Regulatory support of wind power producers against strategic and collusive behavior of conventional thermal units

• Tipo: Artigo em Livro de Atas de Conferência Internacional
• Data: 2016

Autores

Shafie Khah, M (Autor) Outra; Siano, P (Autor) Outra; Fitiwi, DZ (Autor) Outra; Santos, SF (Autor) Outra; Catalao, JPS (Autor) FEUP; Heydarian Forushani, E (Autor) Outra

Ata de Conferência Internacional

Título: International Conference on the European Energy Market, EEM

13th International Conference on the European Energy Market, EEM 2016

6 June 2016 through 9 June 2016

Indexação

Scopus - 3 Citações

Outras Informações

ID Authenticus: P-00K-T9T

DOI: 10.1109/eem.2016.7521224

Abstract (EN): Although wind power generation has extended a maturity in technology, there are still many concerns regarding the optimal support of regulatory bodies for renewable resources. In this context, the regulatory body should form a market structure or consider market rules and regulations to not only attract investors to renewable power plants, but also provide an efficient market that reflects a safe and clear competition environment. In this paper, an agent-based game-theoretic model is developed to investigate the electricity market behavior under oligopoly circumstances. The proposed model reveals the potential of collusive and strategic behavior of market participants. By employing the proposed model, impacts of different supportive schemes on the behavior of the wind power producer and conventional thermal units are investigated. According to the results obtained, if the regulatory bodies do not consider strategic collusion of market participants, adverse consequences for wind power producers might happen in the long-term horizon. © 2016 IEEE.

Idioma: Inglês

Tipo (Avaliação Docente): Científica