SHOULD REGULATORS BE MORE PROACTIVE ABOUT ENTRY? AN EVALUATION UNDER ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION

• Tipo: Artigo em Revista Científica Internacional
• Data: 2012

Autores

Paula Sarmento (Autor) FEP; António Brandão (Autor) FEP

Revista

Título: Hitotsubashi Journal of Economics

Vol. 53 Nº 1

Páginas: 71-84

ISSN: 0018-280X

Editora: Sanseido Publishing Company, Ltd.

Indexação

ISI Web of Knowledge - 0 Citações

ISI Web of Science

Scopus - 0 Citações

Classificação Científica

FOS: Ciências sociais > Outras ciências sociais

CORDIS: Ciências Sociais

Outras Informações

ID Authenticus: P-002-982

Abstract (EN): We compare the costs of two regulatory policies about the entry of new firms. We consider an incumbent firm that has more information about the market demand than the regulator and can use this advantage to persuade the regulator to make entry more difficult. With the first regulatory policy the regulator uses the incumbent price pre-regulation to get information about the demand. With the second regulatory policy the regulator designs a mechanism to motivate the incumbent firm to price truthfully. We conclude that for a wide range of situations, social welfare is strictly higher with the more active regulatory policy.

Idioma: Inglês

Tipo (Avaliação Docente): Científica

Nº de páginas: 14