia Jesuino, *ibid.*, p. 8. Certainly this 'ambiguous pedagogy' about the rules of the democratic game was symptomatic of the divisions within the MFA. These divisions reached a climax of clarity in August, 1975, when the 'Documento dos Nove' (Document of the Nine) was published. Former premier Marcello Caetano, in Brazil at the time, explained in his book on the Portuguese Constitutions, that the 'Documento dos Nove' (drawn up by nine members of the MFA, including Melo Antunes) rejected a) the Eastern European model of society (supposedly dominant among the supporters of the then Prime Minister, Vasco Gonçalves), and b) anarchism and populism ('representative' of the third current within the MFA: i.e. that of Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho and 'poder popular'). The latter, argued Caetano, would 'lead inevitably to the catastrophic dissolution of the state, in a developmental phase when without state, no political project is viable.' see Marcello Caetano (1981), Constituições Portuguesas, Lisbon/São Paulo: Verbo, p. 138.
76. Correia Jesuino, op. cit.
77. Boletim Informativo do MFA, no. 8, January 14, 1975.
78. *ibid.*, no. 12, March 11, 1975.
79. *ibid.*, no. 14, April 8, 1975.
80. *ibid.*, no. 15, April 22, 1975.
81. Correia Jesuino, op. cit., p. 9.
82. *ibid.*
83. see António Rebelo de Sousa and G. Oliveira Martins (1978), Democracia Incompleta, Viseu: Fundação Social-Democrata Oliveira Martins, p. 54.

84. The words are Natália Correia's, poetess and later M.P. for the Social-Democratic Party (PSD) (from the editorial of Vida Mundial, no. 1886, 6 May 1976). An even more extreme example of rejection of the 'new values', which when added to the decolonization process, so it was argued, meant nothing less than the 'loss of identity for the Portuguese people', is found in the following dramatic passage from the work of Adriano Moreira: '(...) the third-worldism that threatens us (...) will truly mean the momento mori of the Portuguese fatherland. In the sequence of the total unconditional surrender to the victorious revolt of the enemies of yesterday, this third-worldism does not only repudiate exemplary patrimony but proceeds in the attempt to pay a final and supreme homage to the victors, which will be the Africanization of the Portuguese people.' see Adriano Moreira (1977), O Novíssimo Príncipe: Análise da Revolução, Lisbon and Braga: Intervenção, pp. 194-5) (Adriano Moreira, Minister of the Overseas Territories from 1961 to 1962 - see note 50, Chapter 2 - is at present a leading member and M.P. for the CDS, Portugal's Christian Democratic Party). Rui Grácio, however, has argued that changing political culture through mobilization activities was never a simple attempt to inculcate new values through a 'one-culture' approach. Thus the arguments of the electorally victorious political parties (particularly the Socialist Party) in this direction were nothing more, according to Grácio, than a caricature of the mobilizing activities actually put into practice. He cites as a most scandalous example the declarations made by newly-elected Prime Minister, Mário Soares, on the presentation of the Programme of the 1st Constitutional Government after the 25th of April, namely: 'We cannot accept that Luís de Camões be purged; that texts by Camões be replaced by texts of Samora Machel or other revolutionary leaders in school textbooks.' see R. Grácio (1981), Educação e Processo Democrático em Portugal, Lisbon: Livros Horizonte, p. 49. Grácio argues that such 'deliberate falsification' of the practices of mobilization activities, in order to create an image of the revolutionary process as 'de-Nation-alization', could only have been conceived within a policy of 'normalization' where the

real intent was 'less one of protecting Camões and more one of harming Samora Machel'. And through him, one might add, Álvaro Cunhal and the Portuguese Communist Party, Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho, M.E.S., P.R.P., etc., etc. see *ibid.*, p. 55; also pp. 30-32.

85. Boletim Informativo do MFA, no. 18, May 20, 1975.
86. J. Correia Jesuino, *op. cit.*, p. 9.
87. see Correia Jesuino for the argument that the idea of the MFA as a 'liberation movement', approved by the MFA in July 1975 (see Documento-Guia-Povo-MFA, July 1975), grew out of the Campanha da Dinamização Cultural (*op. cit.*, p. 7). The rationale behind the liberation movement idea was precisely the one of providing a direct link between the MFA and the people (thus bypassing obstacles at the level of the Government/state administration). Hence, Mário Murteira was to comment on the short-lived Vth Provisional Government (July-August, 1975): 'The Vth Provisional Government was not an alternative, but merely breathing space to allow for the unification of political and military power. At this time there appeared a project for the formation of a popular unity front.' in Flama, no. 1440, 1975. In fact, the time for alliances between organizations of the Left had already passed. The attempt to create a national liberation movement out of the MFA, in July 1975, thus looked essentially like a means of avoiding the electoral results of the previous April.
88. J. Kozol, *op. cit.* The Cuban literacy campaign was particularly effective in reducing illiteracy among adults. According to UNESCO figures, illiteracy dropped from a rate of 23.6% of the population to 3.9%. see also R.F. Arnove, *op. cit.*, p. 244, for figures on both Nicaragua and Cuba.
89. J. Kozol, *ibid.*, p. 144.
90. *ibid.*, p. 142.

91. And particularly not in the countryside where the Campaign encountered most difficulty, i.e. in the minifundia regions of the Centre and North.
92. Which is not to deny the importance of the colonial wars to the Portuguese revolution, a point which has been stressed by many authors, some of whom have been referred to in previous chapters. In terms of the colonial wars, the revolutionary process did of course begin in the countryside, in the countryside of Angola, of Mozambique and of Guinea-Bissau. There, a protracted, armed struggle did take place. For José António Saraiva and Vicente Jorge Silva, who adopt a rather cynical view, Cultural 'Dynamization' was simply a pretext for providing the MFA with 'ideological armour'. Thus, it had to do 'with the ghosts of Africa - with the colonial experience of the Portuguese army.' see J.A. Saraiva and V.J. Silva (1977), O 25 de Abril Visto da História, Amadora: Bertrand, p. 199.
93. see Manuel Villaverde Cabral (1978), "Agrarian Structure and Recent Rural Movements in Portugal", The Journal of Peasant Studies, vol. 5, no. 4, July.
94. Which, as we have pointed out, does not mean that the 'countryside' always welcomed the arrival of the revolution. see note 66 of Chapter 1 and note 53 of Chapter 3 for examples of resistance to the revolution, particularly in the North.
95. Álvaro Cunhal (1976), A Revolução Portuguesa: o passado e o futuro, Lisbon: Edições Avante, p. 125.
96. Known during the revolutionary period as the 'via cubana'. see M. Murteira, 1979, op. cit., p. 341.
97. Murteira quoting Dudley Seers, *ibid.* (Emphasis in the original.)
98. A. Cunhal, op. cit., p. 154.
99. *ibid.* (Emphasis in the original.)

100. J.M. Pereira, in an article in the newspaper O Jornal, 27 June 1975.
101. J.M. Pereira, 1976, op. cit., p. 203.
102. ibid.
103. V.M. Godinho, in an interview with the newspaper O Expresso, 28 December, 1974.
104. see V.M. Godinho, 1975, op. cit., p. 224.
105. V.M. Godinho, in the periodical Opção, no. 22, 23 September 1976. The 'authentic Portugal' that Godinho refers to composed the raw material to be worked by 'alfabetização'. The MFA Boletim commented: 'This situation (i.e. the backward conditions of the Portuguese interior) exists here in Europe and it is therefore almost paradoxical that Portugal cannot be considered a European country. In these 89,000 square kilometres of Europe, there exists underdevelopment, there exists a piece of the Third World, there are evident memories of fascism.' Boletim, no. 12, March 11, 1975, p. 3.
106. V.M. Godinho, 1975, op. cit., p. 208.
107. see Phil Mailer (1977), Portugal, The Impossible Revolution, London: Solidarity, p. 166.
108. In a similar vein, Alberto Melo argued that the literacy campaign was demobilizing, in the sense that it 'tends to separate the "educated" from those who are not, rather than fostering the common enterprise (...).' see A. Melo, 1978, op. cit., pp. 36-7.
109. P. Mailer, op. cit. For the position taken by the 'Movimento da Esquerda Socialista' (MES) on the Student Civic Service, see Appendix VIII. Representatives of the business community argued the trouble with the Student Civic Service was that

it would delay the training of technicians needed for economic development. The extreme-Right was later to term it 'a Gonçalvist abortion guaranteeing obscurantism' (the reference being to Vasco Gonçalves, Prime Minister of the IInd, IIIrd, IVth and Vth Provisional Governments). see M. Caetano, op. cit., p. 136, who refers to the period which followed the 11th of March 1975 as 'The Dictatorship of Gonçalvist Terror' (A Ditadura do Terror Gonçalvista).

110. V.M. Godinho, 1975, op. cit., p. 223.
111. see article in the newspaper O Expresso, December 3, 1975. (Emphasis added.)
112. *ibid.*
113. Professor Francisco Simon, who was responsible for providing information about the Student Civic Service, in Opção, no. 22, September 23, 1976. Some attempts to study the Student Civic Service have already begun. see, for example, Ana Maria Bettencourt and M. Emília Brederode Santos, "O Serviço Cívico Estudantil: Proposta para uma Discussão", in o professor, April, 1983, no. 51.
114. Precisely those that we have tried to explicate in Chapter 3 and in this one.
115. see Appendix **IX** for a diagram of the Portuguese school system.
116. There is a distinction to be made between Civic Polytechnic Education and the Student Civic Service and the MFA Cultural 'Dynamization' Campaign. While the latter two were 'campaigns', and therefore mobilizing activities of relatively short duration, the former was not planned in this sense. It was designed to 'consolidate' over the long-term.
117. Rui Grácio, in O Jornal da Educação, May 1977, p. 9.
118. Recently a Doctoral thesis was completed on the sociology of

- the pedagogy of the revolutionary period in selected secondary schools. see Ana Maria Bettencourt (1983), "La Liaison Ecole - Milieu - Production: a l'école secondaire portugaise, 1975-76", Université de Paris V, Sorbonne, Doctorat 3eme Cycle.
119. see Eduardo Lourenço (1978), O Labirinto da Saudade, Lisbon: Publicações Dom Quixote.
120. Rui Grácio, 1977, op. cit., p. 9.
121. ibid.
122. This phrase is taken from the title of an article published by Rui Grácio in a daily newspaper (Diário de Lisboa, June 1979) (in Portuguese: 'Celebrar e Fazer a Pátria'). see R. Grácio, 1981, op. cit., Part I, Chapter 3.
123. ibid. The general direction of Grácio's analysis is in that of a national (i.e. nation-wide) collective effort. As we have seen, Alberto Melo's analysis has, on the contrary, insisted upon a local collective effort.
124. Eduardo Lourenço, 1977, op. cit., p. 12.
125. J.A. Saraiva and V.J. Silva, op. cit., pp. 123-7.
126. That is, for Saraiva and Silva, the weakness of the two dominant classes of Portuguese capitalism, the bourgeoisie (particularly entrepreneurial) and the proletariat. see O 25 de Abril..., op. cit.
127. ibid.
128. see João Abel Manta's depiction of this process in Appendix **VII**.
129. It is not by any means clear that all political groups sharing the 'poder popular' problematic, and putting it into action as a mobilizing current, were faithful to its central dynamic of 'autonomous popular initiative in the self-organization of

educational and cultural action'. Detailed research on the political groups of the period in terms of their political strategies, methods of organization, sources of funding, etc., would indeed be an interesting project.

130. One might like to say the same about the revolution as a whole. And in a recent work João Martins Pereira, in fact, does: 'Think what one may of the years 1974-75, no one can deny what was an historic period hugely "mobilizing of energies" and hugely "affirmative" (...). I predict that the compendiums of History of our grandchildren will devote more pages to those two years than to the 20 or 30 that followed (regardless of whether the period receives a positive or a negative assessment).' see J.M. Pereira (1983), No Reino dos Falsos Avestruzes, Lisbon: A Regra do Jogo, p. 31.

131. Which may also include rounding them out, filling them in, so that they may function better.